The war of Ngcayecibi, 1877-8 by Spicer, Michael Wolseley
THE WAR OF NGCAYECIBI 1877 - 8" 
Thesis 
Submitted in Fulfilment of the 
Requirements for the Degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS 
OF RHODES UNIVERSITY 
by 
MICHAEL WOLSELEY SPICER 
February 1978 
The candidate would like to express his 
appreciation to the Ernest Oppenheimer 
Memorial Trust whose scholarship for 1820 
Settler and Eastern Cape History has made 
this research possible. 
" 
'. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PREFACE 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
PROLOGUE: THE MAIN CHARACTERS 
I THE CISKEI AND TRANSKEI TO 1872 
II 1872-77: SARHILI AND THE GCALEKA FESIEGED 
It I AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 1877: THE GCALEKA 
DECIDE TO FIGHT 
IV SEPTEMBER TO NOVEMBER 1877: THE RETREAT 
AND RETURN OF THE GCALEKA 
V DECEMBER 1877 TO JUNE 1878: THE XHOSA 
DIVIDED AND DEFEATED 
VI GUNGUBELE, S I TOKHWE TYHALI AND TINI 
MAQOMO: CASE STUDIES IN RESISTANCE 
VII THE TRANSKEI 1878-81: SETTLEMENT AND 
UNSETTLEMENT 
CONCLUSION 
APPENDICES 
I REPORT ON FIELDWORK 
II XHOSA GENEALOGY 
BIBLI(x;RAPHY 
MAPS AND CARTOONS 
1~ So~th Eastern Africa 1877 
2. British Kaffraria after the Cattle Killing 
3. Southern Gcalekaland 
4. Eastward H"o! A Typical view of Sarhili 
5. The Perie Bush 
6. The Queenstown and Indwe District 
7. The Waterkloof, Schelmkloof and 
B linkwater area 
i 
iii 
iv 
1 
24 
68 
102 
144 
186 
214 
241 
249 
253 
254 
opp p. 2~ 'I 
opp p. 4 
opp p. 24!i 
opp p. 88 
opp p. I 84. 
opp p. 203 
opp p • .212 
i 
PREFACE 
This work makes no pretence at being a comprehensive account 
of th,e War of Ngcayecibi and its context in Cape and Imperial History. 
It omits all but passing reference to Imperial Policy, Frere's Federation 
plans, the Constitutional Crisis and the dismissal of the Molteno 
Ministry, all of which have been more than adequately covered elsewhere. 
Rather it concentrates on a study of the war in terms of black/white 
relations. The responses of the blacks to white pressures on their land 
and traditional society are examined, particularly those of Sarhili 
and the Gcaleka, for Sarhili, the gentlemanly but tragic Paramount 
Chief of the Xhosa, is the central figure in the canvas of black Ciskeian 
and Transkeian leaders of the time, and the War of Ngcayecibi is very 
much a Xhosa war. I have tried to avoid a conventional account of the 
military operations of the war, sketching only the broad outlines of 
.military operations and concentrating on the strategies adopted by 
black and white forces, and the reasons for which various black 
chiefdoms or segments thereof participated in the war. 
Orthography. The matter of orthography is a tricky one, for 
Xhosa orthography has been recently overhauled and is not yet finalised. 
I have attempted with the aid of Mr Sidney Zotwana of the Institute 
of Social and Economic Research at Rhodes University to adopt the most 
acceptable forms of Xhosa names. I have dropped the use of all prefixes 
since I felt their use wo;uld have been pedantic in what, after a11, is an 
English language thesis and since there is no' chance of confusion 
between historical figures like Gcaleka and the amaGcaleka people. 
Sources. The documents printed in Cape an~ Imperial Blue-Books, 
especially the Cape Blue-Books, on Native Affairs for the years 1874-1884, 
and the correspondence in the Native Affairs Archive in the Government 
Archives in Cape Town, proved to be the most valuable official and 
semi-official sources. The Merriman and Molteno Papers in the South 
African Library in Cape Town were the [i,ost useful private papers 
consulted,though odd items in the Cory Library, Rhodes University, 
Grahamstown, proved of use. 
The rash of memoirs published after the war were, with exceptions, 
singularly unilluminating. Most prominent amongst the exceptions was 
West W. Fynn: The :·'77 War ••• (East London, 1911), an account of the war 
written by the Clerk of the Resident to Sarhili. Although Fynn has a 
grudge against treatment he receiv.ed from the Colonial Government at 
the time, and is not above dramatising his role, he was in an 
unparalLe11ed position to observe the events leading up to the war 
and records much valuable information. 
The voluminous notebooks in Cory Library of the late Dr A.W. Burton, 
an amateur Border historian who had researched the war, were interesting 
but difficult to use because of an almost total lack of fo'otnoting 
or reference to sources. 
J.R. Soga's two works, The South Eastern Bantu (Johannesburg, 1930) 
and The Ama-Xosa: Life and Customs (Lovedale, 1931) are well known 
and proved useful but, as will be seen, have to be treated with care. 
Of more modern works, J. Peires: "A History of the Xhosa c.1700-1835" 
if 
(unp. M.A. thesis, Rhodes University, 1976) proved invaluable as a 
background to Xhosa society and earlier Xhosa history. The works of 
Christopher Saunders, who has written much on topics related to the war, 
were indispensable. C.J. Schoeman: "Die Negende Grensbotsing" 
(unp. M.A. thesis, University of Port Elizabeth, 1976), the one general 
study of the war thus far written, covers military operations at great 
length and is a work very much in the mould of traditional Afrikaner 
Frontier Historiography. 
Abbreviations. 
Col. Sec. 
D.S .A.B. 
S.N.A. 
Colonial Secretary 
Dictionary of South African Bibliography 
Secretary for Native Affairs 
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PROLOGUE: THE MAIN CHARACTERS. 
I have thought it useful here to summarise the relevant details 
about the main black and white protagonists. I have given the 
relevant D.S.A.B. reference as other sources are referred to in the 
text, except for Veldtman for whom there is not D.S.A.B. entry. There 
is a Xhosa genealogy in the Appendices for less important black figures 
not mentioned in the footnotes. 
THE BLACKS 
Maphasa (c.1835-1894) 
Not to be confused with Maphasa the Tshatshu Thembu chief. Son 
of Bhurhu, the Right Hand son of Khawuta. Maphasa was perhaps the 
second most important chief in Gcalekaland and head of the Tsonyana 
cl'an. The history of his opposition to Sarhili began when he 
refused to believe in the Cattle Killing and went into exile. . In 
1872 Maphasa again refused to support Sarhili, this time in his campaign 
against Ngangelizwe, and increasingly thereafter Maphasa advocated the 
reception of the Gcaleka under British rule, a step he anticipated 
would lead to independent status for himself and the Tsonyana. 
It was the Tsonyana who were involved in the beer-drink at Ngcayecibi's 
Kraal and who instigated much of the trouble that followed, but 
Maphasa refused to fight the whites and, looking for personal advantage, 
in an abrupt volte-face as the war broke out, he joined the colonists 
as an active ally. 
D.S.A.B., i, 503.;.4. 
Ngangelizwe (c.1840-1884) 
The eldest son of Mthikrakra and Paramount Chief of the Thembu. 
A man of unstable temperament, he wished to unite the fragmented 
Thembu Paramountcy, but this ambition brought him into conflict with 
Sarhili and the renascent Gcaleka power. Ngangelizwe's ill-treatment 
of two Gcaleka women, one Sarhili's daughter, provoked open confrontation 
with the Gcaleka and Ngangelizwe turned to the British to save him 
from abject defeat. On the reception of the Thembu as British subjects 
in 1875, he was deposed for his misdeeds, but was reinstated to his 
position in 1876 when the Thembu rallied to his cause. Thereafter he 
sought official favour by demonstrating undivided loyalty to the Colony, 
and thus committed the Thembu as active allies of the Colonists in the 
War of Ngcayecibi, despite Thembu discontent with British rule. 
D.S.A.B., ii,514-5 •. 
Sandile (1820-1878) 
Son of Ngqika and his great wife Sutu, Chief of the amaNgqika and 
Paramount Chief of the Rharhabe. A popular chief despite a certain cruel 
streak which might have been related to his physical disability (he had 
a withered leg from birth), Sandile has wrongly been accused of 
having a weak and vacillating character. His siding with the war 
party in the War of the Axe, the War of .M\anjeni and the War of 
Ngcayecibi was not the result of vacillation and weakness, but rather 
of a fervent nationalism, and a realisation that white rule would 
undermine not only his power but also traditional Xhosa society as 
a whole. Thus in 1877, although the most influential of his chiefs 
v 
and councillors advised against war, Sandile, encouraged by the young 
bloods, felt compelled to support the Paramountcy in its struggle as 
well as desiring to engage in one last attempt to throw off white rule. 
Defeated with Sarhili in open engagement with the whites, he retired 
to the Perie Bush area near King William's Town where, with other 
Rharhabe chiefs he had summoned to his aid, he conducted a desperate 
guerilla war of resistance. The war of attrition mounted against 
him sapped his force's strength and he was killed by a Mfengu patrol 
in May 1878. 
D.S.A.B., ii, 614-6'. 
Sarhili (Kreli) ( c.1814-1892) 
Great son of Hintsa, Chief of the amaGcaleka and Paramount 
Chief of all the Xhosa. A man respected and loved by his people 
and by those whites who knew him well, Sarhili was essentially a 
tragic figure. From the death of his father in 1835 at the hands 
of the colonists, Sarhili fought a lOSing battle with expanding 
white rule. A consummate diplomatist and ardent nationalist, 
Sarhili sought to maintain Gcaleka independence without ever 
directly clashing with the whites, but indirect Gcaleka aid to the 
Ngqika in the 1846 and 1851 wars resulted in the white invasion of 
Gcalekaland and the .seizure of thousands of Gcaleka cattle. 
Sarhili fostered the ,..GatfleKilling, almost certainly in a genuine 
belief in the prophecies of Mhlakaza and Nonqawuse, but this 
action sealed his fate as the villain of the frontier in white eyes. 
He was driven from Gcalekaland into exile across the Mbashe and 
when he was allowed back to part of his land in 1865, it was to 
find himself face to face with the indignity of the Mfengu settled 
on his former land. The Colonial Authorities, afraid of Sarhili's 
influence and potential power, thenceforth consciously discriminated 
against him and the Gcaleka in their dealings with the other 
Transkeian chiefdoms, and a quarrel with the Thembu hastened 
Colonial expansion into the Transkeian Territories and brought 
yet another Gcaleka opponent under British protection. 
Overcrowding and the slow constriction of Gcaleka independence 
drove the Gcaleka into a corner, and when a quarrel broke out 
with the Mfengu in 1877 Sarhili, despite the sure knowledge that 
the Gcaleka would be defeated and dispersed, decided under pressure 
from his councillors and chiefs to fight the Mfengu and their allies, 
the whites. Sarhili tried to unite the Xhosa in a common struggle, 
but after crushing defeats at the two major pitched battles of the 
war, he gave up the struggle and went into exile in Pondoland and 
later Bomvanaland. 
D.S.A.B., i, 686-8. 
Veldtman Bikitsha (c.1822-1910) 
By birth a petty chief of the Zizi clan, he had fought with 
distinction under Sir Walter Currie in the wars of 1846 and 1851. 
As the most important Mfengu leader and living on the Gcaleka 
boundary, he was the focal point of Gcaleka hostility and his location 
was particularly threatened by'the Gcaleka in August and ,Sept,ember 
1877. Successfully pleading for white support then , he rallied 
the Transkeian Mfengu to the Mfengu Levies during the war and was 
the only Mfengu to hold a commission. 
J. Ayliff and J. Whiteside: A History of the Abambo ••• (Butterworth, 1912) 
/ 
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THE WHITES 
Charles Pacalt Brownlee (1821-1890) 
Eldest son of the famous missionary John Brownlee, Brownlee 
was for twenty years Assistant Commissioner and Commissioner to the 
Ngqika. Brownlee had an unrivalled knowledge of the Xhosa language 
and Xhosa history, customs and traditions. While sympathetic to his 
charges, Brownlee had many of the shortcomings of a Victorian 
missionary upbringing. In 1872 he was a popular choice as the first 
incumbent of the newly created Secretaryship of Native Affairs. 
His policy was one ,of the gradual undermining of traditional society 
and the extension of British rule in what he saw as the Cape's 
"civilising mission". Although an able administrator, Brownlee 
was desperately short-staffed and short-funded and his administration 
suffered as a result. Summoned to the frontier as the threat of 
confrontation between Gcaleka and Mfengu grew, Brownlee, while 
not underestimating the severity of the situation as his colleagues 
did, contributed to black and white panic by making his views public. 
He mishandled the disarmament of Maphasa andiMakinana, the minor 
Ndlambe chief, and this error of judgement contributed to the 
eventual rebellion of the Ngiqa. He was severely criticised by 
both Frere and Merriman for his loose tongue and bumbling actions, 
and Frere was in some senses correct when he said Brownlee would 
have been better suited as an Under Secretary of Native Affairs 
in Cape Town. NeVertheless, it must be said in Brownlee's favour 
that he had opposed the disarmament of Maphasa and Makinana as 
inopportune (as he later privately opposed Sprigg's disarmament 
policy), and the system of registration he divised for the Ngqika 
wh9' did not fight, encouraged the division of that people and did 
much to ensure that greater resistance was not faced by the colonists. 
D.S.A.B., i, 126-9. 
Sir Henry Bartle Edward Frere (1815-1884) 
After a highly successful career in India, Frere accepted the 
position of Governor of the Cape Colony in 1876 because he was 
attracted by the special mission with which Lord Carnarvon wished 
to charge him; 'that of federating the South African states. 
Frere arrived in March 1877 and was on his way to the recently 
annexed Transvaal in August 1877 when the Gcaleka-Mfengu quarrel 
broke out. He set up headquarters at King William's Town with 
Merriman, Brownlee and Cunynghame with wham he held a daily council 
to direct the colonial war effort. By a firm, but diplomatic, 
policy, Frere did his utmost to calm colonial panic, arbitrate 
between the dispu-tants and prevent a War which he felt would be both 
unnp.cessary and a hindrance to his mission. Only later in the war 
did he 'foresee that the war could in fact be used to further 
his Federation plans. In the meanth,e, he consist ently moderated 
the hasty and often ill-judged policies and plans of his advisers, 
but was driven to dismiss the Molteno Ministry both because it had 
adopted a strategy which made no sense militarily and economically 
and because ' Molteno stood in the way of the realisation of his 
Federation Plans. 
D.S.A.B., ii, 243-6. 
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John Xavier Merriman (1841-1926 ) 
Cape Parliamentarian and Commissioner of Crown Lands and Public 
Works in the Molteno Ministry. A commanding personality with erratic 
views, Merriman was on the frontier with Frere at the outbreak of the 
war and became a sort of Minister of War. At first inclined to co-operate 
with Frere, he came to share Molteno's views on Imperial interference 
and incompetence, while becoming overconfident of the ability of 
colonial troops to deal with what was an extremely delicate situation. 
In January 1878 after Molteno's quarrel with Frere and Carnarvon, he 
took over almost single-handed the conduct of the war. Despite his 
great ability, Merriman made serious errom of judgement and must share 
the responsibility for sending many colonial blacks into revolt. 
D.S.A.B., ii, 463-9. 
Sir John Charles Molteno (1814-1886) 
The ardent champion of Responsible Government and first Prime 
Minister under it. As a Commandant in the Burgher forces in 1846, 
Molteno became convinced that the regular British army was 
incompetant under South African conditions. During his Office, 
Molteno became increasingly hostile to imperial intentions in 
South Africa, and during the War of Ngcayecibi, he clashed with 
Frere over the employment of Imperial Troops and Imperial Command 
of colonial troops in what he regarded as an essentially colonial 
police action. The result was the unprecedented dismissal of 
his Ministry in February 1878. 
D.S .A.B. , ii, 482-5. 
Sir John Gordon Sprigg (1830-1913 ) 
H.L'.A.~ for 'East London a progressive:farmer bf ,the Komgha 
District,· Sprigg was an unimaginative man represen,ting many of the 
attitudes and prejudices of the frontier colonists. On the 
dismissal of the Molteno Ministry, Frere chose Sprigg,who had converted 
to Federalism,to head the new Ministry. Sprigg embarked on a harsh 
settlement policy involving the absolute crushing of all black 
resistance, the confiscation of lands, the disarmament of all blacks 
and the rapid extension of British rule in the Transkeian Territories. 
This policy, while effectually crushing Xhosa power for ever, 
encouraged resistance by other chiefdoms and was responsible for the 
Basutoland Gun War of 1880 and the Transkeian Rebellion of the same 
year. 
D.S.A.B., ii, 698-700. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE CISKEI AND TRANSKEI TO 1872 
The idea of interaction is now commonly used as a useful tool to 
explain the history of relations between black and white on the Eastern 
. 1 Cape Frontl.er. Although interaction took place on many levels, the 
dominant feature was the competition between the two pastoral peoples 
over the scarce resources of land, water, and cattle. Black and white 
were thereby drawn into a century of conflict, by the end of which the 
militarily stronger whites subjected the blacks and incorporated them 
f . . 2 into aspects 0 thel.r socl.ety. As an introduction to the study of 
why, how and with what results the Xhosa and the whites fought for the 
last time on the Eastern Cape Frontier, it is intended here merely to 
survey briefly the history of the Ciskei and Transkeian Territories 
from the time of the Cattle Killing. 
1. The Ciskei to 1872 
Before the arrival of Sir George Grey as Governor of the Cape in 
1854, successive Governors had grappled with the chiefdoms beyond the 
frontier in order to maintain the security of the Colony. A large 
I have used the word Transkei in the title for brevity. 
There was no unified Transkei at the time, only a group of chiefdoms, 
some in various stages of colonial rule,and these are 
properly referred to as the Transkeian Territories. 
1. Monica Wilson's chapter "Co-operation and Conflict: The Eastern 
Cape Frontier" in 1. Thompson and M. Wi lson (ed.): The Oxford 
History of South Africa I (Oxford, 1969), pp.233-27l, is 
illuminating in this respect. 
2. C. Saunders: tIThe Hundred Years War: Some Reflections on African 
Resistance on the Cape Eastern Frontier" (Unp. paper in Jagger 
Library, University of Cap0 Town) suggests the essential unity 
of Xhosa resistance over the period. 
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colonial black population (apart from the Mfengu) only came into 
existence after Governor Sir Harry Smith at the end of the War of the 
Axe in 1847 proclaimed the Keiskamma River as the boundary of the Colony, 
and the area between that river and the Kei as the Crown Colony of 
British Kaffraria. 3 Within three years, the Rharhabe Xhosa had risen 
against Smith's direct assault on their traditional society and 
gove rnmen t . Smith~ successo~ Cathcart, intended to segregate the 
colonial blacks, and control but not govern them by military means. 
To this end, the Xhosa and their allies were deprived of further land; 
the Amatolas from which the Xhosa had been expelled, were settled by 
Mfengu and military villages, and white settlements were placed on 
confiscated Ngqika, Khoi and Thembu land. 4 
Grey, fresh from his New Zealand success, planned a thoroughgoing 
integration of black and white in British Kaffraria, and the eventual 
extension of this system up to the Natal Border. He aimed to keep a 
firm military grip on British Kaffraria by maintaining the presence of 
troops, settling pensioners, building strategic roads and exercising 
personal diplomacy. The chiefs were thereby to be weaned from war, 
and the way opened for a removal of their power and the introduction of 
simple civil institutions. The latter were to be based on resident 
magistrates, salaries for the chiefs and a "suitable" code of laws 
replacing tribal custom. The absorbtion of blacks into the whi te 
3. T.R.H. Davenport: South Africa: a Modern History (London, 1977). 
The Rharhabe Xhosa were the descendents of Rharhabe, the brother 
to the Xhosa Paramount Gca1eka, who in the second half of the 
18th century was defeated by Gca1eka in a struggle for power and 
who consequently retired across the Kei. J. Peires: "A History 
of the Xhosa c.l700-1835" (Unp. M.A. thesis, Rhodes University, 
1976), pp.86-90. 
4. Davenport, pp.lOO-l. 
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policy was to be facilitated by the establishment of Christian missions, 
schools and hospitals, as well as through the introduction of the black 
man to the civilising influence of regular labour on the farms of white 
settlers and on public works. 5 
Grey's policy, as well as being arbitrary and precipitate, was based 
on a total misunderstanding of tribal custom and ignorance of the reality 
of the land situation (though, of course, he was hardly an exception here). 
He facilely assumed that the blacks would welcome the magistrates, 
and the chiefs submit to the loss of their power when evidence to the 
contrary was so freshly available. Then Grey's plans to settle 
pensioners in British Kaffraria was absurd. In 1855 the average 
population of British Kaffraria was 33 people per square mile, but in 
the black areas it was much higher, reaching 83 per square mile in the 
Ngqika location. It has been calculated that in the 1850's the land in 
British Kaffraria could be expected to support a density of 12 people 
to the square mile. Yet Grey planned to import 5000 pensioners and 
settle them on 1 acre lots. Since these lots were not agriculturally 
viable at least 1500-2000 large farms would have to be established to 
provide work for the pensioners and the expected 20,000 dependents they 
would bring with them. 6 
Grey was saved from the fruits of his ignorance by the Cattle 
Killing, the millenarian response of the blacks to the pressures exerted 
7 
on them by the whites. The black population of British Kaffraria was 
reduced in round figures from 104,000 to 37,000, it being estimated that 
5. J. Rutherford: Sir George Grey (London, 1961), p.304. 
6. Ibid., pp.327-8, 437-38. 
7. See below, pp.7-8. 
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8 20,000 died and a further 33,000 sought relief in the Colony. 
with the frontier chiefdoms shattered, and with an excuse for a military 
solution to the problems presented by his plans, Grey could move ahead. 
Many of the chiefs who had participated in the Cattle Killing 
9 
were arrested and part of their lands were confiscated, providing room 
for the establishment of military villages for the 2400 members of the 
German Legion who had arrived in the Cape in January 1857. The villages 
were duly established on the East London-Queenstown axis. Some land 
was sold to Mfengu. Direct rule was implemented with the importation 
of magistrates, paid headmen, a 10 shilling annual family tax and stock 
10 taxes. 
Those chiefs who had not joined in the Cattle Killing movement like 
Siwani, the Mdushane chief and Kama, the Christian Gqunukhwebe chief, 
were induced to accept the system by large personal land grants over 
and above their salaries. Attempts were made to introduce individual 
tenure, but the blacks displaying their constant suspicion of and 
hostility to white ideas and institutions, resisted the idea and so the 
1 f 11 . h . 11 pans e away Wlt tlme. 
Native Policy, remained static during Wodehouse'$ administration 
at the Cape; what attention was placed on black-white relations was 
almost exclusively focussed on the Transkeian Territories. The 
Grey system of "civilisation" was continued more in theory than in 
practice, for the decade of economic depression at the Cape coincided 
8. M. Wilson in Oxford History, i, 258. 
9. Amongst these were Maqomo,the valiant Ngqika warrior chief, Phato 
the Gqunukhwebe chief and his son Delima, and Mha1a, the Ndlambe chief. 
Rutherford, pp.379-81. 
10. Ibid., pp.379-8l and map opp. p.35l. 
11. Ibid., p.380. 
A.E. du Toit: The Cape Frontier: A study of native policy with 
special reference to the years 1847-1866 (Archives Year "Book, t-, 
1954), pp.265-8. 
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with Wodehouse's stay,and Imperial Government financial assistance for 
the system had dried up with Colonial Office disenchantment with 
12 Grey. 
Apart from Grey's lead, the subjugation of the blacks of the Colony 
and of British Kaffraria, and growing shortages of land and labour made it 
natural that the focus of black-white relations should turn to the area 
beyond the Kei. There the turbulent relations between the various black 
chiefdoms seemed to whites to threaten the safety of the frontier and 
so require their interference. 
2. The Transkeian Territories to 1872 
a) The Kei-Mhashe area 
Up to the Cattle Killing, the Kei-Mhashe area was the territory of 
the senior Xhosa chiefdom, the Gca1eka. The Cattle Killing and the white 
intervention that followed brought a radical change ·in the demographic 
pattern of the area, but the leading role played by Sarhi1i and the 
Gca1eka ~n the Cattle Killing was largely consequent on previous white 
. " h 13 ~ntervent~on ~n t e area. 
In 1835 D'Urban had believed that Hintsa, the Gcaleka Paramount 
Chief and Paramount of the Xhosa nation had instigated the war and 
safeguarded the cattle of the Colonial Xhosa combatants. Sir Harry 
Smith therefore invaded Hintsa's territory to punish him. Hintsa 
voluntarily surrendered himself to Smith and endured a period of captivity, 
12. Ibid., pp.179-l91. 
R.F.J. Gruber: "John X. Merriman, the making of a South African 
Statesman 1869-1878" (Unp. H.A. thesis, Rhodes University, 1961), 
pp.64-70, vividly sketches the economic climate of the Cape in 
the 60's. 
13. I am especially indebted to C. Saunders: lithe Annexation of the 
Transkeian Territories 1872-1895, with special reference to 
British and Cape po1icy" (Unp. D.Phil. thesis, Oxford, 1972), 
pp.35-85, for my account of the Transkeian Territories to 1872. 
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but on being forced to accompany Smith to collect the fine of cattle and 
other stock demanded of him, he attempted to escape. He was shot dead 
and his body was mutilated by colonial volunteers accompanying Smith. 14 
• 15 Since according to Xhosa custom, the person of a ch1ef was sacrosanct, 
such an event would have been cause for coneern if only a minor chief 
had been killed. But for the Paramount Chief to be run down, killed and 
mutilated, and that by white "commoners", was an enormity for which 
many Gcaleka never forgave the whites. Certainly Hintsa's great son 
and heir Sarhili, who was a witness to the event, was deeply influenced 
by it in all his dealings with whites, of whom he henceforth, while 
. ... f dl .. 16 ma~nta1n1ng str1ct courtesy, was pro oun y SUSP1C10US. 
Another action of D'Urban's was to have even more profound 
consequences for all the peoples of the Frontier. The Mfengu, refugees 
from the Mfecane who had sought refuge with the Gcaleka, now claimed that 
they were being mistreated by them, though the truth is probably that 
they were not achieving sufficient advancement amongst the Gcaleka for 
h · b" 17 t e1r am 1t1ons. The missionary John Ayliff, who was stationed at 
Butterworth in Gcalekaland, urged the Mfengu to seek British protection. 
D'Urban saw an opportunity of using the Mfengu as a buffer people who 
might aid and protect the colonists in any future wars. He therefore 
14. Ibid., p.36. 
15. Peires points to the sanctity of the chief's person in Xhosa society 
and cites the wounding of Xhoxho in the head and the consequent 
provocation of war in 1834-5 as an example of what might be termed, 
pace Campbell, 'culture conflict.' Peires, pp.2ll-l3. 
16. For evidence of Sarhili's SUsp1C10n of the whites, one has only to 
look at his behaviour prior to and during the War of Ngcayecibi. 
17. This is Moyer's thesis. R. Moyer: "A History of the Mfengu of 
the Eastern Cape l81S-l86S"(Unp. Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 
1976), p.ll. 
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arranged for their removal to the Peddie area. In 1835 17,000 Mfengu 
moved there from Gcalekaland, taking with them large herds of cattle which 
18 the Gcaleka claimed did not belong to them. The Gcaleka viewed the 
Mfengu move as treacherous and dishonest. As the Mfengu came to 
collaborate more and more openly with the whites and prospered under 
their patronage, relations between the Gcaleka and the Mfengu grew 
" "1 b" 19 ~ncreas~ng y ~tter. 
Again in both the War of the Axe and the Mlanjeni War, Sarhili's 
suspected implication in, and even instigation o~events in the Colony 
was the occasion for two punitive expeditions in which large numbers of 
20 
stock were captured. But Hintsa's policy, which Sarhili continued, 
was to avoid all direct entanglements with the whites because of their 
military superiorityJand so Gcaleka involvement in these wars was 
limited to indirect assistance of the combatant Rharhabe, as blood ties 
demanded. 21 
In 1856-7 Grey was convinced that Sarhili, perhaps in conjunction 
with Mshweshwe, the Basotho Chief, was promoting the Cattle Killing as a 
f " k h h h" 22 means to orc~ng a desperate attac by t e Xhosa on t e w ~tes. 
Most modern authorities agree that the evidence does not support such a 
"plot" theory. On the contrary it seems that Sarhili firmly believed 
18. J. Ayliff and J. Whiteside: History of the Abambo, generally 
known as the Finso (Butterworth, 1912), pp.20ff. 
19. Peires, pp.198-202. 
20. Saunders," Annexat ion", pp. 37-8. 
21. Interview with Mr N.C. Me lane , Qwaninga Location, Wi1lowva1e 
District, 14 Sept., 1977. 
Interview with Chief S.M. Burns-Ncamashe, Rhodes University, . 
1 Nov. 1977. 
22. Rutherford, pp.348-359. 
8 
THE CISKEI AND TRANSKEI TO 1872 
23 the prophecies of Mhlakaza and Nonqawuse. Ironically blacks came to 
hold, and still do today, the theory that Grey and the whites were 
responsible for the Cattle Killing. But there is no evidence to support 
h . 24 suc a View. 
With a firm belief in Sarhili's guilt, Grey in February 1858 
ordered Sir Walter Currie to capture him or drive him so far away as 
to be never heard of again. Currie carried out a filibustering 
campaign with gusto and by the end of the month, Sarhili had been driven 
across the Mbashe, and Currie had swept Gcalekaland, burning, destroying 
and clearing the country.25 
Grey had in mind to extend the British Kaffraria system in the Kei-
Mbashe area, as we have seen. Before leaving South Africa he only 
managed to establish the Idutywa Reserve. Wodehouse continued Grey's 
plans, but after gaining the Imperial Government's 0 permission to 
proclaim British Sovereignty over the area, Wodehouse was faced with 
Colonial unwillingness to defend it despite the Legislative Council's 
recommendation that British authority be declared between the Kei and Natal 
for the purpose of frontier security. Meanwhile, Currie had been 
negotiating with Sarhili on behalf of Grey, to try and persuade him to 
accept land on the Mthatha and so release further land for colonisation, 
but Sarhili was determined to regain his former territory and so after 
some manoeuvring for advantage, he refused to move. In May 1864 
23. Monica Wilson in Oxford History, i, 359-360 discusses the question 
at length and cites numerous sources to support her contention 
that the Cattle Killing was a millenarian movement and not a plot 
hatched by Sarhili. Rutherford, p.286, agrees that Sarhili 
almost certainly genuinly believed the prophecies. 
24. Saunders, "Annexation", p.39. 
25. Rutherford, 387-8. 
Major D.B. Hook: With Sword and Statute (on the Cape of Good Hope 
Frontier) (Cape Town, etc., n.d.), pp.68-9. 
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it was reported that Sarhili was about to cross the Mbashe to reclaim his 
territory, but it seems almost certain that this was a report engineered 
by Currie to enable him to drive Sarhili beyond the Mthatha and so clear 
the way for white settlement. 26 
When it became clear that the Colony would not defend the area if 
British authority was extended over it, and the Imperial Cabinet thought 
that such a move would require extra defence, plans for both white 
settlement and the assumption of British authority were scrapped. The 
, f B . , h K ff' d d' d' 27 secur1ty 0 r1t1s a rar1a was not eeme to requ1re extra spen 1ng. 
Thus Wodehouse refused·to sanction Currie's desire for a punitive 
expedition,and decided to settle Sarhili on the coastal section of his 
former territory to appease him and prevent further trouble from that 
28 
source. In any case there was the chance of swopping land belonging 
to Colonial blacks for the rest of Gcalekaland, ~d so releasing land 
for white farms within the Colony. In the Northern section, Wodehouse 
had already intended to settle the Colonial Thembu from the Glen Grey 
area. That left the central section and this Wodehouse first offered to 
the Ngqika, but they refused, wishing neither to lose their de facto 
independence from Sarhili, nor to upset him by settling on former 
territory of his. 29 Wodehouse turned to the Mfengu who had become 
restless in their overcrowded locations in the Colony. Wodehouse 
believed that his settlement plan would create a balance of power in the 
area and prevent war. The Mfengu would,because of their numbers,be a 
26. Du Toit, pp.179-l95. 
Saunders, "Annexation", pp.4l-6. 
27. Ibid., pp.46-7. 
28. Ibid. 
29. Du Toit, p .211. 
10 
THE CISKEI AND TRANSKEI TO 1872 
counterweight to the Gca1eka and a useful buffer between the Gca1eka 
and Ngqika. 30 The plan was strongly criticized by many, particularly 
because of the long-standing hostility between Gca1eka and Mfengu. 
Charles Brownlee, longtime Commissioner to the Ngqika, asserted that 
a high spirited race like the Kafirs is not 
likely to sit quietly without a final effort to 
" "d d 31 recover 1tS 1n epen ence. 
But the plan catered for such an eventuality. As a colonial official 
argued, the Government should 
keep up until a fitting time, without actually 
causing a rupture, the old animosity between 
Kafir and Fingoe, and this has been effectively 
done by the latter being put in possession of 
the country that was formerly "Rhi1i' s" •..• 
for many years the KaHrs will require "a 
watchful po1icy,and if they are to fight, it 
is better that they should do so with the 
"f" 32 F1ugO 1rst ••• 
The Mfengu had been advised by their missionary Richard Ross only 
to accept the offer of the land if they went as British subjects under a 
government official who was an accredited magistrate, and with title 
to the land. Currie who arranged the move accepted these conditions 
and Wodehouse assured them that they would "continue British subjects 
and receive support and <l:ssistance so long as they proved themselves 
deserving. ,,33 Reassured, by the end of 1865 almost 40,000 Mfengu had 
30. Saunders, "Annexation", pp.48-9. 
31. C.O. 3122: Brownlee to Colonial Secretary, 2 Nov. '67, quoted in 
Saunders, "Annexation", p.49. 
32. C.O. 3122: A. Bisset to Colonial Secretary, 23 Oct. '67, quoted 
in Saunders, "Annexation", p.Sl. 
33. A.14-'67, p.6: Wodehouse to Civil Commissioner, Grahamstown, tel., 
2S July '65, quoted in Saunders,"Annexation", p.52. 
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moved into what became known as Fingoland. Although there was no legal 
basis to the continuance of the alliance between Mfengu and Colony, there 
was a strong mutual acceptance of this that made more formal ties between 
Fingo1and and the Colony inevitable. 34 
In September and October 1864, Sarhili and his people reoccupied his 
former territory. Sarhi1i was to be paid an allowance of £100 per annum 
and both this and his occupation of his former territory were made 
d ·· 1 ., d ., 35 con 1t10na to h1s goo behav10ur • Nevertheless, the missionary 
J.C. Warner who was sent to arrange the move, encouraged Sarhili to hope 
for more land by saying: 'Kreli, you have got the calf, the cow will 
no doubt fo110w,.36 
The removal of the Colonial Thembu became an extremely involved 
issue. Intra-tribal jealousies, as well as careful calculation ensured 
that only a portion of the people moved, despite tqe threat that they 
would have to endure strict colonial control. The Colonial Authorities 
were compelled to allow those remaining to retain the whole Colonial 
Location. Mathanzima, Ndarha1a, Gecelo and Sitokhwe Ndlela were 
assigned separate locations in what became known as Emigrant Thembuland. 
These they occupied on the promise of the ro10nia1 authorities that they 
might rule their people as independent chiefs. 37 
34. Du Toit, p.216. 
Saunders, "Annexation", p.54. 
35. Du Toit, pp.192, 223. 
36. G.H. 8/48: W.R.D. Fynn to Bowker, 7 May '71. 
37. A.E. Du Toit, pp.208-224. 
H.A. Averill: "Conflict and Confrontation: A study of Colonial 
Pressure on native lands on the eastern frontier of the Cape Colony 
1874-1883" (Unp. M.A. thesis, Queens University, 1971), pp.28-31. 
Mathanzima was the right hand son of Mthikrakra and a chief 
therefore of considerable importance. Ndarhala was chief of the 
Ndungwana clan and a distant relative of Ngange1izwe. Gecelo was 
regent of the non-Thembu Gcina and Sitokhwe was chief of the colonial 
branch of the Qwathi,and therefore also a non-Thembu. All 
four moved so as to escape the crowded conditions of the Colonial 
Location, obtain land and independence. Averill, p.30, footnote 5. 
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To the colonist's chagrin therefore, no land at all became 
available for white settlement,either in the Kei-Mbashe area, or in the 
Colony. But the seeds of future unrest had been firmly sown, for the 
Colonial Thembu, particularly the Tshatshu of Gungubele, who had always 
maintained a close alliance with the Ngqika,38 bridled at the implementation 
of greater Colonial control, especially when they saw their close relatives 
across the Indwe River in Emigrant Thembuland completely independent. 39 
b) The Mbashe-Mthatha area 
The area between the Mbashe and the Mthatha Rivers was occupied by 
the Hala Thembu,the main branch of this the senior Southern Nguni 
people. The Thembu as a whole had suffered severely in the 1820's 
because of the Mfecane and had assisted Col. Henry Somerset in his famous 
commando against the marauding Ngwane of Matiwane in 1828. Because they 
were not brought directly into contact with the whites and because of 
their early history of co-operation, they were regarded as friendly by 
the Colony. The majority of the tribe did not participate in the 
Cattle Killing and Sarhi1i's banishment once again impressed them with 
the power of the whites. Thus in 1862, Joyi,the Thembu Regent, turned 
to the whites for help against the Gcaleka, whose presence across the 
Mbashe had intensified the long-standing conflict between the two 
peoples, and asked like Mshweshwe to come under British protection. 
40 This was not granted. 
38. Interview with Chief S.M. Burns-Ncamashe, Rhodes University, 
1 November 1977. 
39. M.S. Griffiths: 
and in Glen Grey 
of South Africa, 
"The Development 
between 1870 and 
1939), pp.43-4. 
40. Saunders, "Annexation", pp.56-7. 
of Native Policy in the Transkei 
1900" (Unp. M.A. thesis, University 
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Ngangelizwe, Mthikrakra's heir, came of age in 1863. He planned 
to restore the Thembu empire so that it stretched from the sea to Glen 
41 Grey, but he had neither the means nor the temperament to be successful. 
The Bomvana under Moni lived on the seaward portion of land between the 
two rivers. Moni acknowledged the subject status of his people to 
Sarhili for the refuge granted by the Gcaleka earlier in the century to 
42 his grandfather Gambushe. Then the Emigrant Thembu under the four 
chiefs Mathanzima, Ndarhala, Gecelo and Sitokhwe intended to rule as 
independent chiefs acknowledging only the nominal Paramountcy of 
Ngangelizwe. Finally living within the main section of Thembuland 
next to Emigrant Thembuland, were two non-Thembu clans, the Qwathi 
under the determined Dalasile, the second most powerful chief in 
Thembuland after Ngangelizwe, and the Vundhle under Sitokhwe Tyhali a minor 
but turbulent chief who lived beneath the Drakensberg near Maxongo's 
43 Hoek. Despite the fragmented nature of the Paramountcy, events were 
to show that the Paramount could still command considerable loyalty 
in a crisis. 
But while Ngangelizwe was attempting to extend his influence, 
Sarhi1i was seeking to recover his former lands and power. Hence the 
rivalry between the Thembu and Gca1eka continued at increased tempo 
with continuous thieving and raiding. The central focus of the dispute 
was Bomvanaland which both chiefs sought to bring more effectively under 
their control. Caught between the two feuding peoples the Idutywa 
41. Ibid., p.57. 
Averill, pp.28-29. 
42. G.M. Theal: A History of South Africa, X, (Struik facsimile, 
Cape Town, 1964), p.145. 
43. J.W. Macquarrie (ed.): The Reminiscences of Sir Walter Stanford, 
Volume 1 1850-1885 (Cape Town, 1958), pp.52, 57. 
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Reserve with its polyglot population, became a hot-bed of intrigue and a 
highway for thieves, which its rather ineffectual magistrate sought vainly 
to control. 't-~ 
c) The Mthatha-Mzimkhulu area 
The Mpondo people being closest to the Zulu, suffered the most 
during the Mfecane. With the establishment of the Trekker Republic 
came a second threat, which was however neutralised by the extension of 
Cape protection over the Mpondo followed by the annexation of Natal. 
But the Cape went further, and in 1844 drew up a treaty with Faku, the 
Mpondo Paramount, which aimed at ensuring frontier stability by setting 
up Faku as a policeman for the whole of the Northern Transkeian Territories. 
In return, Faku received prestige, a subsidy and recognition to his claim 
of territory from the Mzimkhulu to the Mthatha and from the sea to the 
Drakensberg. Under this arrangement, a number of tribes of which the 
Mpondomise (headed by the two feuding chiefs Mditshwa and ~fulontlo), 
the Bhaca and the Xesibe were the most important, were included in his 
territory . These tribes had sought protection from the Mpondo during 
the Mfecane, but once the danger was over, they began to seek to assert 
h · . d d 45 t e~r ~n epen ence. 
In his attempt to extend the Cape's borders to Natal and impose his 
civilising regime over the Transkeian Territories, Grey turned his 
attention to a large, almost unpopulated area of Faku's territory which 
was not really under his control. Grey saw this 'Nomansland' as it came 
to be called as a convenient area to move peoples being challenged 
elsewhere, exert influence and prepare the way for formal British control. 
44. Saunders, "Annexation", p.57. 
45. Ibid, pp.58-60. 
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Grey told Nehemiah~Mshweshwe,who had been displaced by the first 
Basotho War of 1858, that he might settle in Nomansland subject to 
Faku's approval. Nehemiah moved in 1859 and in 1861 MShweshwe persuaded 
Faku to agree to the cession of the area between the Bhaca in the East 
d h d "" h S h h" K" d 46 an t e Mpon omlse ln t e out to 1S lng om. 
In the meantime Grey had changed his mind about the future of 
the area and now proposed to settle Adam Kok's Griqua who were being 
dispossessed of their land round Philippolis. Wodehouse, who took over 
the problem from Grey, saw it was impossible to move Nehemiah and therefore 
limited his territory to that west of the upper Mzimvubu and placed the 
Griqua in the area bounded by the Drakensberg, Hzimvubu and Ingela 
47 
mountains, where by early 1863,3000 had settled. 
By now the Mpondo felt that British protection involved more than 
they had bargained for and, protesting (in vain) against the territorial 
changes already made, refused to sanction any further ones. Mqike1a 
who succeeded Faku in 1867, adopted a hard line and stood firm against 
all attempts to interfere in any way with ',," territory. But Mqikela's 
position was weakened by the fact that Ndamas, Faku's eldest and 
favourite son had been granted a measure of autonomy in Western Pondoland 
by his father and was more amenable to co-operation with the British, a 
48 policy which his Son Nqwiliso sought to further. 
The attempts of the Griqua to set themselves up as a ruling class 
ln the Northern Transkei prompted missionaries in the area to urge the 
Colony to exercise effective control over the area,and their charges to ask 
46. Ibid, pp.62-3. 
47. Ibid, pp.64-67. 
For the move and details of Griqua rule, see Averill, pp.56-83. 
48. Saunders, "Annexation", pp.70-72. 
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, , ,49 for Br1t1sh protect10n. In the Cape 1860's this was not the only 
inducement for the extension of Cape rule. There was growing instability 
over the whole Transkeian Territory, with the Mpondomise feud, rivalry 
between Sarhili and Ngangelizwe and a less pliant Mqikela, and as a result 
Cape officials pushed for an extension of Colonial rule as a solution to 
the instability which they felt threatened the frontier. 50 
Governor Sir Henry Barkly approved such a direction as long as it 
was slow and peaceable. If the power of the chiefs was to be successfully 
undermined, civilisation promoted and warlike tribes kept apart, as Cape 
Native Policy aimed to do, he felt that the old chiefs should be allowed 
to die out. In 1872, prompted by the instability caused by the Griqua, 
Barkly appointed a Commission of Enquiry into the Northern Transkeian 
Territories, which recommended that British magistrates be appointed 
1n Nomansland as a step towards annexation to Natal. Barkly decided 
, f I' h R 'bl Go ,,51 to wa1t, ee 1ng t at espons1 e vernment was 1mm1nent. 
In the Colony it was generally felt that withdrawal from the 
Transkeian Territories would be the worst possible alternative, risking 
white prestige and even the whole white position. Since Britain was 
reluctant to assume extra responsibilities, the Cape would have to do 
so, and with the return of prosperity in the 70's, would be able to do so. 
Nevertheless, as Barkly foresaw, it would still need to be a cautious 
forward movement chiefly because the major motive of such a move was 
the preservation of frontier stability. 
the policy would be counter-productive. 52 
49. Ibid., pp.72-5. 
If resistance was provoked 
50. W.B. Campbell: The South African Frontier 1865-1885: a study in 
expansion (Archives Year Book, 1, 1959), pp.9l-6. 
51. Saunders, "Annexation", pp. 76-85. 
52. Ibid, pp.97-l00. 
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3. Charles Brownlee and Native Policy under Responsible Government 
Under Responsible Government,fina1ly achieved in 1872, a separate 
Department of Native Affairs was created headed by a Minister designated 
the Secretary for Native Affairs. Charles Brownlee, for twenty years 
Commissioner with the Ngqika, later Resident Magistrate of Cradock and 
King William's Town, and a man with an intimate knowledge of frontier 
affairs, was a popular choice for this post. Barkly agreed to be guided 
by his Ministers as regards policy concerning the Transkeian Territories. 
Responsibility for native policy, Colonial and Transkeian, rested 
therefore with the Cabinet, especially Brown1ee. 53 
Brownlee laboured under severe handicaps. Although a reasonably 
able administrator and a man of influence amongst the blacks, he was no 
politician and often seemed to lose his head in a crisis. 54 Then too, 
by 1872 the colonial blacks were recovering from the Cattle Killing both 
in numbers and in morale, and their recovery, plus continuing neglect for 
the reasons which follow, exposed all the weaknesses of the Grey policy, 
without allowing its strengths to operate. 
The problem of Native Affairs was just too large for a Department 
consisting up to 1877 of Brownlee, a Chief Clerk, messengers, and, after 
1875, two additional temporary clerks. Brownlee's budget of £2000 per 
annum was laughable and the salaries offered to officials insufficient to 
attract men of ability. No knowledge of an African language or of 
African customs was required to become a Civil Commissioner. Consequently 
a high proportion of officials in the period 1872-8 had to be reprimanded 
55 
or removed. The effect that inadequate appointment~ had on the 
53. C. Saunders: "The Cape Native Affairs Department and African 
Administration on the eastern frontier under the Molteno Ministry." 
(Unp. B.A. (Hons.) thesis, University of Cape Town, 1964), Chs. II 
and III. 
54. Ibid., p.8. Brownlee's shortcomings were to become only too apparent 
during the war, and were severely criticized. See below, p.13~) toof:-lla~ 1/1. 
55. Ibid., pp.18-20. 
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course of events relating to the War of Ngcayecibi will be followed in 
the careers of T. Liefeldt, Special Magistrate with Sandile from 1867-77, 
T. Cumming,longtime Resident at the Idutywa Reserve and Col. John Eustace, 
Resident with Sarhili from 1876. For the moment it is instructive to 
notice that although Brownlee tried to maintain personal contact with 
. ff' . h . f . 1 56 h nat~ve a a~rs by tour~ng t e Front~er at requent ~nterva s, t e 
Special Magistrate at Middledrift who had charge of 14,000 blacks was 
able to tell the Barry Commission in 1880 that he did not speak an 
African language, knew little about 'native law' despite being a Special 
Magistrate for 25 years, and that he had not been visited by any 
government official since 1870. 57 
The Native Locations Act No.6 of 1876 " ••• to provide for the better 
and more effectual supervision of Native Locations" did attempt to remedy 
the neglect under which Colonial Locations suffered, particularly ~n 
the North East, but it had hardly begun to take effect before the 
outbreak of war in 1877 and the focus of attention of the departmental 
policy continued to be across the Kei. 58 Under the system inaugurated 
by Grey, Chiefs were supposed to have surrendered their judicial power 
in return for pensions or salaries. But because Government officials 
were few and far between, often inexperienced and even incompetent as 
we have seen, many chiefs recovered much of their power. This was 
particularly true of Sandile the Ngqika chief and Paramount of the 
( ,c, h 
Eastern Xho~.q., _t.he Rharhabe. In '1867 Brownlee, Commissioner with the 
56. Ibid., p.12. Brownlee visited the frontier in October 1872, 
January 1874, March and July 1876, August 1877. 
57. Ibid, p.23. 
58. Ibid, p.25. 
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Ngqika since 1847, was promoted to be Magistrate at Cradock, and for 
reasons of economy, was replaced by his clerk T. Liefeldt, in a downgraded 
position. Liefeldt was unable to control Sandi Ie and was anything 
but an example to Sandile in the matter of drink. 59 Brownlee was 
horrified to see how complete the reversion of power to Sandile had been, 
h h d ' 'h' h f h W f N 'b' 60 when e a cause to v~s~t ~m on t e eve 0 tear 0 gcayec~~. 
Theal, who from his position at Lovedale was ~n a good position to 
observe such developments, asserts that Sandile ruled virtually as an 
independent chief, dealing personally with all cases except those involving 
the death penalty and witchcraft, which, with the support of the Ngqika, 
61 he dealt with secretly. In this way Sandile, having successfuly 
resisted much of the impact of colonial rule, was alarmed by events of 
1876 and 1877 which seemed to threaten his quasi-autonomy, and encouraged 
to revolt in order to retain that independence. 
De Kiewiet has aptly summed up the deficiencies of the Colony's 
approach to Native Affairs: 
What one magistrate called 'a zig-zag, do nothing, 
Kafir speech regime' was the inevitable outcome of 
a public opinion that asked for little more than 
peace and a plentiful supply of labour properly 
controlled, and an administration that, however 
excellent its intention financially starved 
its native policy in favour of railways and 
bl ' k . 62 pu ~c wor s proJects. 
59. Many witnesses testify to the reversion of power to Sandile. 
Theal, X, 135-6. 
Cape Archives, Cumming Papers, folder 7: J. Cumming to Rose-Innes, 
1 Feb. '79. 
C.2220, Encl. No.3: Brownlee Memo., n.d. 
60. Molteno Papers, No. 632: Brownlee to Molteno, 27 Sept. '77. 
61. Theal, X, 136. 
62. C.W. De Kiewiet: The Imperial Factor in South Africa (Cambridge, 
1936), p.168. 
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Sensible pragmatism and flexibility did not prevent the outbreak of 
war, and the divide and rule strategy continued by Brownlee actually 
contributed to the precipitation of the crisis. 
4. Forward into the Transkeian Territories 
The eruption of a new conflict between the Gca1eka and the Thembu 
(to be discussed fully in the next chapter) culminating in the defeat 
of the Thembu by the Gca1eka in a short campaign in 1872, drew the 
Colony irrevocably into increasing Transkeian involvement. Brownlee 
who had had to patch upa peace between the two chiefdoms, gave notice 
of his intention to pursue a gradual forward policy beyond the Kei in 
h R f h · . . 63 t e eport 0 1S m1SS1on. He said he believed the Cape Government 
should continue to uphold Grey's civilising ideals, but should intervene 
East of the Kei only when the peace of the frontier was endangered. 
The exception was when small tribes, who were threatened, asked for 
protection, or with those who might already be considered British subjects. 
Thus he suggested that the Government might begin to extend its control 
over the Transkeian Territories with the Gatberg area. This would become 
a strong advanced post, from which we 
can gradually extend our influence and protection 
to such tribes as desire it ••• overawe the 
Pondos, support the Tambookies Thembu and 
Umh1ouh10, and prevent any combination for 
evil between the Amapondos and Kre1i. 64 
63. A.10-'73, p.8: Brownlee to Col. Sec. 10 May '73. 
See also N.A. 840: Brownlee to Col. Sec., 2 May 73, part of which 
is incorporated into his official report. 
64. Ibid. 
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In theory, therefore, the main motive for a continued divide and rule 
strategy was, as ever, the maintenance of peace on colonial borders. 
Accordingly, the ardent expansionist Joseph Orpen was offered the post 
of Magistrate at the Gatberg. He was instructed to act as Government 
representative with the peoples beyond the Mthatha especially with 
Adam Kok to whom it was anticipated he would ultimately move as British 
Resident ~n Nomansland, once a subordinate had been appointed to the 
Gatberg. Orpen took up his position in April 1873 and explained to the 
Sotho inhabitants that the administration of the area would be run on 
65 lines very similar to that of Basutoland. 
Orpen found the Mpondomise feud too tempting to resist and he was 
able to exploit the situation so that both Mditshwa and Mhlontlo again 
asked for British protection. Brownlee was surprised by Orpen's 
request to grant such protection. Faced with the opportunity, he agreed 
but made it clear that in future Orpen should keep in step with the 
66 Government's plans. 
The Langalibalele affair impressed on the Colony the need for a 
representative in Nomansland and once again made clear the ineptness 
of Natal's handling of Native Affiars. Consequently, when the Colony 
considered consolidating its position across the Kei in terms of 
Brownlee's policy, there was a further reason why the Griquas, who 
might already be considered British subjects, should be lnc1uded. 
Orpen in fact pressed the issue in 1874 by forcing Kok to demand 
clarification on the question of his independence. Brownlee was once 
65. Saunders, "Annexation", pp.llO-ll1. 
Theal, X, 31. 
66. Saunders, "Annexation", pp.1l2-l3. 
Theal, X, 31-2. 
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again willing to seize the opportunity, but after some show of opposition on 
the part of Kok and the Griqua to direct annexation~ agreed,but only on terms 
acceptable to them. It was therefore agreed that a British Commissioner 
who was not to be Orpen,reporting directly to Cape Town, would be 
appointed, and would rule in tandem with Kale until the latter's death. 
67 Kok was to receive £700 compensation for lost revenues. Fingoland, 
and to a lesser extent, the Idutywa Reserve, were obvious candidates for 
annexation. The Mfengu had prospered under the able administrator 
Matthew Blyth who urged annexation, many of them becoming quite 
prosperous as peasant farmers. Despite the fact that they were not 
consulted on the move, the Mfengu on being assured that annexation was 
merely a formal recognition of a de facto situation, made no demur and 
even accepted the principle of a ten shilling hut tax. 68 For, as 
Moyer has pointed out, the Mfengu were not the unw~tting collaborators that 
69 they have sometimes been portrayed as. They had chosen to side with 
the British for the benefits that such a move promised, and in the forty 
years since that decision, their vastly increased landholding and 
relative prosperity as peasant farmers bore witness that these benefits 
had indeed accrued. The formalisation of their relationship with the 
British was a logical step and they certainly anticipated that benefits 
would continue to flow from it. 
The significance of the formal reception of the Mfengu under 
British rule was not lost on Sarhili, and he was only too well aware of 
67. Saunders," Annexation", pp. 114-23. 
Theal, X, 34-7. 
68. Saunders, "Annexation", p.118. 
The Idutywa chiefs were less compliant, but their opposition 
was bought off by the grant of farms. 
69. Moyer, p.10. 
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70 ' their prosperity on his former land. This was only one of the 
pressures which increasingly threatened Gcaleka independence and it 
is in a detailed examination of such pressures that the Gcaleka response 
to them, that the more immediate origins of the War of Ngcayecibi 
must be sought. B ' d h D K' . 71 d ut one 1S tempte to ec a e 1ew1et an suggest 
that, vis-a-vis colonial policy towards the Gcaleka and Mfengu, a 
contemporary might have warned: "As ye have sown, so ye shall reap." 
70. Sarhili visited the Mfengu agricultural show in 1875 and was much 
impressed by what he saw. G.16-'76, p.44: J. Ayliff to S.~.A., 
25 Jan. '76. 
71. De Kiewiet, p.168: 
The Gcalekas and the Fingos represented the opposite 
poles of frontier policy. That the Fingos were the 
favourites of the Government, praised for their 
prosperity and industry and the Gcalekas were 
despised for their surliness and indolence was 
due in no small measure to the opposite system 
of treatment that had been meted out to them. 
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CHAPTER 2 
1872-1877 SARHILI AND THE GCALEKA BESIEGED 
1. The Economics of War 
De Kiewiet sees the springs of the war in the desperate economic 
situation on the frontier. His thesis,briefly, runs as follows: 
European expansion had produced overpopulation, overstocking and 
overcultivation in the Transkeian Territories. The sale of labour had 
become the only means of survival, and was a safety valve that prevented 
the desperation that had led to earlier wars. But should there be any 
major economic adversity,serious unrest would follow. The severe 
drought of 1876 and 1877 brought such adversity and was ultimately 
responsible for the outbreak of the war. l 
.-
There is no doubt that the economic pressures on the Gcaleka were 
great. But they were not so great as to act as 'more than a contributory 
factor in the origins of the war. In April 1877 Eustace reported that 
excellent rains had fallen over the previous two months and consequently 
2 the harvest could be expected to be only just below average. His 
assessment seems to have been born out by the fact that later that year, 
when the war had begun, colonial and imperial forces found plenty of 
3 grain in storage throughout Gcalekaland. Overcrowding, with its 
attendant problems, was severe. Allowing for the deficiencies of early 
population estimates and census figures, in 1848, when the Gcaleka 
1. De Kiewiet, pp.148-165. 
2. G.17-'78, p.28: Eustace to S.N.A., 31 Jan. '78. 
3. G. G. R. 1: 
G.G.R. 1: 
Hook to Griffit4, 23 Oct. '77. 
Elliot to Griffith, 18 Oct. '77. 
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possessed all the territory between the Kei and the Mbashe, their numbers 
4 
were estimated at 70,000, while in 1877 Moodie estimates that 66,000 
Gcaleka were living on 1600 sq. miles, less than a third of their former 
territory5 (a population density of 42 to the square mile.) But 
Sarhili contributed to the land shortage (no doubt partly in order to 
demonstrate the necessity of more land for the Gcaleka) by discouraging 
emigration, even for work purposes, and by encouraging immigration. 6 
And conditions were far worse in the colonial locations where population 
7 density was far higher and the drought was more severe. De Kiewiet 
correctly draws attention to the appalling conditions there, reflected 
in the annual reports of the Civil Commissioners of King William's Town 
d .. 8 an Vlctorla East. 
The fact remains too th~t the war began in the Transkei rather 
than in the Colony, with white intervention in a Gcaleka-Mfengu 
quarrel, and when various colonial black groups joined in the war later, 
their decision to do so was as much a political one as one dictated by 
economic pressures. This is not to deny the significance of the sharp 
4. M. Wilson in Oxford History, i, 255. 
5. Moodie, ii,154. Ayliff remarked in 1875 on the density of population, 
but the following year he contradicted what he had said about the 
necessity of Gca1eka seeking relief in labour. See footnote 10 below. 
6. N.A. 152-5: Numerous reports after 1872 by W.R.D. Fynn and James 
Ayliff, successive Residents to Sarhi1i. Also found in 
Transkeian Resident's Letterbook 1865-76. 
7. The population of Sandi1e and Anta's Locations in 1875 was 33,000. 
0.21-'75, p.63. 
Theal asserts the two locations were 585 square miles. Thea1, vii, 
map between pages 187 and 188. Therefore population density in 
1875 was 56 to the square mile. 
8. G.12-'77, G.17-'78: Reports of J. Rose-Innes, C.C. King William's 
Town, P. Nightingale, C.C. Victoria East, R.H. Dugmore, Superintendant 
of Healdtown Location, and E.C. Jeffrey, Superintendant of the 
Kamastone and Oxkraal Locations. 
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upsurge in cattle theft during 1876 and 1877 as a sort of undeclared 
warfare against whites, reflecting the economic condition of colonial 
blacks (this issue will be dealt with in full later).9 It should also 
be noted that the sale of Gcaleka labour was not as great as De Kiewiet's 
thesis would tend to imply. The practice of labouring on the Public 
Works and even as servants in the Colony only really began after 1875, 
for before that date Sarhili had strenuously discouraged the practice. lO 
The same is true of the Diamond Fields. It is hard to assess how many 
Gcaleka worked there, but it must have been very few, as during the 
whole of 1876 only 103 blacks from the whole Cape Colony and Transkei 
went to the Diamond Fields as new labourers. The figure for ten months 
of 1877 was 218, but of these 98 went during the war months of November 
9. See below, p.130. 
10. Sarhili, who had refused to allow Gcaleka to go to the Public 
Works in 1874 when meeting Barkly, changed his mind in 1875, 
but in his yearly report written in early 1876, Ayliff seemed to 
contradict what he had said in his 1875 report (see G.2l-'75, 
p.35)~ 
Very few of the Gcalekas availed themselves of 
Kreli's permission to seek employment on the 
Public Works and about half of those that did go, 
returned in a very short time probably having 
found the work too heavy ••• their wants are so 
few that the money realized by the sale of wool 
and skins enables them to obtain all the clothing 
they require and Blankets - and the produce from 
their gardens supplies the family with food from 
year to year. 
G.16-'76, pp.44-5: Ayliff - S.N.A., 2 Jan. '76. Ayliff admitted 
that with no reserves or foresight the Gcaleka would be reduced 
to misery or want by any natural disaster, like drought, but could 
then redeem the position by using the hitherto ignored expedient 
of the Public Works. This is precisely what happened later in 
the year, but even in December, Eustace only signed 124 passes 
to work at the Public Works, about 1% of the male population. 
G.12-'77: p.77: Eustace to S.N.A., 27 Jan. '77. 
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and December.ll While some Gcaleka did work on farms in the Colony, 
especially in the East London District, and while some squatted on farms 
in the same area,12 it is hard to accept on the basis of the evidence 
above that De Kiewiet's contention that the bulk of the able bodied men 
depended on wages to maintain their living standards applied to the 
13 Gca1eka. 
2. Sarhili and Gcaleka Society 
The reasons why the Gcaleka had resisted labouring in the Colony and 
continued to do so when, after the war, they fell on far harder times, 
point to the nature of Gcaleka society and to the response of that society 
to the non-economic pressures it encountered. The Gcaleka were an 
intensely conservative people, who had been less touched by Western 
influences than other frontier peoples, partly because they had for most 
of the century been cushioned from the main thrust of colonial expansion, 
and partly because they had resisted the advances of agents of Western 
"1' , 14 C~v~ ~sat~on. Sarhili had welcomed and indeed urged the stationing 
V 
of missionaries in Gcalekaland after his resettlement there in 1865, 
but he had limited the number and had made it clear that he regarded 
these as "his" missionaries whom he welcomed for political, rather than 
11. R. Sieborger: "The Recruitment and Organisation of African Labour 
on the Kimberley Diamond Mines 1871-88" (unp. M.A. thesis, Rhodes 
University, 1975), pp.183-5. 
Comparative figures for the Public Works were 250 for the year, 
of which 124 were for December. G.12-'77, p.77: Eustace to 
S.N.A., 27 Jan. '77. 
12. TranskeianResident's Letterbook: W.R.D. Fynn to Ayliff, 22 April '73. 
13. De Kiewiet, p.154. 
14. The annual reports of W.R.D. Fynn and James Ayliff for the years 
1870-76, to be found in the Transkeian Resident's Letterbook (and 
for the years 1874-6 in Government Blue Books G.27-'74, G.21-'75 
and G.16-'76) stress these points repeatedly. 
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15 
religious or educational reasons. Indeed, he and the Gcaleka 
steadfastly ignored the religious and educational activities of the 
.. . 16 
m~ss~onarJ.es • Then Sarhili actively discouraged the Gcaleka from 
labouring in the Colony because he feared that allegations of theft 
levelled at them would draw him and the chiefdom into dispute and even 
conflict with the Colonial Authorities. 17 His attitude to Western 
18 Civilisation may be summed up in his scorn of European dress. 
Sarhili had, as we have seen, personal reasons for his distrust of·whites. 19 
Consequently Sarhili resolutely maintained an independent political 
line, though being careful not to antagonise or directly challenge the 
Colonial Authorities and risk the danger his father had warned against. 20 
One can only marvel at the diplomatic skill and cunning which Sarhili 
exercised in his relations with the Britis". Sarhili's tragedy was 
that however scrupulous he might be in his relations with whites,2l the 
I 
exercising of an independent line by him in the Transkei was inimical to 
the trend in Colonial Policy, which was not only to maintain British 
influence there, but also to gradually extend British control over the 
area in a 'civilising' mission. The history of the Thembu-Gcaleka 
conflict illustrates the developing confrontation between white and 
Gcaleka power and shows how thereafter, there was never the slightest 
15. Chalmers: Tiyo Saga (Edinburgh, 1877), pp.347-S. 
16. G.16-'76, pp.45-6: Reports. by Rev~ R.S. Leslie and J. Dewar, n.d. 
17. G.2l-'75, p.45: Ayliff to Brownlee, 2 Feb. '75. 
IS. Macquarrie, i, 47. 
19. See above, pp .5- 7. 
20. See above, p. 7. 
21. West Fynn: The '77 War (East London Daily Despatch, 1911) pp.3-4 
cites numerous incidents to support this view and Stanford is also 
emphatic on the point. Macquarrie, i, 77-S. 
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chance of Sarhili obtaining more land, the goal which he and the Gca1eka 
desired and needed most. 
3. The Thembu-Gcaleka Quarrel 
In May 1866 Ngangelizwe married Nomkhafu10, a daughter of Sarhi1i. 
This was not an unusual alliance in that such marriages were customarily 
arranged between chiefdoms to improve relations and to serve as obstacles 
.--/ 
, fl' 22 to serlOUS con let. In this case the marriage proved to be a disaster 
for Ngangelizwe, because in 1870 Nomkhafulo fled back to Sarhili after 
being ill-treated by Ngangelizwe • The affair threatened to unleash a 
full scale war between the two peoples since Sarhi1i regarded his daughter's 
treatment as an insult to the Gca1eka, a view shared by his subjects. 
But, anticipating defeat in such a war, Ngangelizwe appealed to the 
Cape Government for advice and aid. Barkly saw the potential for a 
serious war and so sent E.B. Chalmers to Ngange1izwe as a Resident, and 
summoned Sarhili to meet him at King William's Town ln March 1871. There 
he forced Sarhi1i to accept a fine of forty cattle, to be paid to him as 
23 
compensation for the injury of his daughter. Sarhili and his people 
felt this was inadequate. since there was no precedent for a cattle fine 
24 in a case involving an insult to a Paramount Chief and his people. 
Ngange1izwe provoked the Gca1eka further by attempting to assert his 
authority over Bomvanaland. In 1871 he visited that territory under 
false pretext with Chalmers, and in 1872 he planned another visit. 
22. Peires, pp.82-3. 
23. F. Brownlee, Transkeian Historical Records, pp.28-9. 
24. Transkeian Resident's Letterbook: W.R.D. Fynn to Col. Sec., 
28 April '70. 
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Raiding between the Thembu and Bomvana increased, culminating in a 
serious Thembu raid against the Bomvana in September 1872. Moni 
appealed to Sarhili for help and Sarhili decided to teach Ngangelizwe a 
lesson and make clear Moni's subject status to himself. He and his great 
son Sigcawu proceded to administer a crushing defeat on Ngangelizwe in 
October, sweeping through Thembuland and burning Ngangelizwe's Great 
Place. Sarhili was persuaded to return to Gcalekaland by Rev. P. 
Hargreaves of the Clarkebury Mission station where Ngangelizwe was 
h 'd' 25 ~ ~ng. Saunders asserts that it is likely that Sarhili had already 
achieved what he had set out to do by teaching Ngangelizwe a lesson and 
by giving his army a long-sought taste of battle, and would have retired 
26 
anyway. Sarhili was enough of a realist to realise that any direct 
seizure of Thembu territory would have involved him in conflict with 
the Cape. But he was to argue later in the Gcaleka-Thembu-Bomvana 
dispute that apart from historical claims to the land in question he was 
27 
entitled to it by right of conquest, and, refused land by Barkly in 
1874,28 his strategy in the long-drawn out boundary dispute may be 
seen as an indirect method of obtaining land by wearing down the resistance 
of the Colonial Authorities. 
Barkly sent a Commission to investigate the conflict, which 
immediately warned Sarhili and Ngangelizwe that any further fighting 
would bring Colonial intervention. The Commission, after considering 
the history of the dispute, advised that despite the rashness of 
Ngangelizwe's behaviour, he ought not to be weakened any further, but 
25. H.A. 95, No. 69: Report of Edmonstone Commission, 30 Dec. '72. 
pp.18-28. 
F. Brownlee, TranskeianHistoricalRecords, p.24. 
26. Saunders, "Annexation", p.80. 
27. See below, p.q.cZ· 
28. G.2l-'75, p.35: AyliH to S.N.A., 2 Feb. '75. Sarhili had 
continually asked for more land for his people ever since he was 
allowed back to Gcalekaland in 1865. 
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29 
ought to be supported as an ally against the renascent Gcaleka power. 
Indeed, Ngangelizwe in a panic after his defeat, had asked for British 
protection without consulting his councillors. But, when on Chalmer's 
insistence the people and councillors were consulted, they made it clear 
that they were not prepared to part so lightly with their independence. 
Ngangelizwe also had second thoughts when the Commission explained that 
he would forfeit his power over his people when British control was 
extended. 30 
Since the Commission failed to prevent friction continuing between 
the Gcaleka and Thembu, particularly over the disputed boundary, Brownlee 
was sent to arrange a formal peace. He managed to patch up the quarrel 
temporarily, pointing out the boundary as that existing before hostilities 
d "M' , 1 d' db' S h'l' 31 an recogn~s~ng on~ s open y a m~tte su Ject status to ar ~ ~. 
However, the boundary was soon in dispute again, and theft between Bomvana 
and Thembu.and Gcaleka and Thembu was frequent, so much so that Colonial 
G Ag d h 1 " f h 'f 32 overnment ents suspecte t e comp ~c~ty 0 t e ch~e s. 
The victory of the Gcaleka in 1872 greatly increased their confidence, 
and the failure of the Colonial Authorities to prevent the actual fighting 
encouraged them to turn their attention to the bitterly resented Mfengu. 
There is a passage in one of W.R.D. Fynn's reports soon after the war 
that is particularly interesting. Fynn wrote: 
29. H.A. 95, No. 69: Report of Edmonstone Commission, 30 Dec. '72, 
p.30. 
30. Averill, p.45. 
F. Brownlee, Transkeian Histor~cal Records , p.29. 
31. A.10-'73, pp.1-4: Brownlee to Col.Sec., 2 May '73. 
Averill, pp.45-6. 
32. N.A. 153: Ayliff to S.N.A., 9 July '75. 
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In reference to Kreli's bearing towards the Fingoes -
I notice that since he gained his victory over 
Gangelizwe, he and his people openly say that they 
are not afraid to fight any native tribe. I 
have also remarked that at any gathering of 
Fingoes and Gcalekas in shops or elsewhere, the 
Gcalekas invariably end their arguments by telling 
the Fingoes that they will some day serve them 
the same way as they did the Temboes - and drive 
them out of the country Government lent them. 
(Myemphasis).33 
Certainly, immediately after the war, there was an upsurge in Gcaleka-
Mfengu theft cases, and thereafter this trend continued, culminating 
in the fight at the beer-drink that launched the often predicted 
conflict. 
A new crisis in Gcaleka-Thembu relations occured in 1875. 
Nongxokozela, Nomkhafulo's waiting maid who had remained behind in 
Thembuland after her mistress had fled her husband Ngangelizwe's ill-
treatment in 1870, was murdered. Sarhili heard rumours of Nongxokozela's 
ill-treatment and made enquiries of the Thembu. The Thembu prevaricated 
and so Sarhili referred the matter to the Colonial Government. Almost 
immediately thereafter, Ngangelizwe reported the ill-health and then the 
death of the woman. 34 
Ngangelizwe came into conflict with Menziwe, an Mfengu Chief 
resident in Thembuland. Menziwetwho had sought refuge with Mthikrakra 
was favoured by Ngange1izwe in an attempt to st~engthen himself against 
his neighbours, and in the 1872 war Menziwe had faithfully fought for th~ 
33. Transkeian Resident's Letterbook: W.R.D. Fynn to S.N.A., 27 
April '73. 
34. N.A. 153: Ayliff to S.N.A., 9 July '75. 
G.l6-'76, p.43: Ayliff to S.N.A., 2 Jan. '76. 
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35 Thembu against the Gca1eka. Now, angry at Ngange1izwe's repeated 
blunders, he told Ngange1izwe that he would stay neutral in any conflict 
which arose out of the murder. Ngange1izwe responded by threatening 
Menziwe and forcing him to flee to the Idutywa Reserve. Here Menziwe 
reported that Nongxokoze1a's death was due to mistreatment in which 
Ngange1izwe was implicated, and not to i11-hea1th. 36 
When this became known, the Gca1eka were naturally incensed and 
prepared for war. Sarhi1i decided however, to make the issue a test 
case of previous Government promises and the much vaunted British 
Justice. He therefore gave strict instructions to his people to hold 
back and not provoke the Thembu in any way. 37 
Regardless of Sarhi1i's appeal, the Government was bound to intervene, 
since policy was directed at preventing disputes which might endanger 
the security of the Colony. A renewed Gca1eka-Thembu conflict, resulting 
as in 1872 in Gca1eka victory and an increase in Sarhi1i's power, was 
perceived as such a threat. 38 Sarhi1i was forever cast in the role of 
the villain of the frontier for most whites. 39 On the other hand the 
Thembu had always allied themselves to the British40 and increasingly 
after the 1872 war; the The~bu were perceived as the natural allies of the 
Colony and as a counterweight to the Gca1eka in the divide and rule 
f . l' 41 strategy 0 nat1ve po 1Cy. 
35. F. Brownlee, Transkeian Historical Records, p.2S. 
36. N.A. 153: Cumming to S.N.A., 3 Aug. '75. 
37. G.16-'76, p.43: Ay1iff to S.N.A., 2 Jan. '76. 
38. 
The presence of the F.A.M.P.,who had been quickly despatched by the 
Government to prevent a repetition of 1872, must also have had its 
effect. 
N .A. 294: Brownlee to Colonial Secretary, 11 Aug. '75. 
39. To arrive at this conclusion, one has simply to review frontier 
history from 1835. 
40. See above, p.12. 
41. See above, pp .30~31.· 
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Hence Brownlee wrote to remind Ngangelizwe of his dependence on 
British support and to order him to take Menziwe and his followers back. 
Then he arranged for William Wright, the Resident with Ngangelizwe, 
and James Ayliff his counterpart with Sarhili, to conduct an enquiry 
into the death of Nongxokozela at Emjanyana, the Office of the British 
.. 42 
Resident with Ngange11zwe. When informed of the proposed enquiry, 
Sarhili protested that an enquiry in Thembuland was hardly likely to 
produce an impartial result and suggested that if an enquiry was needed 
43 
at all, it ought to be held in the Idutywa Reserve. Brownlee agreed, 
the venue was changed to the Reserve, the enquiry held, and Ayliff and 
Wright reported their findings on 28th August. They found that 
Ngangelizwe was directly implicated in the murder of the woman and that he 
had used his former concubine as a surrogate for his hatred of the 
44 Gcaleka and his desire for revenge. 
Brownlee fixed on a fine of 200 cattle, a decision that prompted so 
much dissatisfaction amongst the Gcaleka that there was again talk of 
45 
war. Sarhili and his councillors told Ayliff that a fine in cattle 
however large, did not constitute a punishment of Ngangelizwe, since he 
would not personally have to bear it. 46 In any case, the Thembu, the 
Gcaleka said, could easily doctor the cattle. Sarhili told Ayliff: 
42. N.A. 294: Brownlee to Colonial Secretary, 11 Aug. ' 75. 
43. G.16-'76, p.43: Ayliff to S.N.A., 2 Jan. '76. 
44. G.39-'76, pp.4-5: Ayliff and Wright to S.N.A. , 28 Aug. ' 75. 
45. G.16-'76, pp.43-4: Ayliff to S.N.A., 2 Jan. '76. 
46. N.A. 153: Ay1iff to S.N.A., 18 Sept. '75. 
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If a fine is considered punishment you must 
remember that I am a wolf and you encourage me 
to do wrong ••• But I know that when I do 
wrong and break the Governor's word, I will be 
47 driven from my country. 
Sarhili and his councillors at first firmly refused to accept the 
48 decision of the Colonial Government, but eventually in December, Sarhili 
agreed to the fine, but only "out of consideration and obedience to 
Government." He felt his "responsible" behaviour merited greater 
recognition. 49 The knowledge that he was perceived as a threat by 
whites became an increasingly bitter pill to swallow. The fact that the 
fine cattle were dying from lungsickness on the road from Thembuland 
to Gcalekaland did not help.50 Worst of all, the Nongxokoze1a incident 
precipitated the extension of British protection over Thembuland, 
effectively surrounding Gca1eka1and by British territory, save for 
Bomvanaland in the North. 
4. The Annexation of Thembu1and 
Commandant T .R. Bowker of the Frontier Armed and Mounted Police 
(F.A.M.P.), was the first to raise the question of the annexation of 
47. N.A. 153: Minutes of a meeting between Ayliff and Sarhi1i, his 
councillors and members of the tribe, 21 Sept. '75. 
48. N.A. 153: Ayliff to S.N.A., 22 Sept. '75. 
49. N.A. 153: Ayliff to S.N.A., 18 Dec. '75. 
Ayliff requested that the £100 that the Government had decided 
to deduct from Ngangelizwe' s salary might be given to Sarhili 
as a Bweetener' and Brownlee agreed to this. However, 
Sarhili had already accepted the fine before he knew of the 
gift. 
50. Fynn, p. 3 • 
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Thembuland. In September he had been instructed to relocate Menziwe 
on his land. Whilst personally supervising this, he had concluded that 
only the annexation of the Thembu could bring permanent peace to the 
seriously troubled Transkei. 5l Bowker, like his predecessor Currie an 
exponent of a vigorously expansionist policy, and greatly suspicious of 
Sarhili,52 raised the matter with Brownlee who told him that the 
Colonial Government approved of his proceding with enquiries as long as 
53 
no pressure was brought to bear on the Thembu. 
The timing of the move could not have been more opportune. The 
Thembu were then disenchanted with Ngangelizwe, who so often had brought 
trouble down on their heads. They greatly feared a Gcaleka attack and a 
repetition of the 1872 disaster and looked for British support in the 
boundary question. Consequently, they proved receptive to the advances 
of Bowker, Wright and Rev. P. Hargreaves. A lar~e meeting was convened 
in October and conditions were framed under which the Thembu, excepting 
Da1asile and the Qwathiwho did not attend the meeting, were to come 
under British authority.54 
51. G.39-'76, p.14: Report of Bowker to S.N.A., 17 Dec. '75. 
52. See below, p.76, footnote 38. 
53. It is clear that the Thembu did not understand the implications of 
British rule. Brownlee later spoke of the Government acceding to a 
request by the Thembu to come under British rule, which was not 
true. G.12-'77, pp.169, 179: Brownlee Memo., April '77. 
It should also be noticed that Bowker had the whole force of the 
F.A.M.P. with him and constantly patrolled the country. This in 
itself can be said to have been a strong pressure on the Thembu. 
That the Colonial Government was the instigator of the move may 
also be inferred by some intriguing correspondence in the Transkeian 
Resident's Letterbook, from which it appears that Bowker and 
Brownlee had arranged to make overtures to Moni as well as the Thembu. 
When James Ay1iff heard of the proposal, he hastily wrote and pointed 
out the grave political consequences of taking such a step, and 
Brownlee, who should have known better, apparently dropped the matter. 
Transkeian Resident's Letterbook: Ayliff to Bowker, I Nov. '75, 
Ayliff to S.N.A., 5 Nov. '75. 
54. G.39-'76, p.ll: Bowker to Under Colonial Secretary, tel., 29 Oct. '75. 
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The salient conditions were: 
Gange1izwe and several clan heads were to be 
recognised as chiefs and paid salaries. Boundaries 
were to be undisturbed, and no hut tax was to be 
paid until 1878. Except for certain crimes and 
the right to appeal to magistrates, the chiefs 
were to retain judicial authority over their 
55 people ••• 
Bowker in forwarding his report and the conditions to the Colonial 
Authorities recommended that Ngange1izwe should be deposed because of his 
56 . behaviour, and the Government agreed - all the conditions were approved 
except the continued recognition of Ngange1izwe as Paramount. On 14th 
December Bowker informed the Thembu of the Government's decision. 
He included Dalasile, who was present, on the list of paid chiefs, 
having persuaded him to receive a magistrate. I~ handing over to his 
successor, Bowker felt confident that British rule could be instituted 
smoothly, since all the Thembu appeared to him satisfied with arrangements 
57 thus far. 
In the meantime, Mr S.A. Probart,M.L.A. for Graaff-Reinet,had been 
appointed by the Govermnent as a Special Commissioner to conclude 
arrangements, and at the same time, to investigate the boundary question 
58 
and recommend a boundary line between the Gcaleka, Themhu and Bomvana. 
He arrived at Emjanyana on 17 December and found that many Thembu were 
angry at an allegation they felt was trumped up by the English to get 
rid of Ngange1izwe. 59 This was to the effect that Ngange1izwe had 
55. Campbell, p .127. 
56. G.39-'76, p.ll : Bowker to Under Colonial Secretary , tel. , 29 Oct. 
57. G.39-'76, p.13: Bowker to Under Colonial Secretary, tel., 14 Dec. 
58. G.39-'76, P .l. 
59. The account below 1S based on G. 39-' 76, pp.18:22, Probart to S.N.A. 
16 Feb. '76. 
'75. 
' 75. 
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beaten his wife Nosepessi. Sympathy for him was widespread when, 
following On the investigation of the allegation by Inspector E.B. Chalmers, 
he fled fearing arrest and banishment from Thembu1and. 
On 24th December, Probart held a general meeting of the Thembu to 
announce the arrangements connected with the extension of British rule -
he felt that Bowker's meeting had been too small and that the Thembu 
needed to be reassured that Ngange1izwe had nothing to fear as long as 
his behaviour was 'good'. All the Thembu chiefs except Da1asi1e attended 
(including the disguised ex -Paramount) but feeling ran high and Probart 
felt compelled to promise that 'good' behaviour on the part of Ngangelizwe 
might result in his being allowed to resume his former position. 
On 31 December Probart visited Da1asi1e. The Qwathi Chief told 
Probart that he no longer wished to come under British authority, for 
he had no idea that when he agreed with Bowker t9 do so, that this would 
involve any loss of personal authority. He said too, that by accepting 
British Authority, he would be associating himself with the stigma 
attached to Ngangelizwe, whose followers had accepted British rule because 
they had lost confidence in him and feared Sarhili. Eventually Probart 
managed to persuade Dalasile to receive a magistrate, but it seems that, 
5 
as with the rest of the Thembu,s1eight of hand was pract~d. Probart 
had already insisted that the Thembu could use the magistrates instead 
of the chiefs as a court of first instance in petty cases, and Brownlee 
who wishes to subtly undermine the power of the chiefs, agreed with him, 
despite the fact that this clearly contravened the terms of agreement 
'0 accepted by the Thembu. Now, when Stanford arrived in Mayas his 
60. G.39-'76, pp.44-S: Probart to S.N.A., 16 Feb. '76. 
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Magistrate, Da1asi1e told him that he had only asked Probart for a 
Magistrate for himself, and not for one who would exercise power over 
61 his people. 62 Da1asi1e certainly never drew his allowance, thus 
being careful not to give British rule over his people the stamp of 
legitimacy,and despite his previous assertion of independence from 
Ngangelizwe, he was one of the leaders of the Thembu movement to have 
N l ' , d 63 gange lzwe relnstate • 
5. The Thembu-Gcaleka Boundary Dispute 
Believing that the extension of British authority over Thembuland 
was satisfactorily concluded and a popular regime inaugurated under 
Wright, Probart set about dealing with the problem of the Gcaleka-Thembu-
Bomvana boundary. It is worth discussing the issue in some detail, for 
it illustrates Sarhili's attempts to maintain his freedom of action 
against Colonial interference, and his increasing inability to do so as 
white control expanded in the Transkei. 
The dispute centred on the Ncehana valley, a fertile area of which 
Thembu had traditionally occupied the major part. Sarhili claimed that 
he had granted land here to Mlatha and Bacela, two Thembu chiefs who 
64 
were refugees from the Mpondo. Since then, M1atha had left the area 
and Bace1a had withdrawn, for the 1872 war had denuded the area of 
65 Thembu. After the war, contrary to Brownlee's settlement agreement 
61. Macquarrie, i, 56. 
62. F. Brownlee, Transkeian Historical Records, p.32. 
63. See below, p.43. 
64. 
During the next few years, Dalasile, as will be seen, was on the 
brink of rebellion several times, but prudence held him back until 
the Transkeian Rebellion of 1880. 
N.A. 154: West Fynn to S.N.A., 20 Oct. '76. 
65. N.A. 151; Correspondence between W.R.D. Fynn, E.B. Chalmers 
and S.N.A., March, April '73. 
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that all should occupy their previous kraals, Bomvanas had begun to 
66 build new kraals in areas previously occupied by Thembu. Sarhili, who 
regarded the valley as his by conquest as well as by right. followed 
suit 67 by sending Gcaleka across the Mbashe to reside in the valley. 
But he failed to prevent Bacela returning in 1874. 68 Any solution to 
the problem was bound to be contentious. but it is clear that the Thembu 
expected British support (Bacela had been the most eager to embrace 
British rulel9 and the Gcaleka were determined to prevent any favouritism. 
Probart arranged to meet Sarhili on his northern boundary in early 
70 January. He requested him not to try and overawe the Thembu by 
arriving with a large number of followers. yet in order to assert British 
authority and discourage resistance to it, Probart station"ed Bowker with 
some of the F.A.M.P. in the Idutywa Reserve, while taking along a personal 
guard of 150 F.A.M.P. Sarhili,who probably intended anyway to manoeuvre 
for advantage, decided that two could play at this game, and therefore 
took along 2-3000 armed men to support his case and guard against 
Perfidious Albion. Probart had to dismiss the police before he could 
persuade Sarhili and his councillors to approach and enter into a 
discussion of the boundary. 
At the meeting, Sarhili appointed his brother Lindinxuwa (also called 
Manxiwe) who had been living in Bomvanaland for some time while 
representing Sarhili's interests there,7l and Ayliff, to represent 
66. Transkeian Resident's Letterbook: W.R.D. Fynn to Chalmers, n.d. 
(c. early '73). 
67. N.A. 151: W.R.D. Fynn to S.N.A., 14 March '73. 
68. Transkeian Resident's Letterbook: Ayliff to W. Wright, 6 Sept. '74. 
69. G.39-'76, p.14: Bowker to S.N.A., 17 Dec. '75. 
70. This account is based on G.39-'76, pp.24-30: Probart to S.N.A., 
16 Feb. '76. 
71. Cory Library, MS.lll: Interview by G. Cory with Lindinxuwa, 
29 Jan. 1910. 
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himself at the boundary fixing. Wright was to represent the Thembu 
almost all of whom had been successfully scared off by Sarhili's tactics. 
Probart proceded with this Commission to trace two suggested boundary 
lines. These he submitted to Brownlee with the suggestion that as 
soon as a decision had been taken, Ayliff and Wright should point out 
the boundary together with representatives of Sarhili, Moni and the 
Thembu. 
The overburdened Department of Native Affairs required eight months 
to come to a decision. It was not until October that the Government 
72 decision on the boundary was announced, a singularly inopportune moment 
since the frontier was in the midst of a full blown war scare. The 
war scare, originating largely in the various Thembu group's disenchantment 
with Colonial Rule,73 only served to render the issue even more delicate, 
because the Colonial Authorities could ill-afford to further antagonise 
their Thembu allies when they were convinced that Sarhili was hatching 
. . h 74 a consp~racy aga~nst t em. 
When in early October Wright and Cumming tried to mark off the 
boundary line decided on, Lindinxuwa and Tyali, Moni's eldest son, 
refused to accompany them, explaining that the present Magistrates did 
not know the whole history of the dispute and that W.R.D. Fynn, 
75 J.C. Warner and Brownlee ought to be present. Sarhili told West 
Fynn that he could not accept Probart's line because it would cut off a 
72. N.A. 154: West Fynn to S.N.A., 14 Oct. '76. 
73. See below, pp.42-3. 
74. See below, p.44. 
75. N.A. 399: Cumming and Wright to S.N.A., 15 Oct. '76. 
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large portion of his country. He continued: 
Of what have I been guilty that Government should 
treat me in this manner? I listened to the word 
of the Government in returning to my country after 
the war with the Thembu, then according to the 
rules of warfare (Kaffir and English) I would have 
been justified in obtaining a portion of 
Gangelizwe's country, as it was mine by conquest. 
Am I now merely to look on and see my country cut off 
d " . h b d h" ?76 an g~ven to t e Tern us an say not ~ng. 
Sarhili argued that the Government should therefore appoint a new 
Commission of men acquainted with the country and its history, and allow 
h " h h"" "77 ~m to accompany t em on t e~r ~nspect~on. Brownlee was willing to 
78 
make some concessions to Sarhili over the Ncehana, but Colonial policy 
towards Sarhili hardened considerably towards the end of 1876 as the 
Government became more and more impatient with Sarhili's constant 
manoeu,:e:i:'ing for advantage. In order to appreciate the threatening 
demarche between the Gcaleka and the Colony, it is necessary to review 
events of 1876 elsewhere on the frontier. 
6. The 1876 War Scare 
The 1876 war scare, despite the usual exaggeration of frontier 
propagandists and rumour-mongers, was a real gauge of tensions between 
black and white. Although the boundary question remained unsolved, 
the danger of a Gcaleka attack on the Thembu had receded. As a result, 
many of the Thembu came to reassess the step they had just taken in 
76. N.A. 154: West Fynn to S.N.A., 20 Oct. '76. 
77. Ibid. 
78. N.A. 845: Brownlee to Wright, draft, 9 April '77. 
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accepting British control. As it became clear that the institution of 
chieftainship, the very foundation of trad~tiona1 society, was threatened 
by British rule, discontent became manitest. Sympathy for Ngangelizwe, 
already aroused at his deposition, coalesced into a movement for his 
, 79 
re~nstatement. Whatever his faults, Ngangelizwe was the Thembu 
Paramount by birth, and he could not simply be made a commoner by an 
alien power. It was clear that the Thembu had not understood the 
implications of British rule when they accepted it, for as Scott wrote: 
There seems to have been a sort of expectation 
on the part of the leaders of the people, that 
they would be taken care of, and yet allowed to 
} h l'k d 80 to as t ey ~ e . 
Tpe lesson that this was not the case was a distasteful one. Dalasile 
used the fact that the British had not solved the'boundary dispute as an 
81 
excuse for not accepting his salary. The Emigrant and Colonial Thembu, 
although only nominally under the control of the Paramount, showed their 
support for the Paramountcy and their opposition to white pressures on 
them by joining the movement for Ngange1izwe's reinstatement, What 
had originally begun in February as a petition for Ngangelizwe's 
reinstatement, became more and more like a movement of resistance against 
British rule. 82 
At the same time, black unrest stirred elsewhere in South Africa. 
Trouble between Sekhukhune and the Transvaal flared up and was compounded 
83 by the awakening of Zulu power under Cetywayo. The death of ~dam Kok 
79. G.12-'77, pp.17l-2: Brownlee Memo., April '77. 
80. G.12-'77, p.89: J.H. Scott to S.N.A:, 28 Dec. '76. 
81 N.A. 40: W. Wright to S.N.A., 7 Oct '76. 
82. G.12-'77, p.172: Brownlee Memo., April '77. 
83. De Kiewiet, pp. 183-209 discusses the range ·of this unrest. 
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in 1875 resulted in land jobbing in Griqualand East and there was growing 
opposition to the British rule which allowed this. 84 In the same area, 
Nehemiah Mshweshwe desperately tried to maintain an old land claim. 85 
Federation Plans, particularly Froude's irresponsible utterances on 
Native Policy had already caused great unease in Basutoland,86 with 
tears that Basutoland would be given to the Free State as an incentive 
t . 0 F d to d a sop for the D1°amond F1°elds. 87 o J01n e era 10n an as Federation 
was seen as an anti-black combination by whites with the prospective 
withdrawal of Imperial arbitration. Thus Nehemiah Mshweshwe in his 
campaign, whether he believed it or not, told Mqike1a and Ndamas 1n 
March 1876 
that the Queen had given up South Africa and 
was going to withdraw all the troops, and that 
the white men being about to continue/to oppress 
the black race, the big chiefs ought to take 
1 h b d o 88 counse toget er to e rea y to res1st. 
By May, the newspapers had converted Thembu dissatisfaction into a 
plot, including Mathanzima, the Emigrant Thembu Chief, Ngangelizwe and 
S h OI' 89 ar 1 1. Frontier opinion, whose concern was always with defence, 
f d h f 1 0 h 0 f f Co, 90 oun t e scare use u 1n t e campa1gn or a De ence omm1SS10n. But 
84. Averill, pp.84-l09. 
85. Saunders, "Annexation", pp.150-9. 
86. Benyon: "Basutoland and the High Commission with particular reference 
to the years 1868-1884: The changing nature of the imperial 
government's "special responsibility" for the territory" (Unp. 
D.Phi1. thesis, Oxford, 1969), pp.312-20. 
87. G.52-76, p.7: Griffith to S.N.A., 21 April '76. 
88. C.1748, No. 12: Barkly to Carnarvon, 25 March '76. 
89. N.A. 154: Levey to S.N.A., 10 May '76. 
90. Molteno and Merriman thought the war scare was begun by the Eastern 
Star, which was certainly guilty of much sensational reporting. 
Merriman Papers, No. 13: Molteno to Merriman'; 5 Sept. '76. 
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the scare only really began in July. On 13th, the Rev. H.H. Dugmore of 
Queenstown telegraphed Brownlee: 
Secret information - Kafirs invade in spring -
Nehemiah, New England - Gange1izwe, Dordrecht and 
Queenstown - Kre1i, Eland's Post and sea coast -
All concentrate at Amato1as ••• Do send means of 
h 1d ' d b f h ;s c1osed. 91 o ~ng our groun e ore pat ~ 
92 Earthworks were thrown up at Dordrecht and Queenstown as the 
'combination' rumours began to include Cetywayo, the Basotho and even 
93 Sekhukhune. R. Cole the Magistrate at Wodehouse and E. Judge, the 
Civil Commissioner and Resident Magistrate at Queenstown sent alarmist 
94 
reports to Brownlee, which reaching the press, contributed to the uproar. 
The Government, although deprecating the alarm and insisting that reports 
from other frontier Magistrates were reassuring, ~ecided to send Brownlee 
again to the Frontier. It is significant that Sarhi1i was the first 
95 
whom it was deemed necessary to sound out. 
Brownlee concluded from his trip, that the Colonial Thembu were 
mainly responsible for the scare at Dordrecht and Queenstown, which had so 
quickly spread over the whole frontier. 96 According to Judge they had 
discussed resisting Government and perhaps even launching a campaign 
, h h' 97 f ' aga~nst t e w ~tes Some 0 the Thembu and Em~grant Thembu took part 
91. C •• 1748, No. 50: Barkly to Carnarvon, 20 July '76. 
92. Ibid. 
93. C.1748, No. 158: Bulwer to Carnarvon, 20 Oct. '76. 
94. C.O. 3262: 
C.O. 3262: 
R. Cole to S.N.A., 22,29 July '76. 
Judge Memo., 31 Aug. '76. 
95. C.1748, No. 50: Bark1y to Carnarvon, 20 July '76. 
96. G.12-'77, p.165: Brownlee Memo., April '77. 
97. C.O. 3262: Memo. by E. Judge, 31 Aug. '76. 
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in these discussions98 but, as Brownlee pointed out, the Thembu as a 
whole, whatever their grievances, were too divided to embark on such a 
99 desperate venture. Sarhili and Ngangelizwe certainly met, and it 
may be surmised that they discussed common grievances, but Brownlee was 
again right when he argued on the basis of information he had received, 
that mutual jealousy and suspicion between the two was too great to 
resolve differences, let alone to launch an effective anti-white front. lOO 
When it came to the Basotho, Cetywayo and Sekhukhune, a combination became 
even more manifestly impossible, not least because of sheer geographical 
distance. The strategy of simultaneous revolt may have been discussed, 
but it is impossible on available evidence to confirm or reject this. As 
in following years, when the same factors were to operate, a clear 
distinction must be drawn between consultation, which there most certainly 
was, since pressure from colonial expansion bec~me an increasingly common 
issue in the Transkeian Territories and beyond, and co-ordinated steps 
101 to combat it, which in all probability it seems there weren't. 
Sarhili vehemently protested his desi -e for peace to Brownlee, a 
profession which is consistent with his previous policy. The scare 
seemed to him to be an attempt to find an excuse for attacking and 
subjecting his people to white rule - Sarhili could hardly be blamed for 
apprehension about white intentions and a determination to resist them, 
when such statements as this appeared in the press: 
98. N.A. 154: Ayliff to S.N.A., 22 July '76. 
99. c.o. 3262: Brownlee to Attorney-General, 18 Oct. '76. 
100. Molteno Papers, No. 508b Annexure 3: Brownlee reply on Memo. by 
Attorney-General, 21 Sept. '76. 
101. Schoeman, p.48, gives no evidence to justify his conclusion that 
there was a combination, except the belief of contemporaries that 
such existed. 
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The only chance I see for white settlement of the 
Transkei would be to conquer some tribe, say 
Kreli's, take his country, and exchange it for 
portions of land held by other tribes, and so get 
a foot in the centre of the masses of the native 
1 . 102 popu at10n. 
West Fynn, who as will be seen had his finger well on the pulse of 
Gcaleka opinion, reported the statement of an old Gcaleka Government 
servant which is illuminating: 
He said that the great talk amongst the Gcalekas 
has been that the Govt. [sic] is anxious to make 
war with Kreli, and only waiting for the slightest 
provocation, and war will be dictated against him. l03 
When the Colonial Authorities, still suspicious of Sarhili, determined 
to implement their boundary decision and reinforce their position in the 
Transkei, began arming their allies the Mfengu 104 in September, Sarhili's 
suspicions of white intentions can only have deepened. Yet he was 
hamstrung by both his need to avoid conflict with the British, and by 
division within the chiefdom. On the latter point, a factor that cannot 
be underestimated in analysing Gcaleka reaction to British pressures, 
the same old man had this to say: 
102. Graham's Town Journal, 29 Dec. '76, Report from the Thembuland 
Correspondent. 
Brownlee refers to other indignities heaped on the blacks by the 
press and to racial incidents, such as the assault on a son of 
Tini Maqomo, and the acquittal of a German who had murdered a 
Thembu· because a witness was drunk, as examples of the provocation 
of the blacks. 
Molteno Papers, Reply to Merriman's reply to No. 467: Brownlee Memo., 
3 Nov. '76. 
103. N.A. 154: West Fynn to S.N.A., 22 July '76. 
104. Molteno Papers, No. 508b: 
21 Sept. '76. N.A. 154: 
This was a crucial, but in 
Brownlee to Attorney-General, tel., 
Ayliff to S.N.A., 30 Sept. '76. 
terms of policy, logical decision. 
'. 
48 
1872-1877: SARHILI AND THE GCALEKA BESIEGED 
Also that he could not see how it could be possible 
for Kre1i to combine with the other tribes against 
the Govt. [sic] when his own tribe would not be 
unanimous, as a very bitter feeling exists between 
Maphasa and Kreli and a great portion of the 
Chief Sibozo (Nzabe1e's) tribe sympathize with 
Maphasa and Kreli is aware of it. 105 
The 1876 war scare demonstrated both growing black opposition to 
the advance of white rule and the concurrent lack of unity amongst the 
blacks. Thompson has rightly asserted that no real sense of racial 
identity among the blacks had developed and so the behaviour of chiefs and 
their people depended on their circumstances at the time and tneir 
perceptions of where their interests lay.106 Colonial officials liked 
to talk about "loyal tribes", but in reality loyalty to an abstract 
concept like the British Monarchywas generally foreign to blacks, though 
the Mfengu and Basotho may be said to have been developing such an idea. 107 
Even the educated Christian elite were to find the conflict of loyalties 
generated by the war of 1877 a traumatic experience. 108 
7. Sarhi1i and the Gcaleka besieged 
Brownlee, prompted by Wright, removed the chief cause of Thembu 
d · . f . h h d 1 . h' ... N b 109 1ssat1s act10n w en e restore Ngange 1zwe to 1S pos1t10n 1n ovem ere 
105. N.A. 154: West Fynn to S.N.A., 22 July '76. 
For Maphasa's differences with Sarhi1i, see below, pp.63-4 
106. L. Thomson in Oxford History, ii, 246. 
107. R. Moyer: "A history o:fi the Mfengu of the Eastern Cape, 1815-65" 
(unp. Ph.D. thesis, London University, 1976), p.20. 
lOB. See below, pp.157-9. 
109. N.A. 294: C. Mills to S.N.A., 29 Nov. '76. Wright had urged this 
step on Brownlee: N.A. 40: Wright to S.N.A., 17 Oct. '76. 
'. 
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Not only were the Thembu now retrieved as allies, and Wright, who had 
f 'd' 'f ,110 d' h' f' h b born the brunt 0 the~r ~ssat~s act~on, restore ~n t e~r a~t, ut 
the hold of the whites over Ngangelizwe was reinforced. Ngangelizwe 
owed to the British both his position and protection from his enemies 
( , )111 the Gcaleka, the Mpondo and Mpondom~se • It was a reasonable 
assumption that in any future conflict Ngangelizwe would see his 
interests in "loyalty" to the British, and that the large majority of 
Thembu would follow his example; though, where there were specific 
grievances combined with less pliant temperaments, this might not be the 
case. 
But precisely because the Thembu had been brought back into the 
fold, colonial attention was again focussed on the Gcaleka. Sarhili 
had never achieved a really good working relationship with his Resident. 
William Fynn had asked to be transferred to another post after serious 
d 'ff ' h h h' f112 d' 1873 hId b J ~ erences w~t t e C ~e an ~n May e was rep ace y ames 
Ayliff. 113 Ayliff did not stay long. He went on long leave to 
England in 1875 and in March 1876 he was appointed to Fingoland in the 
place of Blyth. 114 Moyer's claim that Ayliff was a careerist without 
115 
real interest in the Mfengu is born out by Brownlee Ayliff's own 
reports indicate that, although energetic when he started with Sarhili, 
110. Molteno Papers, Reply to Merriman reply to No. 467: Brownlee 
Memo., 3 Nov. '76. 
Ill. G.2l-'75, p.37: W. Wright to S.N.A., 19 March '74. Barkly's 
visit to the Thembu may have been the deciding factor in avoiding 
a war. 
112. G.H. 8/48: W.R.D. Fynn to Bowker, 7 May '71. Relations between 
Fynn and Sarhili do seem to have improved after the quarrel. 
113. F. Brownlee, Transkeian Historical Records, p.l0. 
114. N .A. 294: C. Mills to S.N .A., 18 March '76. 
115. Moyer, p.3l. 
Molteno Papers, No. 508: Brownlee to Mills, Confidential, 
27 Sept. '76. 
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he became less so as time went on. In the pre-war crisis, he was 
virulently anti-Gcaleka and pro British intervention on the side of the 
Mfengu in the Gcaleka-Mfengu dispute. A somewhat confused interregnum 
in Gcalekaland followed his departure for Fingoland. T.A. Cummung, the 
Magistrate at the Idutywa (and Brownlee's brother-in-law) 
appointed to succeed Ayliff, but he remained based at the 
was officially 
116 Idutywa. 
His lax control of the Reserve had been severely criticised by the 1872 
Edmonstone Commission. He certainly found it impossible to exercise 
effective control over Gcalekaland from his distant base, and ran foul 
of the wily Sarhili, who saw it as his prerogative to interfere in the 
Idutywa where half the population was Gcaleka. In fact it was his 
inability to stop Sarhili's interference that was responsible for his 
discomforture in 1872. 117 Now, in July 1876 Sarhili accused him of 
deliberate vindictiveness in his judgements against him,118 and in 
119 October Brownlee pulled him up for not submitting regular reports. 
Only West Fynn, Ayliff's clerk who had deputised successfully for him in 
1875 and who now acted as a sort of unofficial Resident, was able to 
maintain effective liaison between Sarhili and Brownlee. His regular 
d h ' hI . f ' 1..1 f h ' d 120 an ~g y ~n ormat~ve reports are a valuav~e source or t e per~o • 
Sarhili was not only annoyed by the confusion in British representation 
with him, but also with many of the decisions of magistrates with 
116. N.A.294: C. Mills to S.N.A., 18 Harch '76. 
117. H.A.95, No.69:Report of Edmonstone Commission, 30 Dec. '72. 
pp. 40-7. 
118. N.A. 155: West Fynn to Cumming, 10 July '76. 
119. N.A. 154: Cumming to S.N.A., 20 Oct. '76. In all fairness to 
Cumming, his was an impossible positio~ for he was sandwiched 
between the feuding Thembu and Gcaleka, and the Reserve, with its 
polyglot popu1ation.was particularly susceptible to all kinds of 
tensions. 
120. His relationship with Sarhili is explored fully on p.83, 
footnote 65 below. 
" 
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surrounding chiefdoms. Such decisions seemed to be representative of a 
continuing discrimination against the Gcaleka by the British. 12l The 
most important of these is significant also for its startling parallel 
with the incident that precipitated war between the Gcaleka and British 
in 1877. 
Ndamas, the son of Maphasa, had gone in early 1876 into Fingoland 
without a pass, and had been caught by a Mfengu named Mbiko, arranging 
what seemed to be a liaison with his wife. An argment had followed, 
122 Mbiko had assaulted Ndamas, blinding him in one eye. When M. Liefeldt, 
the Acting Mfengu Agent, came to judge the case, he failed to examine 
Gcaleka witnesses (although he said none were produced) and relied on 
the evidence of Mbiko and his wife. He took Ndamas' lack of a pass as 
weighing against him and fined Mbiko only 3 head of cattle for the 
assault. 123 
124 The importance of the person of a chief has already been stressed. 
To fine an Mfengu three cattle for assaulting and seriously injuring a 
Gcaleka chief was therefore an insult to Gcaleka honour. When he 
reported the case, Maphasa explained its importance: 
"I am dead because my son is dead - we live by 
our sons ••• I would like to see the tears of the 
G . h' ,,125 overnment 1n t 1S case. 
121. De Kiewiet, p.168 recognises this in a passage I have used to 
conclude this chapter. Sarhili referred to discriminatory 
treatment he and the Gcaleka received on numerous occasions. 
See for example, p.35 above. 
122. N.A. 154: Ayliff to M. Liefeldt, 16 March, 25 March '76. 
123. N.A. 154: West Fynn to S.N.A., 7 April ' 76. 
J.,. 
124. See above, p.6. 
125. N.A. 154: Ay1iff to M. Liefeldt, 16 March '76. 
From what Brownlee. Warner and Dugmore say in Maclean. this would 
indeed be rather a light fine. 
J. Maclean (ed.): Compendium of Kaffir Laws and Customs 
(Wesleyan Mission Press, 1858), pp.33-34, 60.-3, 1l0-1l2. 
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When Maphasa and Sarhili heard of the fine, they were outraged: 
"We refuse to receive the fine of three head of 
cattle as compensation in this matter. This is a 
fine for a dog, not for a chief's son. Altho [sic] 
the Govt. [sic] took our country away from us, it 
allowed us our Chieftainship and it is a chief's 
son that has been killed, losing the sight of an 
. 11126 
eye 1.S death. 
Fynn reported that as a result of the Gcalekas' outrage, they contemplated 
. 1 127 a reprl.sa • Brownlee therefore instructed Liefeldt to increase the 
fine to five head of cattle with a further five on proof of blindness, 
pointing out that though Ndamas may have provoked the attack, the case 
was of great political importance and ought not to have received such 
128 
summary treatment. 
1876 also saw Brownlee seeKing to extend hi~ system of gradually 
undermining the chieftainship by subsidising individual chiefs. Well 
aware of the relations between Maphasa and Sarhi1i, Brownlee can only 
have had in mind an indirect attack on Sarhili's position when he 
suggested paying subsidies to Dalasi1e, Sarhili's second son of the 
Great House, Maphasa and his son Xhoxho. 129 That the suggestion was 
made as the war scare broke over the frontier can hardly have reassured 
126. N.A. 154: Ay1iff to M. Liefeldt, 16 March '76. 
127. N.A. 154: West Fynn to S.N.A., 7 April '76. 
128. N.A. 43: Liefeldt to S.N.A., 27 May '76, Brownlee Minute. 
129. On 14th July, Brownlee explained in his Memorandum that Maphasa 
had long advocated measures which would lead to his reception 
under British rule as an independent chief and on 22nd July he 
wrote to Fynn to suggest the allowances: 
C.1748, Encl. 2 No. SO, Brownlee Memo. on Transkeian 
Affairs, 14 July '76. 
N.A. 154: Brownlee to West Fynn, 22 July '76. 
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Sarhili. He reacted immediately to Brownlee's suggestion, asking Fynn 
to point out to Brownlee that as he was responsible for the behaviour 
of his people and chiefs, he was greatly disappointed that he had not 
been consulted in the matter, and trusted that the orders would be 
countermanded: The Government did not realise that the suggested 
subsidies would place these chiefs in an awkward position with those 
of a higher rank in the chiefdom. 130 Fynn reported ln September that 
Xhoxho was pressing for a public airing of the issue so that he and his 
131 
father could confront Sarhili. Relations between Maphasa and Sarhili 
had obviously deteriorated for he and Xhoxho had not attended any 
. 1 . f . 132 meet~ngs or consu tatlons or some tlme. Since Brownlee refused to 
abandon the idea, Sarhili,again asserting that he did not approve of 
the subsidies, suggested that the Government confine them to Sigcawu and 
Mcotoma (the first son of the Righ Hand House) who already had them. 
/ 
133 
Da1asi1e and Xhoxho, and not to elder chiefs like Maphasa. There is 
no correspondence to indicate the outcome of the issue, but Sarhili was 
c1ear!_y aware of Brownlee's tactics and was determined to prevent Maphasa 
being given any Government support. 
Finally, Sarhi1i's claims for more land both for the chiefdom and 
for himself, were turned down. 134 The Government refused to let him 
purchase or lease a farm in the Colony in order to isolate his herds 
from the rampant 1ungsickness. Sarhi1i was able to point to a man in 
130. N.A. 154: West Fynn to S.N. A. , 5 Aug. '76. 
131. N.A. 154: West Fynn to S. N. A. , 30 Sept. ' 76. 
132. N.A. 154: West Fynn to S.N.A. , 22 July , 76. 
133. N.A. 154: West Fynn to S.N.A. , 18 Nov. ' 76. 
134. N.A. 154: Ay1iff to S.N.A., 4 Feb. '76. 
N.A. 154: West Fynn. to S.N.A., 30 Sept. '76. 
Sarhili asked to be allowed to purchase or even lease a farm for his 
own personal use in either the Transkei or the Colony, because his 
cattle were dying from the 1ungsickness after mixing with diseased 
anilma1s. 
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the Idutywa Reserve who was leased a farm in the Peeltown District of 
the Colony by James Ayliff, when in November he complained to West Fynn 
that the Government was being very hard on him. Of course, he was also 
f ' 11 h h th b' exerted on h~m.135 re err~ng to ate at er pressures at were e~ng L 
But on balance, although the evidence of Gcaleka intentions towards 
the end ;of 1876 is contradictory, Cumming's assessment that Sarhili 
ld 'k' 1 'h 1 I' , 136 wou not rlS Via ence agaInst t e Co ony seems rea ~st~c. The 
Gca1eka were purchasing large numbers of guns and paying high prices for 
them,137 but guns were regarded as an indispensible token of manhood,138 
and Sarhi1i promptly turned over two cannon to Fynn which an unscrupulous 
trader tried to sell to him. 139 Sarhili did request permission to 
visit Sandi1e in September, a step which aroused Brownlee's suspicions,140 
and about the same time he summoned all the Gcaleka working in Bedford 
back to Gca1eka1and, though countermanding the order before they had 
! 
l~ft. 141 On the other hand, Sarhili had done nothing more than have 
discussions with Ngange1izwe (amongst others no doubt) during the war 
scare and must have been painfully aware of the rift between himself 
and Maphasa, who after all was one of the strongest chiefs in Gca1ekaland. 142 
135. N.A, 154: West Fynn to S.N.A., 18 Nov. '76. 
136. N.A. 154: Cumming to S.N.A., 28 Oct. '76. 
137. N.A. 154: West Fynn to S.N.A., 22 July '76. 
138. Certainly, Sarhi1i applied for permission to buy guns for his sons 
when they reached majority: N.A. 151: Ay1iff to S.N.A., 21 Aug. '74. 
139 •. N.A. 154: West Fynn to S.N.A., 14 July '76. 
140. N.A. 154: Fynn to S.N.A., 1 Sept. '76, Brownlee Minute. 
141. G.12-'77, p.132: A.Stewart to S.N.A., 18 Jan. '77. 
142. In 1870-2, W.R.D. Fynn estimated that there were about 8000 men 
in Sarhi1i's country and of these 2000 belonged to Maphasa and 
Nzabele. Transkeian Resident's Letterbook: W.R.D. Fynn to Col. 
Sec., 8 Dec. '70, and W.R.D. Fynn to Brownlee, 11 Oct. '72. 
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In the midst of the war scare, ploughing went on as normal in Gcalekaland 
and Sarhili took steps to prevent the sale of liquor 143 by traders. 
When there was an upsurge in theft later in the year as the drought 
deepened, Sarhili dealt promptly with each case, punishing offenders 
f " 1 144 1rm y. When lack of rain halted ploughing at the end of October, 
he and his councillors visited Rev. R.S. Leslie at Thuthura and asked 
him to offer up prayers for rain,and returned after rain had fallen 
145 
shortly afterwards to ask for thanksgiving prayers. The first 
mention of the existence of a war-party in Gcalekaland came only in 
December after the arrival amidst dramatic circumstances of the new 
"d 146 Res1 ent. 
In early 1876, the Gcaleka-Thembu-Bomvana boundary question began to 
assume in the eyes of the Colonial Authorities the proportions of a 
threat to peace. In addition to all the other pressures exerted on 
Sarhili, it was decided that a full time Resident should be appointed 
to Sarhili to exercise greater influence and restraint on him. The 
Government felt that it was necessary to have 'a gentleman on whose firmness, 
discretion and conciliatory manner the Government can place the fullest 
I " ,147 re. 1ance. Not surprisingly Cumming was not chosen. But West 
Fynn, a man who, by virtue of his intimate connection with the Gcaleka 
people was on excellent terms with Sarhili, was passed over in favour 
143. N.A. 154: West Fynn to S.N.A. 5 Aug. ' 76. 
144. N.A. 154: West Fynn to S.N .A .• 28 Oct. '76. 
145. N.A. 154: West Fynn to S. N. A •• 3 Nov. ' 76. 
146. See below,· pp. 57-9. 
147. C.1748, No. 170: Barkly to Carnarvon, 13 Nov. '76. 
" 
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148 
of a man who was unsuited for the job on almost every ground. 
Col. John Eustace, formerly of Her Majesty's regular army, sometime 
commander of the Cape Town Volunteers and M.P. for Cape Town for several 
149 years, was a man of conventional military mind, unacquainted with the 
150 
customs, language and territory of the Gcaleka, he had the one major 
drawback which was bound to make Sarhili and his people highly suspicious 
of his appointment - he was a military man, connected with the British 
Army. For before Eustace's arrival at Nthlambe where the office of the 
British Resident with Sarhili was situated, there had been troop 
movements in the Colony. On 20 July Barkly had written to Carnarvon that 
although his advisers did not anticipate any serious threat consequent on 
the war scare, he nevertheless felt it wise to ask for the despatch of 
early replacements for the departing 32nd Regiment, so that these two 
ld ' 'f 151 cou act 1n concert 1 necessary. The reinforcement duly arrived 
on 16 November in the form of 2 Divisions of the 3rd Buffs which were 
152 transferred to East London. As we have seen the Government viewed 
Sarhili's attitude to the Boundary Question as a serious threat to peace, 
and so Barkly had requested that the Imperial Troops should hold the 
frontier, while the F.A.M.P. were sent over the Kei. Fort unate ly, 
148. 
149. 
150. 
William MacDowell Fynn, West Fynn's father, had become British 
Diplomatic Agent with Sarhili soon after the death of Hintsa, a post 
which he held until 1853. \.Jest Fynn was born in 1845 at Butterworth. 
His elder brother, William Rafferty Donald Fynn was Resident 
Magistrate with Sarhili from the latter's return to Gcalekaland in 
1865 until 1873. The following year, West Fynn became his brother's 
successor's clerk . 
. M. Davies: Twin Trails (Salisbury, 1974), pp. 39-69. 
D.S.A.B., iii, 280-281. 
West Fynn to Cory, 29 Sept. 
Rev. J. Dewar: A Testimony 
The '77 war, p.25. 
1920, in Davies, p.6l. 
to Mr West Fynn's Work, in Fynn, 
Cory LibrarY, PR 1609: Major C.H. 
in cutting from Jhe Daily News, 31 
Malan to the Editor, 23 Aug. '78, 
Aug. '78. 
151. C.1748, No. 50: Barkly to Carnarvon, 20 July '76. 
152. C.1748, Encl. No. 191: Cunynghame to the War 01fice, 26 Nov. '76. 
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instead of sending the 3rd Buffs to King William's Town in accordance 
with these arrangements, Barkly told Sir Arthur Cunynghame the Imperial 
Commander in Chief in South Africa, to merely disembark the 3rd Buffs 
153 
at East London. But the mere disembarkation designed to make 
Sarhili respect the Colonial boundary fixing, produced a state of tension 
in the Transkei such that even the Mfengu suspected that the whites 
, d d 154 1n ten e war. 
Into this situation stepped the new Resident with Sarhili. That a 
stranger should be appointed when all previous Government representatives 
had been frontiersmen, well known to him even if not well-liked by him; 
that he was a military man at a time of troop movements and increasing 
white pressure; all this seemed to confirm Sarhili's fears that the 
appointment of Eustace was the first step towards depriving him at worst 
of the country, his freedom and position or at bes~ enforcing an unacceptable 
b d I , h' 155 oun ary 1ne on 1m. 
Sarhili was to be introduced to Eustace by Cumming on Tuesday 28th 
November. A report that the F.A.M.P. had crossed the boundary resulted 
in the war cry being raised on the Monday and armed men flocked to the 
Residency and its environs. 156 Sarhili, thoroughly alarmed, had already 
fled to his kraal on the Qora some ten miles away. West Fynn went 
repeatedly to try and allay his suspicions, but it was not until the 
Saturday that he agreed to be introduced to Eustace by Fynn. 157 
153. Ibid. 
154. N.A. 154: Cumming to S.N.A., 2 Dec. '76. 
155. Rev. J. Dewar, in Fynn, pp.25-26. 
Hook, pp.216-220. 
The Cape Mercury, 1 December 1876 quoted in Hook, pp.2l6-220. 
156. N.A. 154: Cumming to S.N.A., 2 Dec. '76. 
157. Rev. J. Dewar in Fynn, p.26. 
'. 
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The message delivered to Sarhili by Eustace was not reassuring as to 
the independence of the Gcaleka. Eustace told Sarhili: 
The Queen .•. as Paramount Chief of South Africa, 
whilst willing to extend the protection of her 
laws ••• to all who seek to live under them ••• 
does not recognize the right of any chief or 
people to make war, or in any way to alter their 
boundaries, 'without the consent of her 
158 Governmen t. 
Sarhili was therefore to comply with the boundary line recently laid 
down. In reply Sarhili asked Eustace why he had not been consulted 
On the changes and asked if, as Eustace admitted he WhS regarded as 
Paramount Chief of the Gcalekas, 
Where is my chieftainship, if I am not consu~ted 
on these changes? If I were to treat my 
servants as the Government treats me, they would 
b . f· d 159 not e sat~s ~e • 
Eustace was further questioned about the Government's military 
intentions, the shortage of land and the boundary question. The 
Gcaleka clearly indicated that they did not regard even the grant of 
the whole Ncehana valley, a concession Brownlee had made, as closing the 
matter. Nevertheless, when the meeting closed, Bhotomane, Maphasa and 
Sarhili said they accepted Eustace, but warned him that he would find 
his position a difficult one since the Gca1eka were "a people of many 
1 . 11 160 c;.omp a~nts. 
158. Hook, p.225. 
159. Ibid, p.228. 
160. Ibid, p.23l. 
" 
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An incident had been narrowly averted. Sarhili had told his 
councillors at a meeting on the Tuesday that he was sick and tired of 
being hunted by the English and preferred to die instead. Some of the 
converted Gcaleka warned their missionaries that war was imminent. 
And Cumming on the Saturday refers for the first time to the existence 
of a strong war party, though adding that Sarhili would avoid war if he 
. 161 poss~bly could. A report given to Richard Tainton, the Special 
Magistrate of King William's Town, by an Mfengu headman confirms 
Cumming's report. The Mfengu acknowledged the existence of a large 
war party amongst the Gcaleka, but said that Sarhi1i was doing all he 
could to suppress it. This he said was because a Basotho Doctor, who 
had been doctoring him, ordered two bulls to have their front right 
forelegs amputated. One represented Sarhi1i, the other the English. 
Whichever one survived longest would be successful/if a war broke out. 
Sarhili's bull died first and he was consequently very frightened. 162 
But it is significant that on the day of Tainton's report, Ayliff wrote 
to Brownlee to tell him of a report by an Idutywa resident that Sandi1e 
had sent to Sarhili to say that the police were "dividing" his country, 
and that he was tired of the police. Sarhi1i replied that he must not 
submit to this - he would assist Sandi1e to defend his territory.163 
With the coming of the New Year, the crisis seemed to have passed. 
The rains of February broke the drought and averted the threat of 
161. N.A. 154: Cumming to S.N.A., 2 Dec.'76. 
162. N.A. 155: R. Tainton to J. Rose-Innes, 19 Dec. '76. Tainton was 
to be murdered along with his brother and a police officer almost 
exactly a year later at the beginning of the Colonial Rebellion. 
See below, pp.153-4. 
The Basotho doctor may well be the same that Brownlee refers to as 
introducing the custom of salt-water injections and sea-bathing 
to the Gcaleka in 1876-7. 
G.12-'77, p.169: Brownlee Memo., April '77. 
163. N.A. 154: Ayliff to S.N.A., 19 Dec. '76. 
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. l63a fam~ne. Eustace, who had signed a spate of passes for the Public 
164 Works in the colony, a real indication of distress amongst the Gcaleka, 
and who then anticipated a serious food shortage could remark in April 
at the great change wrought by the rains. 165 The Gcaleka-Bomvana 
boundary was beaconed off on 3rd February, including the Ncehana Valley 
in Gcaleka Territory. Realising that an immediate separation of peoples 
would be unwise because of a scarcity of food and the preponderance 
of people on the Bomvana side of the boundary, Eustace allowed Bomvana 
to remain amongst the Thembu as long as they were prepared to stay 
under British authority.166 
But the lull was more apparent than real. Despite compensation 
elsewhere for the loss of the Ncehana, the Thembu were dissatisfied, 
and soon began to direct a stream of complaints through Scott to the 
Government. Thembu chiefs refused to let men gp and seek work so as 
not to weaken themselves, and they would not allow the removal of people 
because this might prejudice their claim to land based on their 
. 167 
occupat~on. Nor was Moni satisfied. Eustace had suggested that 
W.R.D. Fynn be appointed British Resident with Moni because of his 
personal knowledge of the area and its inhabitants. Fynn was appointed 
l63a. See above, p.24. Other Transkeian Agents reported similarly but 
warned of a shortage of food, except amongst the Mfengu towards 
Christmas: N.A. 155: various reports, June '77. 
164. G.12-'77, p.77: Eustace to S.N.A. 27 Jan. '77. Eustace signed 
165. 
166. 
167. 
224 passes for the Public ~vorks in November and December, a startling 
increase. 
G.17-'78, 
N.A. 155: 
confident 
wife and 
N.A. 155: 
N .A. 40: 
N.A. 42: 
p.28: Eustace to S.N.A., 31 Jan. 78. 
Eustace to S.N.A., 26 April '77. Eustace had felt 
enough in February to leave Gcalekaland to fetch his 
children from Cape Town. 
Eustace to S.N.A., 8 Feb., '77. 
Scott to Wright, 19, 21 Feb. '77. 
Wright to S.N.A., 27 July '77. 
" 
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168 
retrospectively as from 1 February. In July Fynn forwarded 
complaints from Moni that although Sarhili's claim to the Ncehana Valley 
had been recognised, his claim to the land formerly belonging to Mlatha, 
" b h' T I' h db' d 169 and S1nce h1s departure, y 1S son ya 1, a not een recogn1se • 
To show that they hadn't abandoned their claim, the Bomvanas began 
ploughing on the Thembu side of the border in late July.170 
There were other signs that the calm Eustace spoke of in April was 
illusory. There had been another Gcaleka-Mfengu flare-up before April. 
171 There was a case of murder involving Gvaleka and Mfengu, and another 
in which Sarhili, Fynn and eventually Brownlee thought that the Mfengu 
were trying to wrongfully lay the blame for a crime on the Gcaleka. This 
"d 1 d d 1 k 1" h b d 172 1nC1 ent e to arme Gca e a 1n1ng t e or ere In May Eustace 
warned Sarhili that the sale of brandy, which had encouraged several 
fights between Gcaleka, could involve Mfengu who weFe also crowding round 
. 173 
the sellers and lead to bloodshed hard to localize. 
Sarhili's relationship with Eustace was not cordial. Fynn's 
1 , h S h'l' 'd d E f ' 174, b b c a1m t at ar 1 1 aV01 eustace or some t1me 1S orn out y reports 
of Eustace himself. 175 In April on Eustace's return, he had complained 
to him that he was "still made a bugbear of, as wishing for war" by 
168. C.O. 3277: Brownlee to Colonial Secretary, 3 March '77 • 
169. N.A. 155: W.R.D. Fynn to S.N.A., 11 July '77 • 
170. N.A. 42 : Wright to S.N.A., 27 July '77 • 
171. N.A. 155: Ayliff to S.N.A., 13 Jan. '77 and correspondence following. 
172. N.A. 154: West Fynn to Ayliff, 9 Nov. '76. 
N.A. 155: Ayliff to S.N.A., 3 Feb. '77 and Brownlee Minute. 
173. N.A. 155: . Eustace to S.N.A., 5 May' 77. 
174. Fynn, p.5. 
175. N.A. 154: 
N .A. 155: 
Eustace to S.N.A., 22 Dec. '76. 
Eustace to S.N.A., 25 Jan. '76. 
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the Government. Eustace tried to assure Sarhili that the Government 
had never believed the rumours about him, and recommended to Brownlee 
that Sarhili should be granted a farm so as to remove one of the causes 
f 1 · 176 or comp a1nt. 
8. Dissension within the Walls: Gcaleka Responses 
But it was perhaps in intra-tribal politics that the tensions 
amongst the Gcaleka were greatest at the time. The pressures brought 
to bear over several years on the Gcaleka, particularly over the last 
eighteen months had polarized opinion. The development of war and 
peace parties within the Gca1eka chiefdom has already been noted. The 
177 leaders of the two parties may be identified from contemporary reports. 
The leaders of the war party were Runeyi and Qaza, two of Sarhi1i's 
most influential councillors and leaders of the armies of the Great 
Councillors, the Ntshinga I Divison of royal clans and the Qawuka' 
Division of commoners respectively, Bacela, Qaza's son, Sigcawu, 
Ngubo, Sarhili's cousin and bosom friend, Ngxito the Gcaleka chief and 
to1a (war-doctor) whom even Sarhili feared, and Sitshaka, a minor son 
of Hintsa. Taken together, these men wielded a tremendous amount of 
power and influence. 
176. N.A. 155: Eustace to S.N.A., 28 April '77. The practice of 
buying off chiefs' opposition was not new - see above p.22, footnote 68. 
177. The following sources yield information in this respect: 
Cory Library, M.S. 14, 608(3): A.W. Burton: Notebook 
on 1877-8 war, pp.1l-12. 
C.l961, Encl. No. 43: Statement of West Fynn before 
Frere, 29 Sept. 3 Oct. '77. 
C.1961, Encl. No. 57: Report of Lot-Khaie, Native 
missionary. 
G.17-'78, p.217: Brownlee Memo., May '78. 
Peires, pp.41,footnote 5, 78-9. 
J.H. Soga: The South-Eastern Bantu (Johannesburg, 1930), pp.l19, 240. 
J.H. Soga: The Ama-Xosa: Life and Customs (Loveda1e, 1931) Ch. VI. 
F. Brownlee, Transkeian Historical Records, p.10. 
The most important source are Fynn's two reports to Frere. The fact 
that Fynn chose to keep information of this nature to himself for so 
long is just one of the many curious aspects o~ his role in the period 
before the war, a role that is explored more fully in the following 
chapters. 
63 
1872-1877 : SARHILI AND THE GCALEKA BESIEGED 
The peace party was led by Bhotomane, Sarhili's chief councillor, 
and included Maphasa, head of the important Tsonyana clan, his son Xhoxho, 
Maki one of Sarhili's councillors, Sibozo a chief from the Qolora area, 
and a minor chief named Kusi. A black preacher attached to the 
Thuthura Mission, Rev. Lot-Khaie reported that Ngxito inclined for a 
long time towards the peace party and only joined the war party in mid 
1877, and Brownlee repeated this statement in his Memorandum of May 1878. 
Sarhili as we have seen also inclined towards the peace party. 
But at the same time the peace party was split by differing attitudes 
towards British rule. Sarhili was,as we have,seen a convinced 
traditionalist, determined to preserve political and cultural independence. 
Maphasa and Maki on the other hand were both favourably disposed towards 
British rule, though for different reasons. Maki had formerly been 
an extremely influential councillor (Theal maintai~s that he was 
Sarhili's chief councillor) when Tiyo Soga began his mission work at 
Thuthura, in the late 1860's. Maki alone amongst the Gcaleka 
councillors expressed an active interest in the mission, and was reported 
by Tiyo Soga as being favourably disposed to European institutions as 
178 
a whole. Maphasa, son of Bhurhu, half-brother of Hintsa and adviser 
to both him and Sarhili whose uncle he was,179 on the other hand sought 
British rule as a means to recognition of independent status. In 1872 
he had expressed a wish "to live entirely under the Government';L80 and 
encouraged by W.R.D. Fynn, he had defied Sarhili and refused to 
fight the Thembu. 18l In July 1876 Brownlee wrote in his Memorandum on 
on Transkeian Affairs that Maphasa had long advocated measures which 
would lead to his independence and reception under British rule. We 
178. Chalmers, pp.396-9. 
179. Saunders, "Annexation", p.17l, footnote 5. 
180. C.O. 3205: Blyth to Col. Sec., 3 Sept. 1872. 
181. Transkeian Resident's Notebook: W.R.D. Fynn to S.N.A. 31 July, 
2 Oct., 11 Oct. '72. 
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have seen how he became the centre of a controversy between Sarhili 
and Brownlee over subsidies and how he and Xhoxho had refrained from 
attending Gcaleka councils and meetings at the same time, being supported 
in their conflict with Sarhi1i by Sibozo. 182 The account of Eustace's 
meeting with Sarhili in Hook depicts Maphasa as taking a strongly 
'd d I' 183 1n epen ent 1ne. Soon after the meeting,Xhoxho visited Eustace to 
assure him of his and his father's loyalty to the British, thus indirectly 
184 
confirming Cumming's report of the existence of a war party. 
That members of the two parties or 'rather in the early 70's 
opposing schools of thought, had long been involved in manoeuvring for 
advantage can be seen in the story of Maki and Ngubo. Maki's 
progressive ideas brought him into conflict with conservative elements in 
the chiefdom and he was accused of bewitching Sarhili's cattle (a 
standard mechanism for getting rid of people who were becoming too rich 
I 
or powerful for the comfort of the chief or his councillors) and was 
185 forced to flee to the Idutywa Reserve. Theal says he was replaced 
by Ngubo who was implacably opposed to the whites. 186 Maki must have 
returned, because he was one of the Gcaleka who accompanied Eustace 
when he marked out the boundary in February 1877. 187 Soga relates 
how Maki and Mbali, a diviner, drove a wedge between Sarhili and 
Ngubo by blaming the latter for the disaster which befell the Gcaleka 
troops at the second battle of the war. Ngubo, already in disfavour 
182. See above, p. 48. 
183. Hook, pp.2l7-224. 
184. N.A. 154: Eustace to S.N .A., 22 Dec. ' 76. 
185. Chalmers, pp.396-9. 
186. Theal, X, 52. 
187. N.A. 155: Eustace to S.N.A., 8 Feb. '77. 
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because he had disobeyed Sarhili's orders in launching the first attack, 
, 1 '1 188 went ~nto vo untary ex~ e. It is interesting to note that Maki, 
Bhotomane and Mba1i were the first Gca1eka to surrender to the British 
f h f ' 1 f 1 h' ,189 troops a ter t e ~rst apparent y success u w ~te campa1gn. 
In June and July two developments took place which point to deepening 
tensions within the chiefdom. Cumming reported that many Gcaleka were 
visiting Ngxito, and were circulating stories of visions and revelations 
which produced much excitement, although it did not appear that Sarhili 
, 1 d 190 was 1nvo ve • Frere in October, after the war had begun, refers to 
reports that the Gcaleka had been influenced by one prophetess who claimed 
to have seen visions of Hintsa, other chiefs and armed men rising from 
the water and calling the chiefdom to arms. It was said she was 
responsible for the adoption of close formation tactics at Ibeka which 
'b d h f the Gcaleka. 19l contr1 ute to t e massacre 0 Some sources even claim 
I 
h h ' h N' h d h f ' 192 t at t 1S prop etess was 1ta, t e aug ter 0 Ngx1to. These 
startling parallels to the millenarianism of the Cattle Killing are g1Ven 
more prosaic trappings by Lot-Khaie, the black preacher, who told Frere 
of many people in the period preceding the war having visions of armed 
troops, warriors, baggage wagons and so on. As the excitement increased 
women going for water said they saw these things, but Lot-Khaie dismissed 
h · h f' 193 t ~s as t e customary amusement 0 compan10ns. 
188. Soga, AIDa-Xhosa, pp.113-5. 
189. G.19-'86, p.8: Report on Resettlement of Sarhili in Bomvanaland. 
190. G.17-'78, p.216: Brownlee Memo., May '78. 
191. C.1961, No. 57: Frere to Carnarvon, 12 Oct. '77. 
192. "An Ex Cape Mounted Rifleman" :with the Cape Mounted Rifles: 
Four years active service in South Africa (London, 1881),p.98. Henceforth 
referred to as Ex C.M.R. 
193. C.1961, No. 57: Frere to Carnarvon, 12 Oct. '77. 
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Equally intriguing was the attempted" coronation" of Sarhili that 
both Eustace and Fynn refer to. 194 When Hintsa was killed Soga says 
that Sarhili was not formally installed as his successor and Paramount 
of the Xhosa. The ceremony of ubu-hlalu or placing a necklace of red 
beads around the neck of the new Paramount, was not performed because 
people thought the time was inopportune. A division of opinion took 
place over the umqo10 ceremony whereby every adult male recognised the 
Chief by bringing a gift of cattle to him. The Ntshinga favoured 
the performance of this ceremony, but the Qawuka believed that this 
would provoke the new Chief to prove himself and so bring further troubles 
down on the Gcaleka. In the end, the Ntshinga went ahead and so 
some cattle were collected. 195 
Both Fynn and Burton196 mention that Qaza and Runeyi had acted as 
regents until Sarhili came of age, and both consider, that the non-
installation of Sarhili contributed to their influence. In June and 
July there was considerable excitement over the discussion of Sarhi1i's 
"coronation" amongst the Gcaleka, but neither Sarhili nor his councillors, 
in particular Qaza and Runeyi, were in favour of this. Fynn and Burton 
say that the latter's reasons were that this move would give power to 
Sarhili and since he supported Sarhili's policy, to Maki. Maphasa, 
Eustace says, also advised against it on the grounds that Hintsa had 
d " d 1 f h f d h" 197 le on y two years a ter t e ceremony was per orme on 1m. 
194. C.196l, Encl. No. 43: Report of West Fynn to Frere, 29 Sept. '77. 
G.17-'78, pp.28-9: Eustace to S.N.A., 31 Jan. '78. 
195. Soga, Ama-Xosa, pp.99-l02. 
196. Cory Library, MS 14, 608(3): A.W. Burton: Notebook on 1877-8 war, 
pp.1l-12. 
C.196l, Encl. No. 43: Statement of West Fynn before Frere, 
29 Sept., 3 Oct. '77. 
It may be that Burton is relying on Fynn but the context does not 
seem to indicate this. 
197. G.17-'78, p.29: Eustace to S.N.A., 31 Jan. '78. 
'" 
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Sarhi1i would have preferred to have proceded with the arranged great 
hunt, a customary activity which released the aggressive tensions of the 
chiefdom, but which, owing to the controversy over the "coronation" did 
198 
not take place. 
While the sources for these accounts above are not always entirely 
reliable, it seems certain that there was discussion of some formalisation 
of Sarhi1i's position and that this was rejected. When seen against the 
background of politicking and the activities of the war diviners, 
prophetesses and Ngxito, it seems reasonable to conclude that there was 
in the first half of 1877 increasing manoeuvring between those who 
feared that any such demonstration would bring ruin and disaster to 
the chiefdom. 
Sarhi1i faced a dilemma: he wished ardently to preserve the position 
and traditions of not only the Gca1eka, but of the Xhosa nation as a 
whole, but he realised that any conflict with the Thembu or the Mfengu 
would draw in the British as their allies, and consequently would be 
disastrous. In the quarrel that erupted between the Mfengu and 
Gca1eka in August 1877, Gca1eka opinion as to whether to launch an all 
out attack on the Mfengu long trembled in the balance. The Mfengu, 
assured of white support in the eventuality of war, seemed to take 
ma1icio'us delight in rubbing salt into the wounds of Gca1eka resentment, and 
must bear much of the responsibility for tipping the scales in favour 
of war. There are good grounds for suspecting that many of the 
acquisitive and competitive Mfengu looked at this time of overcrowding 
and economic troubles to some tangible benefits from the outcome of a 
war with the Gca1eka. 
198. C.1961, Encl. No. 43: Report of West Fynn to Frere, 29 Sept. '77. 
G.17-'78, pp.28-9: Eustace to S.N.A., 31 Jan. '78. 
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AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 1877: THE GCALEKA DECIDE TO FIGHT 
1. The Beer-Drink of Ngcayecibi's Kraal 
The story of the beer-drink at Ngcayecibi's kraal is one of the best 
known in Xhosa tradition and there are many versions. There are also 
several written accounts, some contemporary, which differ as to 
d 'I b' h' l' 1 1 eta~, ut ~n sum, t e ma~n out ~nes are c ear. On 3rd August 
Ngcayecibi, a Mfengu living at Headman Qenqa's kraal near Butterworth, 
held a beer-drink ~n honour of the marriage of his son Kewuti. Some 
Gca1eka including a party of the Tsonyana clan under two petty chiefs, Mxoli 
and Fihla, attended the beer-drink. 2 The time came when the guests began 
leaving. Mxoli demanded more beer and was informed by his Mfengu hosts 
that there was none left. Now the Mfengu had a reputation for 
! 
being very 
tight with their beer3 and obviously Mxoli suspected that they were, as 
usual, holding back a reserve to drink themselves when their guests had left. 
He insisted, and when another Gcaleka who was not of his party assured him 
that the beer was indeed finished, Mxoli struck him and a brawl developed. 
Outnumbered by the Mfengu, the Gcaleka were driven across the Gcuwa River. 
Mxoli and Fihla were severely beaten, and one of the companions died. 
1. E.g. Theal, X, 53-4; J. Ayliff and J. Whiteside: A History of 
the Abambo, (Butterworth, 19l~, p.63; Soga: S.E. Bantu, pp.255-6 
(2 versions); Fynn: pp.l-2; C.2220, Encl. No. 21: Brownlee 
Memo., c.Aug. '77. Encl. No. 83: James Ayliff to West Fynn, 
5 Aug. '77. 
2. Soga and Theal say that an open invitation was customary on such 
occasions, while most informants assert that the Gcaleka were 
actually invited. 
Soga: S.E. Bantu, pp.255-6; Thea1, op.cit. Vol. X, pp.53-4. Under 
Blyth's firm control, no Gca1eka had been allowed to attend Fingo 
beer-drinks, but Ay1iff had let the rule slide. Campbell, p.122. 
3. The Gcaleka have a saying: "There is always beer in a Mfengu's 
outside room". Interview with Mr N.C. Melane, Qwaninga Location, 
Willowvale District, 14 Sept. 1977. 
<. 
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The Tsonyana were enraged and were only prevented from making an 
immediate retaliatory raid by a chief named Tuada. 4 The fight was reported 
at the Resident's office the next day, and West Fynn, in the absence of 
5 Eustace, went on the 5th to the scene of the fight, where he took statements 
from those involved. 6 Eustace decided on the basis of Fynn's report to 
7 him that there was no need to hurry back. Both he and Fynn assumed that 
the matter could be settled with Ayliff as was the custom in Gcaleka 
8 disputes with the Mfengu. 
But this was the third incident between Maphasa's people and the 
Mfengu, and the second actually involving relatives of his. 9 Feeling 
between the Mfengu and Gcaleka was running high as has been seen, and the 
brawl was therefore no ordinary young~man's stick fight, especially since 
the person of a chief had been violated. lO The Tsonyana's anger 
therefore did not abate, and on the night of the 8th-9th August they carried 
out a large-scale retaliatory raid right along the Gcuwa River. Maphasa 
and Xhoxho were fully implicated, Xhoxho actually leading the raid. ll 
4. C.1961, Encl. No. 83: Eustace to Frere, 18 Aug. '77. 
5. He was on a tour of Thembuland with the newly-appointed Chief 
Magistrate, Major Elliot. The idea of his accompanying Elliot was 
to demonstrate to the Transkeian blacks that Government officials 
worked in harmony and did not take sides in tribal disputes. 
N.A. 42: Eliot to Brownlee, 3 Aug. '77. 
6. C.196l, Encl. No. 83: West Fynn to Ayliff, 9 Aug. '77. 
7. G.17-'78, p.29: Eustace to S.N.A., 31 Jan. '78. 
8. C.1961, Encl. No. 83: Eustace to Frere, 18 Aug. '77. 
9. See above, pp.51-2. 
10. See above, p. 6, for a discussion of this question. 
11. Fynn, p.2. Thea1, X, 54 dates this event too early • 
Maphasa when asked by a Mfengu headman why he had resorted to violence 
when the matter was in the hands of the magistrates simply replied 
that 'a Gcaleka chief had been killed.' G.17-'78, p.166: Ayliff 
to S.N.A., 11 Aug. '77. 
Melane quotes a similar response by Xhoxho to Sarhili's injunction 
not to risk a war over a petty interview. Interview with Mr N.C. 
Melane, Qwaninga Location, Willowvale District', 14 Sept. 1977. 
Maphasa was involved in a further case of theft from Mfengu the 
following week. G.17-'78, p.162: Ayliff to Eustace, 16 Aug. '77. 
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At the time West Fynn palliated their responsibility, saying that 
Maphasa was most annoyed with his people and reprimanded them severely 
for taking the matter into their own hands when he had referred it to 
. . 12 h~s mag~strate. But in his pamphlet written ~n 1911, he admits that 
when he went to investigate the raid, he had to convince Maphasa and 
Xhoxho that their approval of the raid would bring severe consequences, 
before they agreed to assist him in collecting the stock that had been 
13 
seized by the Tsonyana. This amounted to some 3 horses, 134 cattle 
and 629 sheep and goats. 14 
Xhoxho, Sarhili's brother, had reported the raid to the Paramount, 
who sent a message ordering the Gcaleka to return to their kraals. 
Together with Fynn's presence, this had a quietening effect, and the 
parties of armed Mfengu and Gcaleka who had been facing one another across 
h d 11 d · d 15 t e Gcuwa gra ua y ~sperse. There is a Mfe,ngu report that Sarhili 
told Maphasa to 'drive the Mfengu to the Tsomo' ,16 but this seems unlikely 
in the light of the evidence. Nevertheless, the two peoples remained 
12. C.196l, Encl. No. 83: West Fynn to Ayliff, 9 Aug. '77. 
13. Fynn, p.2. 
14. C.l96l, Encl. No. 83: Eustace to Frere, 18 Aug. '77. 
15. Fynn, p.2. 
Melane confirms that Sarhili sent such a messenger. Interview with 
Mr N.C. Melane, Qwaninga Location, Willowvale District, 14 Sept. '77. 
A Mfengu headman also reported that he had heard Bhotomane's 
messenger say that Sarhili had told the missionaries not to let 
their people (the Christians) flee, as the raid was Maphasa's 
responsibility, not his. G.17-'78, p.166: Ayliff to S.N.A., 
11 Aug. '77. 
16. G.ll-'78, p.154: Evidence of Magida before Ay1iff, 15 Aug. '77. 
C.2220, Encl. No. 21: Brownlee Memorandum, c. Aug. '78. 
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extremely tense, particularly those who were further away from the 
17 boundary and did not know precisely what had occurred. 
When Brownlee was informed of the beer-drink and subsequent raid, 
he telegraphed Inspector E.B. Chalmers, commander of the F.A.M.P. at 
Komgha, suggesting he move up a troop of police to prevent further 
incidents. With the understanding that marked his behaviour throughout 
the next two months, Chalmers replied that such a move would be seen by 
the Gcaleka as Government favouritism to the Mfengu, and would therefore 
have a provocative effect. He sent to Ayliff advising that more good 
18 
would be done by waiting and Ayliff, at that stage, agreed. 
Unaware of Eustace's continued absence, Brownlee also asked Chalmers 
to tell Eustace that he should demand the immediate restitution of the 
stock from Sarhili. Then, in co-operation with Ayliff, he should conduct 
an enquiry, depending on the outcome of which, fu~ther satisfaction 
might be demanded of Sarhili. 19 It looks as if Brownlee, in the absence 
of reports from Eustace, jumped to the conclusion that the colony's 
bete-noire was responsible for the trouble. 
Since Eustace had not returned, Ayliff began conducting an enquiry 
among the Mfengu as to the origins of the beer-drink brawl. Fynn sent 
20 to inform Eustace of the raid and to request his return, and in the 
17. G.17-'78, p.167: Ayliff to S.N.A., 11 Aug. '77. 
18. G.17-'78, p.167: Ayliff to S.N.A., 12 Aug. '77. 
A direct descendant of Veldtman, Thomas Bikitsha, asserts that 
Veldtman asked for Government support immediately after the raid, 
but at first the Government were only prepared to give the Mfengu 
o.rms. Interview with Hr T. Bikitsha, Zozulwana Location, 
Butterworth, 20 Sept. 1977. 
It is interesting to note that all informants were agreed that the 
Mfengu actively solicited the aid of the Whites and were therefore 
partly, if not wholly responsible for their involvement. 
19. G.17-'78, p.148: S.N.A. to Chalmers, tel., 11 Aug. '77. 
20. G.17-'78, p.29: Eustace to S.N.A., 31 Jan. '78. 
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meanwhile did his best to collect the stolen stock. But some had been 
eaten and some taken by Gcaleka other than the Tsonyana. Consequently 
they proved difficult to trace, and no-one, including Sarhili, was keen 
to make up the missing Mfengu stock out of their own herds. Forty head 
of cattle were to remain outstanding for almost a month, ~fact which 
Ayliff capitalised on when advocating strong measures against Sarhili. 2l 
During the week following the raid, there were a series of petty 
clashes and thefts in which both sides were involved. The Mfengu generally 
obeyed Ayliff's order to fall back from the boundary and they did not 
22 
follow up their successes in fights by invading Gcalekaland. But 
they were not all virtue and innocence, as Ayliff claimed, for there are 
several recorded instances of Mfengu provocation. 23 The GcaH~ka, who 
were busy robbing some of the vacated Mfengu kraals along the border, 
threatened in return to drive the Mfengu to the Ndenxa River, the 
I 
b d . 1 d 24 western OUn ary of F1ngo an • It was in the Idutywa Reserve that 
tensions were greatest. As had been apparent in 1872 and on several 
occasions since then, Cumming exercised little authority or control over 
h h 1 . 25 t e eterogeneous popu at10n. The Gcaleka and Mfengu residents of 
the Reserve therefore took up this new quarrel with little let or hindrance. 
After the raid of the 9th, there were several incidents climaxing on the 
17th in the reported wholesale theft of cattle from Mfengu residents. 26 
21, G.17-'78, p.169: Ayliff to S.N.A., 18 Aug. '78. 
Theal, X, 55. 
22. C.196l, No.29: Frere to Carnarvon, 25 Sept. '77. 
23. C.196l, Encl. No. 83: Eustace to Frere, 18 Aug. '77. 
24. G.17-'78, pp.154-5: Evidence of Mfengu before Ayliff. 
25. See above, p.SO. 
26. C.196l, Encl. 3 No. 58: Eustace to Brownlee, 25 Aug. '77. 
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Cumming at first expected a Gcaleka attack on the Reserve since there 
1 h d b h 1 • d 27 were numerous Gca eka drawn up on t e boun ary, ut t ese ater ret1re • 
Eustace, now returned, referred the matter of the Gcaleka on the boundary 
to Sarhili, who said the men had assembled without his sanction owing to 
alarming reports of fighting between the Mfengu and Gcaleka in the 
Reserve. Fynn supported Sarhili's claim. Eustace himself believed 
that most of the cases of theft reported by Cumming were conmdtted by 
Reserve Gcaleka, although stolen stock was passed on to receivers in 
Gcalekaland. In the instance of Mfengu cattle, Eustace thought it likely 
that these in fact belonged to Gcaleka movIng from the Reserve to 
Gcalekaland. 28 
2. The White Dilemma 
As a result of his enquiry and the continuing unrest, Ayliff wrote 
to Brownlee on 18 August strongly urging that seldom had a more 
favourable opportunity arisen to encourage the loyalty of the Mfengu. 
Government should show that it was determined to protect British subjects 
and to put down with a strong arm if necessary 
such insolent and overbearing attempts to take 
the law into his own hands of Kreli or any 
h ' h' f 29 ot er nat1ve c 1e . 
To Ayliff's mind, there was no doubt of Sarhili's knowledge of the attack 
on 9th, and by implication, his approval and possibly even direction of it. 
He therefore urged that the time had come for the military occupation of 
27. Ibid., G.17-'78, p.149: 
to S.N.A., tel., 21 Aug. 
Civil Commissioner King William's Town 
'77 • 
28. C.1961, Encl. 3, No. 58: Eustace to Brownlee, 25 Aug. '77. 
An ironic reversal of the Mfengu "theft" of cattle from the 
Gcaleka in 1835 when they removed from the Gcaleka into the 
Colony. Moyer, p.159. 
29. G.17-'78, p.170: Ayliff to S.N.A., 18 Aug. '77. 
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the country and the stationing of a force of troops at Butterworth to 
30 prevent a recurrence of events. Ayliff followed his letter with a 
telegram to Brownlee on the 19th, warning that Veldtman Bikitsha, the 
most influential Mfengu headman, had been informed by friends in 
31 Gcalekaland that his location was to be attacked. 
Brownlee and the Molteno Ministry did face a dilemma. If, on the 
one hand, it appeared at all likely that the Gcaleka were preparing to 
attack the Mfengu en masse, the only course of action open to them that 
was consistent with the principles of native policy hitherto exercised 
by them, would be to intervene. 
In 1876 when it was believed that the Mfengu were vulnerable to 
Gcaleka attack, Brownlee had sanctioned the arming of Mfengu by Ayliff. 32 
As Frere was to minute before the war broke out, 
We are under the strongest oblicatio~s ..• to 
protect the Fingoes who have been placed Ln 
33 this country under our Government. 
In mid 1877, the Gcaleka still vastly outweighed the Mfengu in terms of 
numbers and arms, and observers felt that in a free fight, the Gcaleka 
34 
would sweep the Mfengu away. 
30. Ibid. 
31. G.l7-'78, p.148: Chalmers to S.N.A., te1., 20 Aug. '77. 
32. See above, p. 47. 
33. Molteno Papers: Minute for Ministers by Frere, 23 Sept. 1877 
quoted in Saunders, "Annexation", p.l70. 
34. Cf. C.196l, Enc!. 2, No. 30: Lt. Melvill to Col. Glyn, 2 Sept. '77. 
Reporting on the events of 29 August, when a Gcaleka army of 6000-
7000 briefly invaded Fingoland, Melvill observed that had the 
Gcaleka pressed their attack, they would have swept the Mfengu and 
police away. Hook calculated that the total Gcaleka army numbered 
about 9000. Hook, p.234. 
This number was down from the computed strength of 12,000 in 1876 
because of the defection of the Tsonyana and the neutrality of 
Lindinxuwa and his followers. The figure of"12,000 is given by 
Theal, X, p.52,as Sarhili's strength before the war. 
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On the other hand, such intervention would antagonize the Gcaleka 
further and would risk turning a possible tribal war into a black-white 
confrontation. Eustace and Chalmers had both shown that they were aware 
of the dilemma when they said that the arrival of the police on the 
Gcaleka-Mfengu border would be viewed as Government favouritism to the 
Mfengu. But in any case, the Mfengu had become the symbol for all the 
recent pressures affecting the Gcaleka, economic, social and political. 
Even if the immediate crisis were averted, the Mfengu would remain to 
confront the Gcaleka, and unless a radical revision of native policy were 
h ' ld' 35 to occur, ot er crlses wou arlse. 
UnfortunatelY,Brownlee was not helped to a decision by a balanced 
view of the situation. Eustace's first reports which indicated the 
opportunity and necessity for cool negotiation only came to hand some 
36 time after Ayliff's alarmist telegram. Meanwhile, in the absence 
I 
of evidence contradicting Ayliff's view, Brownlee decided the time had 
come to send the troop of police to Butterworth. He tried to make that 
step as acceptable as possible to the Gcaleka by stressing through 
Eustace that the F.A.M.P. were sent to Butterworth as much to restrain 
the Mfengu as to support them in the event of a Gcaleka attack, and by 
reiterating the need for Ayliff and Eustace to conduct an enquiry into 
the initial dispute and subsequent raid. When the Government received 
h f h '. ld d 'd f h ,37 t e report 0 t e enqulry lt wou eCl e on urt er actlon. Brownlee, 
35. G.17-'78, p.149: S.N.A. to Chalmers, 20 Aug. '78. 
36. Frere had still not received any report from Eustace on 27 August. 
C.1961, Encl. 1 No. 23: Frere to Molteno, tel., 27 Aug. Eustace's 
first report of 18th to Brownlee, explained only the initial 
disturbances, and his second of 25th missed Brownlee who had come 
to the frontier (see below,pp.86-7) C.1961, Encl.33: Eustace to 
Brownlee, 18 Aug. '77 and C.1961, Encl. 3 No. 58: Eustace to 
Brownlee, 25 Aug. '77. 
37. G.17-'78, p.149: S.N.A. to Chalmers, tel., 20 Aug. '77. 
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as Frere was to do later, therefore resisted pressured for precipitate 
action38 and triedJaccording to his 1ights,to adopt a course of action 
that would defuse a tense situation. Circumstances and mutual suspicion 
were to defeat his attempts. 
3. The Police arrive, the Mfengu provoke 
Eustace sent Fynn over to Sarhi1i to explain carefully why the 
police were coming, in order to allay the intense susp~c~on with which 
he correctly anticipated their arrival would be greeted. Sarhili told 
West Fynn that he was sorry the police had come because he feared their 
ld . f1 .. 39 presence wou ~n arne the s~tuat~on. His prognosis was borne out by 
events. The Mfengu began to taunt the Gca1eka by saying that they were 
glad their fathers, the police, had come, and that they would now drive 
h 1 k · h 40 t e Gca e a ~nto t e sea. Aroused by these taunts, the Gcaleka 
I 
gathered on the border and on the night of 22nd, the war cry was sounded. 
An incident involving a Mfengu policeman was largely responsible for 
provoking the Gca1eka into a new series of raids on the Mfengu, culminating 
in a serious confrontation with them. The policeman had brought a 
message from his employer, Mr R. Scott, the magistrate at Mqanduli, to 
Eustace, but he had not returned with the reply, as he said he had been 
concerned with the unrest. Instead,he had stayed at his property in 
Ve1dtman's Location. On 22nd, together with two others, he fired shots 
38. See for example C.196l, Encl. 3 No. 30: E.B. Chalmers to Bowker, 
2 Sept. '77, quoted in extenso,fP'~€-' below. 
Eustace confirmed that there was a powerful anti-Sarhili lobby of 
whom Bowker was one, indirectly characterising the policy advocated 
by them when he said 
I don't think the knocking on the head all the 
independent chiefs on our border is the correct 
policy any more than the suppression of the 
native states in India ••• 
Merriman Papers, 1877 file No. 39: Eustace to Merriman, 1 Sept. '77. 
39. C.l96l, Encl. 3 No. 58: Eustace to Brownlee, 25 Aug. '77. 
40. C.196l, Encl. No. 29: Eustace to Brownlee, ter., 29 Aug. '77. 
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into the hut of a Gcaleka man and was almost immediately arrested. 
Thereupon he told Eustace's Gcaleka police that if the Gcaleka attempted 
a raid on Ve1dtman's Location they would meet with a very different 
41 
reception to that they had received from the Mfengu at Butterworth. 
On the night of 23rd the Gca1eka gathered at the Kraal of the man 
shot at by Scott's messenger. A few shots were exchanged with Veldtman's 
Mfengu, but Veldtman soon withdrew his men in accordance with Ayliff's 
. . 42 ~nstruct~ons. On the following day, while Ayliff and Eustace were 
investigating the disturbance, Gca1eka were reported to be crossing the 
boundary, but they only found parties of the two peoples gathered either 
side of the boundary, and these with the help of a patrol led by Chalmers, 
were persuaded to disperse. At nightfall, however, the forces regrouped 
and a full-scale clash below Butterworth ensued, with Maphasa's Tsonyana 
again prominent. Both sides claimed that the other had initiated the 
43 battle. Fynn relates the story dramatically, no doubt embellishing 
his role, but his account ~s illuminating as regards Sarhili's involvement 
in the conflict. 44 Fynn says he was roused from bed at 12 p.m. by two 
of Sarhili's councillors. They reported serious fighting on the Gcuwa 
and asked him on behalf of Sarhili to go and stop the fight, since 
Sarhili's presence would inflame the whole tribe. Fynn duly went off, 
found Xhoxho, who was in the thick of things, delivered Sarhili's message, 
41. C.l96l, Encl. 3 No. 58: Eustace to Brownlee, 25 Aug. '77, and 
C.196l Encl. 1 No. 30: Eustace to Brownlee, 1 Sept. '77 
42. 
43. 
44. 
Fynn dates this event in September (not his only error of dating), 
but otherwise his account agrees substantially with that of Eustace, 
save that he becomes the man who interviewed the prisoner and 
punished him! Fynn, pp.ll-12. 
C.196l, Encl. 1 No. 58: Ayliff to S.N.A., 25 Aug. '77 • 
Ibid., C.l96l, Encl. I No. 30: Eustace to S.N.A., 1 Sept. '77. 
Fynn, p.2. Fynn has dated the event rather early, but it is obvious 
he is referring to the same occurrence. 
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managed to get the Gcaleka away, and convinced the Mfengu to do the same. 
On returning home, he found Sarhili there with two of his sons. 
Sarhili explained his presence to Fynn by saying: 
'As I had sent you on a very dangerous and unpleasant 
business, I knew your wife and family would be 
very anxious about you, so I considered it best 
to come over and keep them company until you 
returned. I am very glad to see you safe, and 
trust you succeeded in stopping the fight'. 
Fynn told Sarhili that he had succeeded but had counted nine dead Gcaleka 
which, Fynn says, upset the chief considerably.45 
Fynn did not tell Eustace of his midnight foray when the fight was 
officially reported the next morning. This may partly be explained by 
Fynn's low opinion of Eustace's abilities, and a certain amount of 
"1 f h" 46 J ea ousy 0 1m. What is certain is that Fynn increasingly acted as a 
47 
self-appointed "buffer" between the Gcaleka and the Government. Eustace 
wrote in a most revealing passage that on 25th, 
Mr West Fynn decided that he should go to 
I 
Ii •• Mapassa and the scene were the flghtlng was 
reported, and that I s~~uld visit large 
gatherings of Gcalekas assembling at Xoxo's 
(Finta's son) [Hintsa'~ and Botman. 48 
~\ 
1\ 
45. Ibid. W.T. Brownlee, Ayliff's clerk estimates the casualties at 
16 Gcaleka and 7 Mfengu killed (see footnote 50) and Theal at 24 
Gcaleka killed, a figure also given by Lt. Melvill in his report 
a few days after the fight. The higher figure would give weight 
to the Gcaleka reaction to the fight. Theal, X, 56. C.l96l, 
Encl. 2, No. 30: Lt. Melvill to Col. Glyn, 2 Sept. '77. 
46. See above, p.61. 
47. Rhodesian Archives, FY 1/1/3: West Fynn to Rev. J. Dewar, Chief 
Mcotoma Kreli and others, 24 Oct. 1911. This is the reply to Cory 
Library Ms. 2018 quoted below, p.83, footnote 65c. Fynn refers 
to his role at the time of the war as like that of a railway buffer, 
pushed and pulled in opposite directions. 
48. C.l96l, Encl. No. 83: Eustace to Frere, 25 Aug. '77. 
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Fynn reported to Eustace that he found Maphasa and 800 men on the 
border. Maphasa was very bitter about the fight, but eventually agreed 
to withdraw if Fynn managed to get the Mfengu to do so as well. This 
he did with the help of W.T. Brownlee, Ayliff's clerk. 49 Brownlee's 
f ' h' 50 account con 1rms t 1S. Fynn crossed the river and told one of the 
Mfengu headmen that he had been sent by Kreli and Bhotomane and the 
Resident to disperse the Gcaleka forces , and he asked the Mfengu to do 
• • S" I 11kew1se. 
The significance the Gcaleka attached to the raid of 24 August emerges 
clearly from Eustace's report of his visit to Xhoxho and Bhotomane's 
kraals. The reason the Gcaleka advanced for the large assemblage of 
men there was the report they had heard of the previous night's attack 
by the Mfengu, who 
since the com1ng of the police had th~eatened 
them with vengeance, saying their fathers had 
come, and they were going to drive them into 
the sea. 52 
The cause of the previous night's attack, the Gcaleka said, was that 
some Mfengu had stolen a few Gcaleka goats and had ambushed the Gcaleka 
who pursued them. Despite the extreme hostility which the Gcaleka 
displayed towards the Mfengu, Eustace nevertheless arnanged with Ayliff 
to meet on Monday 27th at Butterworth to begin the long-delayed official 
, 53 
enqu1ry. 
49. Ibid. 
50. C.l96l, Encl. I No. 58: W.T. Brownlee to Ayliff, 26 Aug. '77. 
51. Ibid. 
52. C.196l, Encl. No. 83: Eustace to S.N.A., 25 Aug. '77. My emphasis, 
53. Ibid. 
80 
AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 1877: THE GCALEKA DECIDE TO FIGHT 
4. Treachery unmasked, war postponed 
The following day produced dramatic developments. The accounts of 
the two missionaries stationed in Gcalekaland, Rev. R.S. Leslie54 and 
Rev. J. Dewar,55 and of Rev. J. Auld of Emgwali,56 who had ridden over 
to Thuthura for a Presbytery meeting, confirm Fynn's more detailed account. 
The fight on 24th and the resulting high Gcaleka casualties probably 
cemented the determination of the Gcaleka to launch an all-out attack 
on the Mfengu and their white allies. Dewar reports Sarhili as saying 
after the fight: 
That so many sons of their fathers should have 
been killed by these Fingo dogs was not to be 
tolerated. 57 
Whereas before, raids had involved only individual sections of the tribe, 
and the gathering of armed men in response to rumour had been similarly 
limited; and whereas certain signs had indicated that there was an 
oagoing debate as to the course of action to be pursued; and whereas 
58 preliminary steps such as sending cattle to the coast had been taken; 
now, on 25th, the war cry was sounded throughout Gcalekaland, not to 
respond to some Mfengu threat actual or rumoured, but to summon all men 
armed to Sarhi1i's kraal to prepare the army for an attack on the Mfengu. 
Auld describes the numbers of armed men all making for Sarhili's place 
that he saw on his ride over from the Emgwali. Some of these shouted 
54. R.S. Leslie to Fynn, 11 March, '79, in Fynn, p.24. 
55. J. Dewar in Fynn, pp.24-31. 
56. Cory Library, PR 1272-4: James M. Auld: 'Reminiscences' 1n 
Blythswood Review, Aug., Oct., Dec., 1924. 
57. Dewar in Fynn, p.27. 
58. Fynn, p.6. Fynn says that the cattle had been sent to the coast 
as early as some two weeks before. 
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to him that 'it was war'. When he arrived at the Residency, he noticed 
numbers of armed men at each kraal. Most had already had the black 
war-mark applied on their forehead by the 'Tola' or war-doctor, Ngxito. 59 
On Sunday 26th, Dewar says the roads were 'alive' with armed men 
h h . d 60 on t e way to t elr ren ezvous. It was this movement that prompted 
Fynn to leave the church service at the Thuthura and report the matter 
to Eustace. On his way, Fynn saw that one of the groups was led by 
Sibozo, a chief from the Qolora mouth area who was previously supposed 
to have belonged to the peace-party. Eustace dismissed Fynn's opinion 
that war was now certain, saying that he considered the day's activities 
to be merely part and parcel of the general unrest. Fynn refused to 
believe this and proceeded to Sarhili's kraal where his own opinion was 
confirmed. He estimated that he had seen about 5000 men on his way 
over, while at the kraal he thought there were a further 1500 men. 
These were engaged ~n catching horses, arranging guns and assegais. 
Ngxito, the Tola, was stirring a pot of blackish liquid and branding 
his mark on the forehead of men who passed him by in single file. 
Sarhi1i and 30 councillors were sitting together having already received 
the charm. 6l 
Fynn was in possession of one extraordinary piece of information 
which he had hitherto kept secret, but which he now felt he ought to 
use to try and prevent the Gcaleka going to war. Maphasa had come to 
him 'a few nights previously' to ask him for a pass granting the 
Tsonyana protection in the colony. Maphasa explained that he made this 
59. Cory Library, PR 1272: Auld, 'Reminiscences' in Blythswood Review, 
Aug. 1924. 
60. Dewar, in Fynn, p.27. 
61. Fynn, p. 6 • 
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request because Sarhili, 'under the influence of his chief men' had 
decided on war with the Mfengu, and Maphasa believed, as he had in the 
past, that a clash with the Government would bring ruin to the Gcaleka. 
Fynn drew Sarhili aside and told him of Maphasa's proposed defection, 
warning hlln that he would not only therefore have to fight the Government 
62 if he chose war with the Mfengu, but would do so with a divided people. 
Although relations between Sarhili and Maphasa were bad, 'and Maphasa 
had refused in 1872 to join Sarhili in his invasion of Thembuland as we 
have seen, Fynn's warning must have surprised Sarhili considerably. The 
\ 
Tsonyana had been the initiators of the unrest and had figured prominently 
63 ~n subsequent clashes. At that very moment they were drawn up on 
the Gcuwa River, apparently ready for action. 64 Fynn contends that this 
revelation caused Sarhili to call off the attack and submit the whole 
matter to the Governor for arbitration, as he had suggested. After 
explaining that he personally was against war, but his people were 'like 
madmen', especially after the recent heavy Gcaleka casualties, Sarhili 
asked Fynn to ride over and inform Ngubo of their conversation. Fynn 
demurred saying he had already compromised himself with Government and 
could do no more. The following day Bhotomane informed Fynn that Sarhili 
had ,held a meeting of all the chiefs at Wapi's kraal near Nthlambe, and 
Maphasa had refused to attend. Later in the day Sarhili rode over to 
inform Fynn that he had prevailed on his chiefs to refer the whole dispute 
to the Government and that his men would consequently now disperse and 
62 • Fynn, p. 7. 
Maphasa is said to have exclaimed: 'If we fight this war, we will 
be scattered'. 
Interview with .Sub-Headman Z. Fihla, ThuthUra Location No.4, 
I{entani Distr1ct, 22 Sept. '77. 
63. See above, pp.69-70. 
64. Fynn, p.7. 
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return to their kraals. He had appointed some of his councillors and 
missionaries to represent him at the investigation to be held at Butterworth. 65 
The events of the next two weeks proVe conclusively that the attack 
on the Mfengu which seemed imminent on 26th had at least been postponed. 
But as time went on, it became more and more evident that Sarhili was 
merely temporising, while pressures increased from his people for a final 
settlement with the Mfengu. 
The dispersal of the Gcaleka army was more easily promised than 
achieved. Mutual suspicion between Gcaleka and Mfengu remained. 
Firstly, the slightest rumour or movement on one side of the frontier 
raised the war cry on the other. Sarhi1i had told Fynn that Eustace 
must send to Ayliff and Chalmers to restrain the Mfengu and to withdraw 
65. Fynn, p. 7. 
Fynn's account is plausible. It is confirmed by Dewar, Leslie and 
Auld (but they may have had much of the story' from him), and also 
by evidence of the close relationship and trust between Fynn and 
Sarhili: 
a) Fynn offered to make up the 40 outstanding cattle to put 
Sarhili in the clear for the Enquiry. Sarhili declined 
gratefully, but made them up himself. 
G.l7-'78, p.l79: Eustace to S.N.A., 1 Sept. '77. Fynn, pp.9-1O. 
b) Fynn was presented by Sigcawu with Sarhili's favourite armlet 
on the latter's death, at Sarhi1i's express desire. Fynn, p.30. 
c) In 1911 Sarhili's sons sent Fynn a letter expressing the 
Gcaleka people's debt to him, when Fynn moved to Rhodesia. 
Inter alia, the authors of the letter say, confirming b) 
above, that 
Fynn's services Were such as to win you the 
confidence of the native people and the respect 
and esteem of our late chief Kre1i, in token of 
which among other evidences his last wish was that 
his favourite assegai and arm-ring should be 
delivered to you by the hand of his eldest son, 
the late chief 'Sigcawu', who commanded his 
father's forces during the war, which duty was 
faithfully performed. 
Cory Library, MS 2018: Mcotoma Kreli and others to Fynn, 
16 Aug. 1911. 
d) Gcaleka informants to this day remember 'Wesi' and his role as 
peacemaker, while they have no particular recollection of Eustace. 
Interview with Mr N.C. Melane, Qwaninga Loca~ion, Wil1owva1e 
District, 14 Sept. 1977. Interview with Sub-Headman.Z. Fihla, 
Thuthura Location No.4, Kentani District, 22 Sept. 1977. 
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the police from the frontier as they only served to encourage the Mfengu. 
He said that if there was any more fighting, he could not guarantee to 
keep his people quiet. 66 In actual practice, the presence of Chalmers 
and his police and his tactful behaviour did help to keep the two peoples 
apart. 
Secondly, there were those in both the Gca1eka and Mfengu camp who 
were not keen on a settlement. The Gcaleka war party wished to see the 
removal of the police who were preventing them from getting to grips with 
the Mfengu. Ayliff was anxious to make an example of Sarhi1i. 67 Bryce 
Ross, the missionary, was of a similar mind and tried to influence the 
68 Enquiry when it began. Some of the Mfengu naturally saw advantage 
in pressing the issue: they anticipated that as in previous wars, there 
would be the prospect of rewards of additional land and captured cattle. 
Having prospered in the Transkei, they too felt cramped for space. 
Thirdly, anarchy in the Idutywa Reserve constantly involved the 
69 peoples of Fingo1and and Gca1ekaland. 
Thus the enquiry made little progress. On Monday 27th, Ay1iff and 
Eustace no SOoner had begun, than the Enquiry was broken up by Mfengu 
reports of an imminent Gca1eka attack. This, Eustace acidly commented, 
70 turned out to be the attempted theft of three Mfengu sheep. On the 
Tuesday, the Enquiry did not proceed as it seemed no Mfengu witnesses had 
66. G.17-'78, pp.179-80: Eustace to S.N.A., 1 Sept. '77. 
67. See above, p.73. 
68. Merriman Papers, 1877 file No. 36: Eustace to Merriman, 1 Sept. '77. 
69. G.l7-'78, p.32: Eustace to S.N.A., 31 Jan. '78. 
70. G.17.-'78, p.179: Eustace to S.N.A., 1 Sept. '77. 
" 
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71 been warned to appear. On Wednesday a sharp skirmish took place 
near Barnett's shop, the future Fort Ibeka. Eustace, who rode over 
after reports of the fight had again broken up the Enquiry, was certain 
that a general attack was not intended. He saw two large groups of 
Gcaleka merely sitting in Gcalekaland. Sarhili told Fynn that Gcaleka 
resentment at the apparent collusion between the Mfengu and police, who 
were drawn up together at Barnett's shop, had accounted for the raid. 
But Eustace's opinion was borne out by the fact that the Gcaleka avoided 
the police, and Chalmers was able with the help of Sarhili's councillors 
d h 1 k . hd 72 to persua e t e Gca e a to Wlt raw. A military observer who had 
been sent by Col. Glyn, commander of the Imperial garrison at King 
William's Town, to report on the fifth reported that it was a deliberate 
attack on the Mfengu with Veldtman's kraal as the objective. His 
opinion is suspect, however, as he arrived the day after the fight and 
73 his sources were those favourable to the Mfengu. 
On 30th there were still large numbers of Gcaleka drawn up, but 
they stayed two miles from the border. When Eustace relayed via Fynn a 
message from the Governor, Sir Bartle Frere, calling on Sarhili to 
control his people or face the consequences, Sarhili replied that neither 
he, nor Ngubo, nor the majority of Gcaleka wanted war. He promised to 
break up the army, and by the next ~ay, the men had dispersed to their 
74 kraals. Eustace was too sanguine, though, when he reported the all 
clear on 1st September. Sarhili had told him that he had lost confidence 
in Brownlee who, he said, aimed at turning the Gcaleka into jackals75 
71. Ibid. 
72. Ibid, pp.180-l. 
73. C.196l, Encl. 2 No. 30: Lt Melvill to Col. Glyn, 2 Sept., '77. 
74. G.l7-'78, p.l81: Eustace to S.N.A., 1 Sept., '77. 
75. Merriman Papers, 1877 file No. 36: Eustace to Merriman, 1 
Sept., '77. 
I 
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while he told Fynn that Mfengu interruptions of the Enquiry and their 
exaggerated reports of Gcaleka movements showed they did not really want 
. .. 76 
an ~nvest~gat10n. Even if the Enquiry did achieve something, hostility 
between the two tribes would continue. Gcaleka men would, for example, 
be unable for some time to travel through Fingoland to the Public Works. 77 
S. Frere, Merriman and Brownlee on the Frontier 
Thus far emphasis has been placed on developments in the Transkei. 
Towards the end of August, quite fortuitously, the Colonial Government 
found it had representatives within striking distance of the disturbances, 
and it was therefore able to give close attention to them. Frere had 
been asked by his Ministers to travel to the Eastern Province to 
acquaint himself with its problems, and he had therefore undertaken a 
tour with J.X. Merriman, the Commissioner of Crown Lands and Public Works. 
The Party arrived at Port Elizabeth on 21st, and reached Grahamstown on 
27th. 78 
In the meantime, the Cabinet in Cape Town was grow1ng increasingly 
apprehensive at the lack of news from the frontier. It was believed in 
the absence of reports by Eustace that the disturbances were being directed 
by Sarhili. 79 Molteno therefore telegraphed Frere to announce that the 
Cabinet advised the forwarding of a wing of the 88th Regiment (the 
Conn aught Rangers) from Cape Town to East London, and that Brownlee was 
76 • Fynn, p. 9 • 
77. G.17-'78, p.18l: Eustace to S.N.A., 1 Sept. '77. 
78. Saunders, "Annexation". p.164. 
Gruber, pp.277-8. 
79. C.196l, Encl. 1 No. 23: Molteno to Frere, tel., 27 Aug. '77. 
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d " h f" " " h" 80 procee 1ng to t e ront1er to J01n 1m. From the start, Frere refused 
to be stampeded into hasty action, and said that until he had definite 
news from Eustace, it would be best to wait and form no conclusions about 
Sarhili's intentions. He advised that caution be displayed in sending 
the detachments since their arrival might increase unease on all 
"d 81 S1 es. He proposed going to King William's Town where he would conduct 
an enquiry with the help of Merriman, Brownlee and Bowker. In the 
meantime he advised that the disputants be told to suspend hostilities 
" d" 1 d f h" "" 82 1mme 1ate y an re er to 1S comm1SS10n. Accordingly, Eustace was 
C\ 
telegraphed to report his views and to inform Sarhili of the Governor's 
warning, while Bowker was requested to make it clear to.~ll parties 
that the Government would see that full justice was done to all. 83 
Frere and Merriman arrived in King William's Town on 4th September 
and Brownlee on 5th. Informed of the dispersion of Gcaleka forces 
, 
after the clash of 29th, Frere finally rejected Molteno's suggestion 
that the wing of the 88th be sent to the frontier. The two ministers 
agreed that Frere should order Ayliff and Eustace to complete their 
Enquiry and report the result, while they, the Governor's Party, 
conducted a tour through the affected districts. 84 
The vast majority of frontiersmen and some important Government 
officers did not share Eustace's sanguine assessment of the situation 
and Frere's cautious policy. 85 The whole frontier was 1n an uproar. 
80. C.196l, Encl. 1, No. 23: Molteno and Frere, Telegraphic 
Conversation, 28 Aug., '77. 
81. Ibid. As Saunders points out, Frere was upset by the prospect of 
war. Only when the war was some months old did he realise that, 
far from delaying confederation, it might, in fact, speed it up. 
Saunders, "Annexation", p.116. 
82. C.196l, Encl. 1, No. 23: Molteno and Frere, Telegraphic 
Conversation, 28 Aug., '77. 
83. C.196l, No. 30: Frere to Carnarvon, 5 Sept., '77. 
84. Ibid. " 
85. Ibid. 
EASTVVARD HOtt 
" 
BR-WNL-E:-"\Vhat's the meanmg of all that row thero? 
KREI,I:~It.'8 only my childreIl at play, Father. 
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At every station from Port Elizabeth on his progress to King William's 
Town, Frere had been met by deputations who, in customary frontier 
fashion, expressed the utmost anxiety about the threat to the frontier 
posed by the disturbances and demanded that positive steps be taken to 
end them. Frere's assurances that the unrest was merely an inter-tribal 
1 " fl'" . h . d l' 86 quarre , a matter 0 po 1ce , were met W1t open 1ncre u 1ty. The 
majority of frontiersmen believed that Sarhili was directing a deep-
seated anti-white conspiracy and that the Government was playing into 
his hands by refusing to take 'firm' action. Bowker, who had taken on 
the mantle literally and figuratively of Sir Walter Currie, urged an 
87 immediate concentration of troops at King William's Town. E.B. Chalmers 
echoed the sentiments of many when he wrote to his superior, Bowker: 
86. Ibid. 
Kreli is foremost in his promises to maintain peace, 
and Eustace and Fynn both believe him. lam 
perfectly convinced in my own mind that the old 
fox has been acting a very treacherous part, 
and I am sorry to find that the officials were 
hood-winked. I have it on the most reliable 
sources that the Gcaleka intended war with the 
Fingos, and Kreli himself was as much for it as 
anyone else. I believe the retrograde move 
[the dispersal of Gcaleka force~ is only a 
.. 
dodge... I really do hope the affair will 
not be patched up. I do not see how the 
Government can wink at the fact of the Gcaleka 
having crossed the boundary last Wednesday 
87. C.196l, Encl. 1 No. 23: Molteno to Frere, Telegraphic 
Conversation, 28 Aug. '77. 
But it is interesting to note that those whites who knew Sarhili 
felt that he would have avoided war with the whites if possible. 
Macquarrie, i, 76. 
" 
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i.e. the 29th August in such numbers, and attacked 
the Fingos ••• It is positively stated that 
Gange li swe is as deep in the plot as any of Kreli's 
war party. Menziwe and the other Fingos in 
Thembuland were to be the victims. Sandilli was 
asked to join, but hesitated; some of his 
people would, however, have gone against the 
Fingos, but the majority were neutral. The 
Bomvanas crossed in considerable numbers •.• 88 
Charles Mills, the Colonial Under Secretary agreed with Cha1mer's ~. 
sen timen ts • He wrote to Merriman saying he was sorry the reinforcements 
were not sent up and said he thought Sarhili should be driven beyond 
the Mbashe again where he could 'play at Kilkenny c~ts' with the 
surrounding tribes. In the same letter he indicates that Molteno and 
Merriman were in favour of immediate action too: 
The chief {j101teno] is en°tirely of your opinion. 
He would have struck and crushed Kre1i at once 
had he had his own way.89 
6. Anti-white conspiracy? 
What was the evidence for the conspiracy theory which Chalmers 
advanced? In one of his conversations with Eustace, Sarhi1i denied 
that he had ordered those Gcaleka who had returned from the Idutywa 
Reserve to Gcaleka1and to do so. He would have preferred them to stay 
in the Reserve to guard his flank against Ngange1izwe. 90 There was 
no reason why an alliance should be cemented in 1877 when those very 
88. C.1961, Enel. 3 No. 30: E.B. Chalmers to Bowker, 2 Sept. '77. 
89. Merriman Papers, 1877 file No. 37: C. Mills to Merriman, 
3 Sept. '77. 
90. Merriman Papers, 1877 file No. 36: Eustace to Merriman, 1 Sept. 
'77 • 
" 
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differences that had been prevented any co-operation 1n 1876 still 
remained. In fact there was less reason since Ngangelizwe was now 
restored to his position and Bomvana/Thembu friction was once again 
"d 91 ~n ev~ ence. 
With regard to the Bomvana, the surprising thing is that more 
h f · h 92 Bomvana were not present at t e 19 ts. Considering Moni's subject 
status to Sarhili, the message he asked his Resident,William FynnJto 
relay to Government at the end of August is extremely significant. 
He said: 
From what I can learn the disturbances between 
the Gcalekas and Fingoes was not an arranged 
affair, and I hope the Government will take matters 
quietly and not settle the quarrel in haste for 
fear it may lead to greater trouble and 
confusion~ I wish the Government to understand 
that I will not take part in this quarrel, 
whatever turn it may take, and will do all in 
my power to prevent my people from assisting 
the Galekas who I hear are disregarding the 
words and wishes of their Chief Kreli. 93 
Sandile was consulted on the subject of an attack against the 
Mfengu, but he refused to participate. Fynn relates how Runeyi went 
on a visit to Sandile with eight followers on 8th August returning 
about a month later. Runeyi was robbed en route in the Idutywa 
91. N.A.43: Elliot to S.N.A., 6 Sept. '77. 
Though there was friction too, between the Thembu and the 
Mfengu. In one instance the Mfengu had refused permission for 
the Thembu to gether wood in Fingoland. This departure from 
custom had provoked the Thembu. 
N.A.43: Eliott to S.N.A., 30 Aug. '77. 
92. C.196l, Encl. No. 29: Eustace to S.N.A., tel., 3 Sept. '77. 
See also above, p.89. 
93. G.17-'78, p.l83: W.R.D. Fynn to Eustace, 31 Aug. '77. 
'" 
91 
AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 1877: THE GCALEKA DECIDE TO FIGHT 
Reserve, but did not let this detain him. Fynn heard that he had 
approached Sandile to join the Gcaleka in an attack on the Mfengu, but 
Sandile replied that he had had 
'enough of wars, and his leg troubled him, he 
was getting old, and would have nothing to do 
. h ,94 Wl.t war. 
Sandile's attitude at this stage was probably that until such time as 
the whites definitely intervened and black-white conflict began, the 
beer-drinking fight, raiding and counter-raiding was purely a Gcaleka 
d .. 95 omestl.C l.ssue. 
The Court of Enquiry began sitting again 1.n early September. 
Eustace and Ayliff agreed to hear the Mfengu case first, but, according 
to Eustace, Ayliff made no attempt to curb Mfengu verbosity and so the 
Court had not yet begun to hear Gcaleka evidence 'when war intervened 
some three weeks later. 96 Sarhili was represented for the first few 
days by Bhotomane, but after a while, he said he would leave his case 
with Eustace in whom he said he had confidence. 97 But at the end of 
August he had expressed misgivings about Brownlee's whole policy and the 
94. C.1961 Enc1s. No. 43: Statements of West Fynn to Frere, 29 S·ept., 
3 Oct. '77. 
Fynn's story is partially confirmed by correspondence between 
Ayliff and Eustace on the subject of the robbery. 
G.17-'78, pp.161-2: Correspondence between Ayliff and Eustace, 
Aug. '77. 
95. This is the explanation Chief Burns-Ncamashe offered when questioned 
about Sandi1e's attitude to the war in the light of his later 
support of Sarhi1i. Interview with Chief S.M. Burns-Ncamashe, 
Rhodes University, 1 November 1977. 
96. Merriman Papers, 1877 file No. 40: Fustace to Merriman, 8 Sept. '77. 
97. C.2220, Encl. No. 21: Brownlee Memorandum, c. Aug. '78. 
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" '1 98 Enqu~ry ~n part~cu are It is evident that despite what he told 
Eustace, the long-winded and one-sided approach of the Court must have 
f ' d h ,,' 99 con ~rme t ese m~sg~v~ngs. But Sarhi1i did try to keep his word. 
He retained only a few small armed bands on the border to act as scouts 
and immediately after the sole direct raid on Fingo1and, he restored the 
twenty horses seized from a kraal in Ve1dtman's 10cation. 100 
Lack of control in the Idutywa Reserve, however, allowed conflict 
between Mfengu and Gca1eka inhabitants to continue which adversely 
affected efforts to pacify the two neighbouring territories. The most 
notorious case was the one which led to Cumming's dismissal. One of 
Ve1dtman's men on a visit to the Reserve was murdered and stripped of 
his possessions by four Reserve Gca1eka. When these men were arrested 
and brought before him, Cumming let them off with a warning saying he 
had not the authority to punish them and was goin~ to refer the matter 
101 to Government. 
7. Sarhili refuses to meet Frere 
In the meantime, Frere's tour of the frontier was continuing. 
On 16th September he arrived with his entourage at Butterworth. He 
received reports from both officials and Mfengu and explained it was his 
desire to understand the dispute and do justice to it. Whilst waiting 
for Sarhi1i whom he had asked to visit him at Butterworth, he received 
Thembu and Bomvana delegations. Ngangelizwe and his councillors 
, 
\ 
accompanied by Elliot came to express th7fr loyalty to Government and 
pay their respects to Frere. Two of Moni's sons, Langa and Serhunu, 
98. See above, pp .85-6. 
99. Fynn, p. 9. 
100. G.17-'78, pp.172-3: Ayliff to S.N.A., 15 Sept. '77. 
101. C.1961, No. 39: Frere to Carnarvon, 25 Sept. '77. 
" 
93 
AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 1877: THE GCALEKA DECIDE TO FIGHT 
accompanied by W.R.D. Fynn, brought a message from their father saying 
that in the case of Sarhi1i fighting the Government, he would be on the 
side of the latter. 102 Xhoxho Maphasa delivered a message of similar 
, 103 
~mport • 
Sarhi1i sent a stream of excuses to Frere for not visiting him. 
Frere, anxious to avoid further delay and unwilling to see his peace 
initiative flounder, expressed to his advisers his willingness to visit 
Sarhi1i in Gca1eka1and. 104 Frere certainly believed that the Gca1eka 
had to be disabused of the illusion that they could do as they pleased, 
but he felt that the lesson might be driven home without recourse to 
105 
war. In any case he was also motivated by a desire to postpone any 
possible engagement until the parlous state of frontier defence could 
be remedied. He wrote after the beginning of the war: 
If an outbreak could have been postpo~ed until the 
usual season for such disturbances after the Kaffir 
harvest, two or three months hence, we should have 
been better prepared. If it could have been 
deferred for a year there was good ground for 
hoping that effective measures might have been 
taken by the Government to make any such outbreak 
, 'bl ,. 106 ~mposs~ e or qu~te ~nnocuous. 
There were many good reasons why Frere's offer should have been 
approved by his advisers. Sarhili pointed out to the Fynn brothers 
and Dewar, when they rode over to try to persuade him to visit Frere, 
102. Ibid. 
103. C.2220, Encl. No. 21: Brownlee Memo., c. Aug. '78. 
104. C.196l, No. 39: Frere to Carnarvon, 25 Sept. '77. 
lOS. Saunders,"Annexation", p.170. 
106. C.196l, No. 44: Frere to Carnarvon, 3 Oct. '77. Though it is clear 
that Frere envisaged subjecting the Gca1eka to British rule 
even tua11y. " 
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that if Frere had met the Mfengu ln their country, it was only right that 
he should meet him ln his own. There was a precedent. Sir Henry 
Bark1y had visited him in 1874107 and had even congratulated him for 
.. . 'f ,. f d'" 108 contrlbutlng to a bUl1dlng or recelvlng uture 19n1tarles. If 
the whites feared for Frere's safety, how much more had he to fear for 
his safety, firstly in what was enemy territory. and secondly at the hands 
f h h ' 109 o t e w ltes. The fate of his father Hintsa was, as has been noted, 
ever present in Sarhi1i's mind, and this was by no means the only case 
of white duplicity towards the Xhosa. 1lO Bhotomane warned Frere himself that 
the country was full of people who told 
falsehoods, and many people haJ said to the 
chief that the Governor had come to seize him. 111 
If Sarhi1i had hesitated to meet his new Resident in his own 
, 
country in 1876, it was absurd of the whites to expect him to meet the 
Governor in enemy territory with war trembling in the balance. 
Although aware of these factors, Brownlee and Eustace allowed the 
longstanding white prejudice against Sarhi1i to cloud their advice. 
They argued that to visit Sarhili could be to make an exception of him 
when all other chiefs had visited Frere (and consequently presumably 
112 
would mean a loss of face). 
107. Fynn, pp.lO-ll. 
108. Hook, p.237. 
In any case Brownlee by now felt that 
109. Sarhili's record was far better than the whites in this respect. 
Sarhi1i in fact had a reputation for fairness amongst whites, 
e.g. Fynn, p.5; Macquarrie, i, 76; Soga, S.E. Bantu, p.240. 
110. See below, p.167. 
111. C.196l, No. 39: Frere to Carnarvon, 25 Sept. '77. 
112. Ibid. 
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Sarhili would have to be punished before peace would return to the 
. 113 Front~er. He did suggest meeting Sarhili himself as an alternative, 
but Sarhili refused to meet Brownlee, saying to West Fynn that he held 
Brownlee responsible for the present trouble for not having listened to 
114 his frequent warnings of the inevitability of a Gcaleka-Mfengu clash. 
Consequently Frere did not see Sarhili. Frere, although angered 
by his failure, sent a written message to Sarhili, setting out what he 
would have said in an interview, and enjoining him to deep the peace while 
the Enquiry proceeded. The tone of this message was friendly, not 
. 115 m~natory • Before moving on 20th from Butterworth for King William's 
Town via the Ngqika and Ndlambe locations, it was decided that further 
precautions ought to be taken to prevent an outbreak of violence. Cumming 
113. Molteno Papers, No. 609: Brownlee to Molteno, 2 Sept. '77. 
Brownlee found the continuing disturbance significant, since the 
normal custom was to suspend raids while the question of peace 
or war was discussed. 
C.196l, No. 39: Frere to Carnarvon, 25 Sept. '77. 
If Sarhili had been detained, the Gcaleka would have regarded this 
as the end of the nation. Such a risk could not be taken. 
It is certain that if Sarhili was willing to go, his councillors 
would have refused to allow him to do so. 
Interview by J. Peires with Chief Ford Mgangele, Mgwali Location, 
Stutterheim, September 1975. 
Theal says that the warriors were completely under the influence 
of Sigcawu and Ngubo. Gcaleka opinion therefore would not sanction 
Sarhi1i's pandering to the whites. 
Theal, X, 58. 
114. Fynn, p.ll. 
Cory Library, MS 1272: Auld: 'Reminiscences' in Blythswood 
Review, Aug. 1924. 
115. C.196l, Encl. 1 No. 39: Frere to Sarhili, 20 Sept. '77. 
Saunders cites an undated press report that reports Frere as 
threatening Sarhili with imprisonment on Robben Island. Saunders, 
"Annexat ion" J p .171. 
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was replaced by E.B. Chalmers who moved up to the Idutywa Reserve with a 
f I ' 116 h'1 ' d f h If h F AMP f troop 0 po 1ce, w 1 e 1t was arrange or ate • • •• orce 
to be stationed in the Transkei where they were to have both military and 
I ' d ' 117 po 1ce ut1es. Bowker's ill-health had made his replacement 
essential and Charles Griffith, the Government Agent in Maseru was then 
, h' d f h 118 hurry1ng to t e front1er to take over as Cornman ant 0 t e F.A.M.P. 
On 20th too, Merriman telegraphed Molteno suggesting that an assistant 
Magistrate be appointed at Butterworth and that a Mfengu militia of 
picked men from Veldtman's location be trained. He said such steps, if 
immediately implemented, would show Sarhili that the Government meant to 
support the Mfengu and would also serve to reinforce the loyalty of the 
"119 Mfengu, which the Government were naturally keen to retain. 
8. The Die is cast 
, 
Unfortunately while those moves which had been made by the Government 
by 20th September seemed to the Gcaleka to be clear evidence of Government 
support of the Mfengu, it was not apparent that an attack on the Mfengu 
would be opposed by any substantial opposing force, for there were then 
1 b 2 I ' 'h k ' 120 b f 1 on y a out 00 po 1ce 1n t e Trans e1. In the a sence 0 a c ear 
deterrent, war seemed the solution of the problem most likely to be 
favourable to the Gcaleka. Many of the Gcaleka were still under the 
impression that the whites, as in 1872, would not intervene in the actual 
f ' h' 121 18 tmg. 
116. G.17-'78, p.34: Eustace to S.N.A., 31 Jan. '78. 
117. Molteno Papers, No. 616: Frere Minute for Ministers, 19 Sept. '77. 
118. Cory Library, PR 822: A sketch of the public career of Colonel 
Charles Duncan Griffith, King William's Town, 1881, p.7. 
119. Molteno Papers, No. 618: Merriman to Molteno, tel., 20 Sept. '77. 
120. Including the 150 sent up by Brownlee on 20 August. 
C.196l, Encl. No. 23: Brownlee Memo., 28 Aug. '77. 
121. This belief was still held when Saga interv£ewed informants for 
his books which were published in 1930 and 1931. Saga, S.E.Bantu, 
p.250. 
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Two events served to hasten the slide to war. On 21st September, 
Bace1a, the son of Qaza (both of whom were supposed to be prominent 
members of the war party)122 led 300 Gca1eka on a raid into Fingo1and 
and the Idutywa Reserve. They seized cattle, sheep and goats. When 
accosted by a troop of F.A.M.P. they refused to hand over their spoil, 
saying: 'We do not care any longer for your government, we will take 
the cattle'. Although they relinquished the sheep and goats, they rode 
off with the cattle and the police did not attempt to stop them. The 
f 11 . d h d . d' 123 b h . ( o oWlng ay t ere was renewe ral lng. A out t e same tlme soon 
after Frere left Butterworth, Fynn says) Runeyi returned from his mission 
to Sandile. On his arrival, so formidable was his reputation as a 
warrior, and so determined was he on war, that people everywhere said: 
'now there will be war'. He was not particularly hostile to whites, says 
Fynn, but believed they should stand aside as they b,ad done 10 1872. 124 
Even such optimists as Frere and Eustace read the signs and concluded 
war was imminent. When the latter, West Fynn and Dewar rode over to 
Sarhi1i's kraal on 21st to deliver Frere's message of 20th, Sarhili 
appeared to them to be sulky, complaining of being worried on all sides 
by his people's raids into the Idutywa and white pressure on him over 
there. He said he could not prevent these raids, but desired peace and 
125 
wished the enquiry at Butterworth was concluded. The next day, 
Eustace heard the details of Bace1a's raid, and his view that the situation 
was deteriorating was confirmed by the news Xhoxho Maphasa brought to 
122. C.196l, Encl. No. 43: Statement of West Fynn to Frere, 29 Sept. '77. 
123. G.17-'78, p.34: Eustace to S.N.A., 31 Jan. '78. 
124. C.196l, Encl. No. 43: Statement of West Fynn to Frere, 3 Oct. '77. 
125. G.17-'78, p.33: Eustace to S.N.A., 31 Jan. '78. 
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him that night. Xhoxho said he had just come from Sarhili' s 
kraal where large numbers of men were gathering. He feared Sarhi1i 
meant war, for one of his councillors had said that he was in a similar 
frame of mind as he had been during the cattle killing twenty years 
before. Xhoxho, on behalf of his father, assured Eustace that the 
majority of the Tsonyana would not join Sarhi1i in a war and requested 
Government protection since he expected Sarhi1i to attack them on the 
outbreak of war. This Eustace promised. 1?6 
As a result of the raids, Frere decided to ask Eustace to make one 
final demand to Sarhi1i to restrain and punish his peop1e. 127 Frere 
had, however, by then concluded that a resort to force was inevitable. 
Eustace sent messages to Sarhi1i demanding an explanation for the raids, 
restitution of stock and the restraining of his people on pain of his 
quitting the country. While he was awaiting a reyly he heard that 
Chalmers had sent for a reinforcement of 75 men and a gun, saying he would 
not be able to hold the reserve without them so anarchical were conditions 
128 there. On 23rd more confirmation of preparations for war appeared. 
One of the last traders to leave Gca1eka1and told Eustace that the war 
cry had been sounded since the previous day. Men were swarming up from 
the coast, some saying to him that they had come up once before,but had 
been prevented from fighting 'by the old magistrate' pres~ab1y Fynn 
now they were determined not to go home without a fight. Love, the 
trader in question, had been warned to leave Gca1eka1and by his chief. 
Leslie, the missionary, said many men were flocking to Sarhili's kraal 
126. Ibid, p.34. 
127. C.1961, No. 39: Frere to Carnarvon, 25 Sept. '77. 
128. G.17-'78, p.34: Eustace to S.N.A., 31 Jan. '78. 
" 
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and Eustace's police told him there was going to be war, and asked for 
129 passes to leave the country. 
When Sarhili eventually replied to Eustace's messages, he simply 
requested to see Fynn, whom Eustace declined to send, saying in any case 
130 Fynn did not wish to go. Fynn went all the same, and Sarhili told 
him that he was 
sorry Colonel Eustace should think of leaving the 
country, but it was now in such a muddle that 
there was no settling anything, not only in his 
(Kreli's) country, but also in the Idutywa 
Reserve, where the magistrate could not manage 
his people. How could Colonel Eustace expect 
him to manage his people when they had gone so 
far? It was useless collecting cattle; as 
131 fast as he collected them, more were taken. 
The substance of what Sarhili told Fynn was relayed to Eustace by one 
of Sarhili's councillors the next morning. Eustace decided immediately 
to leave for Ibeka (Barnett's shop), and began making arrangements for 
132 the transportation of his family and goods. Fynn says he and the 
missionaries had decided to stay, but during the day he received a 
telegram from Merriman advising the remaining whites to leave Gcalekaland, 
. h h h . d h h . . k 133 warn~ng t em t at t ey rema~ne t ere at t e1r own r1S • The same 
day Merriman sent a telegram to J. Rose-Innes, the Civil Commissioner 
129. Ibid. 
130. Ibid. 
131. C.196l, Encl. No. 43: Statement of Fynn to Frere, 29 Sept. '77. 
132. G.17-'78, p.3S: Eustace to S.N.A., 31 Jan. '78. 
133. Fynn, p.12. 
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and Resident Magistrate at King William's Town, desiring him to publish 
the next day a Government notice making arrangements for the outbreak of 
as a clash between the police and the Gcaleka was imminent. 134 war, 
Sarhili had finally decided that there was no 'Q.~.h~;:· solution th.a-t: 
war to the growing pressures which beset him and his people. As 
happened ~n 1835, when the bands of reluctant Xhosa Chiefs were forced 
135 into war by the actions of their people, so now Sarhili found the 
actions of his people had made war the only alternative. Information 
g1ven by a Thembu servant to Walter Stanford, whose sources, as will be 
seen, were usually reliable, provides important evidence in this regard. 
This man, "Soldat" by name, told Stanford in early October that he had 
been visiting in Gcalekaland, and was at Sarhili's kraal after the visit 
of Eustace and the Fynn brothers (almost certainly 21st September). 
Sarhili said after the white officials left: 
I mean war, and war with the English as well as 
the Fingoes. We shall drink coffee together 
with the English. 136 
The last part of his statement appears enigmatic to say the least, but 
it is clear that Sarhili had decided for the second time to fight the 
Mfengu and their white allies. Accordingly, "Soldat" says, Sarhili 
sent to Ngubo to make ready and summoned Ngxito,who arrived three days 
later and began the ceremonies of doctoring the warriors. 137 That 
night, the 24th, Fynn says that he could hear the men singing the war 
134. C.161, Encl. 3, No. 39: Merriman to Rose-Innes, tel., 24 Sept. '77. 
135. Peires, p.2l3. 
136. G.G.R.I.: Stanford to Elliot, 13 Oct. '77. 
The 21st September is the only occasion Eustace mentions riding 
over to Sarhili's kraal. West Fynn accompanied him according to 
Eustace (see above p.97, footnote 125). Such a dating fits in 
with white accounts of Ngxito's activities. Fynn, p.13. 
137. G.G.R.I.: Stanford to Elliot, 13 Oct. 177. 
101 
AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 1877: THE GCALEKA DECIDE TO FIGHT 
l38 
songs amidst a continual war-cry. 
Sarhili, characteristically provided an escort led by Sigcawu and 
Mcotoma to ensure the safety of Fynn, the missionaries and their families. 
Fynn relates how Mcotoma told him that as long as he was over the Kei 
l39 by the 26th he would be in no danger. 
When one reviews the events of August and September 1877, one is left 
with the overwhelming impression of a complex situation gradually slipping 
out of control. Simplistic explanations do not suffice. It is as 
untrue to simply assert that the Gcaleka made an unwarranted attack on 
British territory and British subjects pace white contemporaries,140 
as to imply that the whites set out to deliberately use what might have 
been an easily resolved and petty inter-tribal quarrel to make war on 
d h h 1 k Xh h · . 141 an crus t e Gca e a, pace some modern osa 1stor1ans ~ 
138. Fynn, p.13. 
139. Fynn, p.13. 
140. Such as Ayliff, see above, p.73. 
141. Such as Chief S.M. Burns-Ncamashe and Mr Mda-Mda. 
Chief Burns-Ncamashe says 
Many of us who are studying this part of history 
think that had the British left this to the 
blacks themselves to decide, it would not have 
grown into a war... There were the whites 
wanting to take sides and settle it in a 
foreign way when it could have been settled 
by the chiefs themselves. 
Interview with Chief S.M. Burns-Ncamashe, Rhodes University, 
1 November 1977. The Chief did admit, on being pressed on this 
point, that there were extraordinary circumstances affecting this 
particular "quarrel", which was no ordinary youngster's stick-fight. 
Interview with Mr Mda-Mda, Nyokana Store, Nyokana Location, 
Wi110wvale District, 17 September, 1977. 
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SEPTEMBER TO NOVEMBER 1877: THE RETREAT AND RETURN OF THE GCALEKA 
1. The Battle of Gwadana 
Anticipating an imminent clash between the Gcaleka and Mfengu after 
the events of 20-30 September, the Colonial Government stepped up its 
preparations for war. On 25th Molteno gave Moerriman and Frere sanction 
to act for him on the Frontier. l On the same day Merriman published a 
special Government Gazette announcing the steps taken by the authorities 
including the establishment of an Mfengu levy, and informing the frontier 
2 population where they might seek refuge in case of war. Also on 25th, 
Brownlee issued a Government Notice directed at colonial blacks, calling 
on them as subjects to refrain from participating in any possible Transkeian 
. b 3 d~s tur ances. In order to drive home its message, Frere's party visited 
King William's Town soon after. The exact relationship between Imperial 
and Colonial Troops was not defined until after the first clashes. 4 
As Frere observed later, the Gcaleka were almost certainly aware 
that delay would not assist their efforts to expel the Mfengu from 
5 Fingoland and the Idutywa Reserve. But although the renewed raiding 
1. Molteno Papers, No. 628: Molteno and Frere Tel. Conversation, 
25 Sept. '77; C.l96l, No. 39. Frere to Carnarvon, 25 Sept. '77. 
Molteno alsQ gave Merriman and Brownlee permission to act for the 
whole Cabinet. 
2. C.196l, Encl. 3 No. 39, Merriman Memo., 25 Sept. '77. 
Mfengu levies had first been raised in the 7th Frontier War. 
During the Gcalekaland campaign three Divisions of Transkeian 
Mfengu under the overall command of James Ayliff served with the 
white forces. Each Division was camppsed of 6 local units of 250 
men each commanded by white officers, except in the case of one led 
by Veldtman. Cory Library, MS 14, 254/13: Burton, ii, 71. 
3. C.196l, Encl. 2 No. 39: Notice from the Department of Native 
Affairs to her Majesty's subjects on the Eastern Frontier, 25 Sept.'77. 
4. There was much correspondence, though, between Frere and Cunynghame 
on the lack of communication between the F.A.M.P., the Imperial 
troops and the civil authorities. See C. 1961 Nos 42, 49 and 
enclosures. 
5. C.l96l, No. 44: Frere to Carnarvon, 3 Octo. '77. 
" 
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continued, the Gca1eka evinced a clear desire to avoid the police by 
6 
withdrawing whenever they approached. The question of what to do 
about the whites was in fact still being discussed at Sarhili's Kraal, 
Holela. On 25th, Chalmers sent to Merriman saying that he had heard that 
the Gcaleka were due to attack Fingo1and in the afternoon and requesting 
. . 7 1nstruct10ns. Merriman replied: 
You will prevent any violation of our border 
or molestation of our subjects in any way, 
peaceable if possible, but by force if necessary. 
First warn Galekas, then arrest them if they 
show resistance - use force and be careful 
that it is effectual. 8 
On the morning of 26th, as Chalmers was about to leave Ibeka on a 
patrol, he got confirmation of these orders from Griffith, who had just 
arrived there. 9 
Proceeding on his patrol, Chalmers learnt that a Gca1eka army had 
10 
crossed into the Reserve and was attacking some Mfengu Kraals. 
Soga identifies the Gcaleka involved. He says that Sitshaka, Khiva and 
Mxoli, whilst on their way to the meeting at Holela, attacked some Mfengu 
6. C.196l, Encl. 2 No. 44: Griffiths - Merriman, 30 Sept. '77. 
7. Molteno Papers, No. 628: Telegraphic Conversation between Merriman 
and Molteno, 25 Sept. '77. 
8. Ibid. 
9. C.1961, Encl. 2 No. 44: Griffith to Merriman, 30 Sept. '77. 
10. C.1961, Encl. 2 No. 102: E.B. Chalmers to Griffith, 28 Oct. '77. 
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Kraals beneath the Gwadana Mountain in the Reserve.. The war cry was 
sounded and was heard at Ho1e1a, which was only a couple of miles 
distant. Thereupon the Qawuka Division of the army under Ngubo left 
11 the meeting without waiting for Sarhili's orders, and joined the fray. 
Chalmers summoned Ay1iff and his Mfengu Levy from the Mpu1use 
store nearby and on their arrival according to orders, committed his 
forces in support of the Mfengu under attack. The Gcaleka attached 
the whites in three columns, numbering spme 5,000 men, but were 
temporarily checked by the 7-pounder gun of the police. After a whi 1e, 
the gun carriage broke down and Chalmers ordered the withdrawal of the 
gun. Mistaking that for a general withdrawal, the Mfengu retreated 
en masse, becoming entangled with the F.A.M.P. horses. Chalmers feared 
at this stage that the F.A.M.P. would be cut off and surrounded by the 
Gcaleka, and so he ordered a withdrawal. 12 Ayliff confirms that the 
13 
retreat became a rout~ in the confusion precipitated by the Mfengu, 
and as a result, white casualities were relatively high - one officer and 
six men killed. 
In view of the reverse at Gwadana, the weakness of the force when 
compared to that of the Gcaleka, and the anarchy of the Reserve, Griffith 
decided to abandon the Reserve and concentrate his forces at a place that 
came to be known as Ibeka. Over the two days following the battle, the 
shop and outbuildings there of the trader John Barnett were fortified, 
and preparations were made for the attack which, considering the large 
movement of troops in the vicinity of Sarhi1is Great Place, some six miles 
d · d·· 14 ~stant, seeme ~mm~nent. 
11. Soga, Ama-Xosa, p.120. 
Soga, S.E. Bantu, p.258. 
12. C.196l, Encl. 2 No. 102: E.B. Chalmers to Griffith, 28 Oct. '77. 
13. Macquarrie, i, 75. 
14. C.196l, Encl. 2 No. 44: Griffith to Merriman, 30 Sept. '77. 
'. Ex C.M.R., p.76. 
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At Holela, the meeting of the whole chiefdom continued. The 
Gcaleka were elated by their success and the desire for war must have 
become overwhelming, especially when on 28th the Mfengu under Veldtman 
attacked Gcaleka Kraals below Butterworth, including the Kraal of the 
15 pacific Bhotomane. Soga maintains that Sarhili resolutely refused 
to make the customary official declaration of war, even refusing to give 
16 the order for attack on 29th September before the battle of Ibeka. 
In view of preceding evidence, this is unlikely.17 Melane's account of 
the meeting after Gwadana is far more plausible. He says that Sarhili 
explained to the Gcaleka that war with the Mfengu - and therefore with 
the English - would be 'above' them (i.e. too much for them). Khiva, 
dressed in all the finery of a favoured general challenged this view. 
In a rousing speech to the effect that Sarhili must simply sanction his 
army according to custom, and let events follow their/course, he won 
the approval of the majority. Sarhili then submitted to the inevitable, 
and said that the Gcaleka should in that case fight to show that they 
were men. However, he predicted the defeat and dispersal of the 
Gcaleka and therefore ordered Lindinxuwa and his people, the Bojela, to 
stay neutral in the war, so that he could look after the chiefdom's 
18 interests when the war was over the the whites were punishing the combatants. 
15. C.196l, Encl. 2 No. 44: Griffith to Merriman, 30 Sept. '77. 
Kaffrarian Watchman, early Oct. '77, "In defence of KrelL" 
16. Saga, Ama-Xosa, pp.114-119. 
Soga says that when an enemy approaches and the Xhosa army is 
mobilised a state of war has to be proclaimed by the supreme chief, 
and the warriors given authority to fight by him. This legal 
constitution of the army is called uku-yolola. 
17. See above, pp.l00. 
18. Inverview with Mr N.C. Me I ane , Qwaninga Location, Willowvale District, 
14 Sept. 1977. Fihla confirmed the outlines of Melane's 
account: Interview with S'ub-Headman Z. Fihla. Thuthura Location 
No.4, Kentani District, 22 Sept. 1977. 
Khiva had won his spurs in the 1872 war, when he commanded the 
Tsonyana for the first time: Saga, S.E. Bantu, p.25l. 
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Whatever the truth, Sarhi1i did make one final effort to get the 
whites to withdraw before launching the attack on Ibeka. On 28th, 
Sigcawu rode up to Ibeka accompanied by a party of 500 men. Bearing a 
white flag and accompanied by an interpreter, he asked to speak to the 
commander of the Post, Captain Robinson. Sigcawu explained to Robinson 
that he had come to apologize on behalf of his father for the death of 
the policemen at Gwadana. He said the Gca1eka did not wish to fight 
the police, but only the Mfengu, and therefore asked Robinson to retire 
and let the attack take place. If he failed to retire, the attack would 
take place within two days all the same. Robinson told Sigcawu plainly 
that any Gcaleka transgression of the boundary would be met by force on 
the part of police, and Sigcawu and his party accordingly withdrew. l9 
2. The Battle of Ibeka 
Gca1eka strategy was determined by several factors. The Gca1eka had 
never been officially involved in previous frontier wars and therefore 
had less reason to avoid direct attack on prepared positions than the 
Rharhabe, who usually avoided costly head-on confrontations in favour 
of proven guerilla tactics. But the Gcaleka were also emboldened by 
their success at Gwadana, by the acquisition of guns, by the youthful 
inexperience of those most eager for war and by the activities of Ngxito 
20 
and his prophetesses. Apart from the customary war mark applied to 
the forehead to give immunity from bullets, each warrior was given a 
charm to be worn round the neck for the same purpose, by a woman reputed 
to be Ngxito's daughter. The same woman was reputed also to be responsible 
19. Ex. C.M. R., pp. 77-8. 
B. Holt: Where Rainbirds Call (Cape Town, 1972), p.126. 
There is an official report by Robinson printed in the Kaffrarian 
Watchman, 22 Oct. '77. 
20. For the activities of these, see above, p.65. 
Theal, X, 61, also states that the woman dictated these tactics, but 
he may have got this from Ex C.M.R. 
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for the adoption of close formation in favour of the customary open 
f . 21 ormatlon. The Gcaleka evidently believed after all this that the 180 
F.A.M.P. and 2000 Mfengu at Ibeka22 could easily be overwhelmed and Fingoland 
and the undefended Idutywa entered and swept clear of Mfengu. 
On the afternoon of 29th September, the Gcaleka army numbering some 
8000 warriors approached Ibeka, and after initial skirmishing, launched a 
major head-on attack against the post. Grouped in close formation they 
proved easy targets for the three artillery pieces, rocket tube and 
measured fire of the police. Checked and then driven back by the Mfengu, 
without whom the whites would have been overwhelmed, the Gcaleka re-gr~uped 
and tried to turn first the right and then the left flank of the post in 
what appears to have been an imperfectly co-ordinated pincer movement. 
But again the withering fire and Mfengu charges drove back the Gcaleka. 
On the right flank, the prophetess Nita was killed leading a division 
into the attack. After one final feeble attack, the Gcaleka retreated 
in good order, leaving several hundred killed and wounded to a colonial 
1055 of one wounded policeman and six killed and six wounded Mfengu. 
The following day, the Gcaleka made a far less determined attack on the 
post. It seems that the ability of the police to shell them at distances 
up to 2400 yards, plus their considerable losses, had demoralised them, 
and by mid-morning, they had withdrawn to a spot some ten miles from the 
post. For the Gcaleka,delay in August had cost them that surprise which 
21. Ex C.M.R., p.97-8. 
22. C.l96l, Encl. 2 No. 44, Griffith - Merriman, 30 Sept. '77. 
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23 in the face of superior arms, was their only hope of success. 
3. Black Responses to Ibeka 
Before the battle, there had been much activity by the whites to 
prevent any possible combination or co-operation with the Gcaleka. 
NOw, the defeat the Gcaleka suffered, cost them the potential support 
of the other black chiefdoms. 
Just before the outbreak of war, Brownlee had made one of his 
periodical reshuffles of Departmental Officers. In line with the 
policy of placing 'officers and gentlemen' in the more important posts 
(cf.Eustace's appointment) Sir Henry Elliot became Resident with 
Ngangelizwe. The former Resident, William Wright was appointed to 
replace Theophilus Liefeldt, the special Magistrate with Sandile since 
1867, who had been downgraded to the less important position of Resident 
23. C.1961, Encl. No. 61, Griffith to Military Secretary, 3 Oct. '77: Frere 
to General Ponsonby, 17 Oct. '77, quoted in J. Martineau: The Llfe 
and Correspondence of Sir Bartle Frer; (London,.189S), Volume II, p.202. 
Theal, X, 61, says the number was varlously estlmated at 7-10,000. 
One must be careful to qualify Moyer's generalisation that 
in the first months of the war, before colonial 
troops could be mobilised effectively, most of 
the fighting was done by the Mfengu 
(Moyer -in C. Saunders and R. Derricourt (eds): 
Beyond the Cape Frontier (London, 1974),pp.l2l-2) 
and the impression he seems to give that the Mfengu saved the 
whites from disaster. After a11,the whites had stepped in to 
prevent the Gcaleka from overwhelming the Mfengu in a war the 
latter had helped precipitate (albeit that the whites were far 
from disinterested participants) and the Mfengu had unintentionally 
contributed to Gcaleka victory at Gwadana. The skirmishing 
prowess and large numbers of the Mfengu were a vital and effective 
complement to the superior fire power of the numerically weak 
whites at Ibeka, but after Ibeka, while Colonial troops were 
mobilised, the Gcaleka retired and showed only a determination to 
resist invasion and attack. The truth is, whites and Mfengu played 
a true complementary role throughout the war and 
by December, there were just under 2000 Imperial troops at the Cape, 
just over 1100 F.A.M.P., 300 trained and untrained volunteers and 
burghers, 3000 Thembu and over 3000 Mfengu. G.H. 21/5: Return 
of Military Force at the Cape, Dec. '77. 
'. 
109 
SEPTEMBER TO NOVEMBER 1877: THE RETREAT AND RETURN OF THE GCALEKA 
with Anta because of his drinking and inability to influence or control 
d Ol 24 On 25 h S b F ' San 1 e. t eptem er rere s party made a quick visit from 
King William's Town to Tembani,25 both to introduce Wright to the Ngqika 
and to persuade them to stay out of any Transkeian war. At this meeting, 
Sandile emphasised that he was determined to remain quiet whatever might 
happen to other tribes, a profession which his chief councillors echoed. 
Frere left the meeting with the impression that the only real danger was 
the panic stricken frontier talk which inflamed black and white suspicion 
26 
equally. Brownlee however, noted that there was great sympathy for 
Sarhili and antagonism towards the Mfengu. He observed that since his 
removal as Special Commissioner to the Ngqika in 1867, the neglect of 
Ngqika by the colonial authorities had allowed them to resume much of 
27 their independent status. Sandile, in fact, as was to become increasingly 
clear ln the next few weeks, ruled the location virtually as an independent 
h o f 28 c le • Brownlee remembered too, that Sandile had at the end of 1876 
said he was tired of the police in his location and had been encouraged 
by Sarhili to resist activities of their's that threatened his position. 29 
Brownlee therefore determined to stay on in the Location to try and set 
the Ngqika on an even keel, but his indiscretion in voicing his fears 
24. Frere later commented acidly on Colonial "government" of the Ngqika: 
We send a sot [Liefeldt] to represent us, and then 
we wonder that the chief is not cured of drunkenness. 
We replace him by a man who is said to have been sent 
here [the Colony] because he allowed a petty chief 
in Kaffraria to call him a liar on the bench: and 
we wonder Sandili's people do not respect us more. 
Frere to Merriman, 21 Nov. '77 quoted in Martineau, ii, 205. 
25. G.17-'78, p.1l7: W. Wright to W. Ayliff, 22 Feb. '78. 
26. C. 1961, No. 44: Frere to Carnarvon, 3 Oct. '77. 
27. Molteno Papers, No. 632: Brownlee to Molteno, 27 Sept. '77. 
28. See above, p.19. 
29. See above, p.59. 
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excited both black and white inhabitants of the area and led to Frere 
30 
asking Merriman to recall him back to King William's Town. Meanwhile 
the Governor met the Nd1ambe and Mdushane chiefs of the King William's 
Town'District, including Siwani, Toyise anJ Jali, and warned them to 
,. '11' d 'f d f R I h . . 31 s~t st~ an wa1t or or ers rom J. ose- nnes, t e~r mag~strate. 
Brownlee was also at variance with Merriman and Frere on the question 
of the Thembu. He knew that there was great antipathy towards the 
Mfengu on the part of the Thembu and sympathy for Sarhili. There was a 
danger that some Thembu might be drawn into the war and so he suggested 
that the danger might be lessened by removing Menziwe, the Mfengu Chief, 
from Thembuland and relocating him at the Bo10twa River (a measure long 
demanded by Ngangelizwe). Merriman however, felt no concessions should 
be made to Ngange1izwe whom he abhorred, and the Governor was inclined 
32 to agree. 
However, on the more important question of the possibility of a 
general "combination" of chiefdoms, Brownlee and Frere were agreed. 
There was much evidence of consultation. Xhe10, a councillor to 
Ngangelizwe, told Stanford, the magistrate with Da1asi1e, that Sarhi1i 
had sent messengers to Nqwi1iso, chief of the Western Mpondo. These 
had been referred to Mqike1a's kraal. where they had met emissaries from 
Cetywayo. The latter told Mqike1a that the Zulu 'were not going to put 
up with Shepstone any more, because he was destroying them' .33 
30. Molteno Papers, No. 646: Merriman to Molteno, tel., 2 Oct. '77. 
31. Cory Library, MS. 14, 254/13: Burton, i, 21. 
The main concern these chiefs expressed at the meeting was the 
severity of the drought. 
32. Molteno Papers, No. 632; Brownlee to Molteno, 27 Sept. '77. 
33. C.O. 4429, p.74: Elliot to Brownlee, 28 Sept. '77, and enclosure. 
'. 
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Brownlee knew of these visits, but did not countenance the wild frontier 
rumours of a deeply laid anti-white plot directed by Cetshwayo. Although 
some Gcaleka might hope that aid would be sent to them by the Mpondo and 
Zulu, he thought such aid was highly improbable and 
with the conflicting interests in existence 
between the several tribes, it was hardly possible 
that an organised plan for action could be 
34 
arranged. 
Soga's conversations with some of Sarhili' s councillors confirm Brownlee's 
point that there had been consultation, but that conflict of interest 
prevented any arrangements being made. Sarhili is said to have told 
Zulu emissaries that he did not intend to fight the whites and that in 
any case, Zululand was too far away for co-operation. He is also said 
to have explained to Basotho emissaries after Ibeka that he expected to 
be attacked by the Thembu supporting the whites and that his only way of 
retreat was 
Hqikela for 
agreed with 
through Pondoland. If the Basotho could arrange 
right of passage he would join them thereafter. 35 
Brownlee's conclusion. 
I can only say that I could never learn anything 
tangible to support the suspicion ••• of any 
conspiracy or combiation among the Kaffir tribes; 
34. G.17-'78,pp.216-17: Brownlee Memo., May '78. 
35. Soga, Ama-Xosa, pp.116-8. 
" 
l .. dth 
Frere 
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though, doubtless, there would have been no lack 
of sympathy had any success attended the first 
efforts to dislodge and plunder the Fingos. 36 
Frere's proviso explains the significance of Ibeka. Had the 
Gcaleka followed the success of Gwadana with another victory, it is 
more than likely that the Ngqika and Thembu would have seized the chance 
to drive out the upstart Mfengu and overturn colonial authority. The 
clear-cut defeat of the Gcaleka at Ibeka, followed soon after by a rapid 
colonial drive through Gcalekaland, made it expedient for frontier 
chiefdoms to at least stay their hands and await events if they did not 
I 
actively pursue self-interest by joining the colonists. 
Thus Nqwiliso sent a message to Frere offering the assistance of 
the Western Mpondo on 1st October. 37 Moni stuck to his earlier profession 
of a desire to remain neutral and on 4th October pleaded with W.R.D. Fynn 
not to move with his family and thereby bring his loyalty in question. 
The Gcaleka chiefs of the Idutywa saw self-interest now in offering 
support to the whites, despite their previous active involvement in 
38 disturbances with the Reserve Mfengu. 
36. C.l96l, No. 44: Frere to Carnarvon, 3 Oct. '77. 
37. 
38. 
Frere was later to change his mind as he began to focus on the 
Zulu problem. In March 1878 he wrote of 
my conviction, which has been gradually and 
unwillingly growing, that Shepstone and others of 
experience in the country were right as to the 
existence of a wish among the great chiefs to 
make this war a simultaneous rising of Kaffirdom 
against white civilisation. 
However, he did qualify this stateme~t by expressing his continued 
belief that, as evidenced by the war itself, a combination was 
impossible. 
Frere to Herbert, 18 March '78 quoted in Martineau, ii, 223. 
G.G.R.I.: Nqwiliso to Frere, 1 Oct. '77 . 
G.G.R.I.: Elliot to Griffith, 4 Oct. '77 . 
Merriman continued to distrust them as did Elliot. G.G.R. 13: 
Merriman to Griffith, draft, 9 Oct. '77 • 
" 
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Perhaps the most vital question was the reaction of the Thembu. 
Griffith immediately after abandoning the Idutywa Reserve requested 
Elliot to raise a Thembu levy. With Ngange1izwe's help, the Idutywa 
39 
might be reoccupied and held. Merriman did not let his antipathy to 
Ngange1izwe prevent him from seeing the advantage of involving the 
40 Thembu on the colonial side and so he supported the move. But 
Brownlee, whose apprehensions relative to the Thembu have been noted, 
thought it prudent only to ask Elliot to call on the Thembu to remain 
neutral. Not unnaturally Elliot was confused by such disparate orders 
emanating from military and governmental sources, but he grasped the 
importance of Ngange1izwe as the key to the Thembu's '10ya1ty,.4l Elliot 
says he persuaded Ngangelizwe to call on his people to turn out and 
42 
support the Government, but only the Thembu who had been harassed by 
the Bomvana responded immediately. The rest waited for some days before 
joining the Paramount and Elliot ~n the Reserve. Significantly, 
43 Dalasile and Sitokhwe Tyhali did not send any men. 
39. C.196l, Encl. 2 No. 44: Griffith to Merriman, 30 Sept. '77. 
40. G.G.R. 13: Merriman to Griffith, draft, 9 Oct. '77. 
Eustace had made the same recommendation to Merriman, with whom 
he appeared to be on terms of some intimacy. Merriman Papers, 
1877 file No. 60, Eustace to Merriman, 6 Oct. '77. 
41. C.M.T. 1/58: Elliot to Brownlee, 12 Oct. '77. 
42. G.R. 21/7: Elliot to Griffith, 4 Dec. '77. Ellint clearly 
states that Ngangelizwe followed him immediately, but Theal, X, 
62 says that the delay in raising the Levy, which soon numbered 
3000, was due to hesitation on the part of Ngangelizwe. 
43. N.A. 43: Stanford to S.N.A., 5 Oct •. '77. 
" 
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4. White Responses to Ibeka 
The battle of Ibeka also served to crystallise the objectives of 
the whites. According to their perceptions of the situation, they had 
44 
attempted to prevent a war. Now that full-scale war had broken out, 
they determined to take advantage of the opportunity it presented to 
end what had been both an anomaly and a perpetual thorn in the side of 
colonial rule of the frontier. 45 On 5th October Frere issued a 
proclamation announcing the deposition of Sarhili as Chief of the Gcaleka, 
and the intention of the Cape Government to invade, to militarily occupy 
and to finally annex Gcalekaland. These steps were justified as the 
necessary punishment of Sarhi1i and the Gcaleka for their invasion of 
British territory (Fingoland and the Idutywa Reserve), their attack on 
46 British subjects (the Mfengu) and their attack on British troops. 
Although agreed on their objective, there was disagreement amongst 
members of the Government on the mechanics of the limitation of the 
disturbances and suppression of the Gcaleka, as well as on the post-war 
settlement plan. Molteno,with his acute suspicion of Imperial interference 
in his Government's affairs and his poor opinion of the suitability of 
Imperial troops to colonial campaigning,desired to restrict the role 
of Cunynghame and the Imperial troops as far as possible. He favoured 
an immediate, short, sharp and exclusively colonial campaign in which 
the F.A.M.P. would be supported by volunteers, burghers and Mfeng~, 
Th b d d 1 . 47 em u an Mpon 0 ev~es. Frere pointed out the many flaws in this 
44. This was particularly true of Frere - see above, pp. 87-8. 
45. Saunders, "Annexation", p.173. 
46. C.196l, No. 51: Frere to Cunynghame, 10 Oct. '77. and Enclosure. 
47. Molteno Papers, No. 654: Molteno and Merriman, Tel. Conversation, 
5 Oct. '77. 
P. Lewsen (ed.): Selections from the Correspondence of J.X. 
Merriman 1870-1890 (Cape Town, 1960), footnote 3, p.28. 
" 
115 
SEPTEMBER TO NOVEMBER 1877: THE RETREAT AND RETURN OF THE GCALEKA 
plan. Firstly, it would lead to the creation of a divided command which 
in military terms was most dangerous. Secondly, in the absence of a 
strong colonial defence force, the use of native levies and volunteers 
was a sad necessity which ought to be limited as far as possible - these 
were men who served more out of a desire for plunder than out of loyalty, 
and they were bound to strip Gca1eka1and bare. Further, 
these people are not likely to confine themselves 
to plunder. They will certainly commit 
atrocities after their wont, and bring discredit 
on the colonial system of native management. 
Thirdly, the F.A.M.P. was in a parlous state, less than half its 
theoretical strength of 1100 being operational and the whole force in 
urgent need of a complete refit. Fourthly, and most importantly, the 
objective the Government had set themselves could be best achieved by a 
well equipped and organized force rather than a hastily assembled motley 
band. A · f d 1 .. bl 48 certa~n amount 0 e ay was ~nev~ta e. 
Merriman came to agree with Frere. He was happy to see Cunynghame 
appointed on 2nd October to overall command of the Imperial and Colonial 
troops, reassuring Molteno that Cunynghame did not intend interfering 
with Griffith's handling of the Gcalekaland campaign.49 He acquiesced 
48. Frere to Merriman, 5 Oct. '77, quoted in Lewsen, Selections 
1870-90, pp.27-30. The state of the F.A.M.P. had been exposed 
by an inspection conducted by H. Hallam Parr, Frere's Military 
Secretary, on 9th October. Merriman wrote to Molteno: 
In place of a well-seasoned body of men, hardened 
and ready for exposure, like the force of a few 
years back ••• we have now a mob of raw unseasoned 
lads, without drill, without discipline and 
utterly unreliable. 
Merriman to Molteno, 31 Oct. '77, quoted in Lewsen, Selections 
1870-90, pp.30-3l. See also Ex. C.M.R., p.15 for further 
details. 
49. C.1961, Encl. No. 49: Merriman Memo. on Cunynghame's military 
proposals, 1 Oct. '77. 
'. 
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in Cunynghame's joining the daily council held by Frere, Merriman and 
Brownlee since their return to King William's Town. 50 Although keen to 
involve the Thembu and volunteers in Gca1eka1and, Merriman was alive to 
the dangers of using volunteers as police in the colony and of raising 
Mfengu levies there. 5l The panic by the colonists and the overbearing 
attitude of the Colonial Mfengu after the successes of their Transkeian 
counterparts could have a disastrous effect on the colonial blacks and 
h b d h · h 52 t ere y raw t em ~nto t e war. 
Government strategy aimed therefore at localising the war to 
Gcalekaland where a decisive blow was to be administered to the Gca1eka 
in an open confrontation. Failing that, the Gcaleka were to he hemmed 
in by the Bomvana guarding the Mbashe, the Thembu driving from the Idutywa, 
Griffiths driving from Ibeka. The Gcaleka were to be kept out from 
the Colony by the Imperial troops, including the 88th summoned to the 
frontier after Gwadana. Initially a landing of Imperial troops at 
Mazeppa Bay was contemplated as the best means of preventing a Gcaleka 
escape across the Mbashe, but the plan was abandoned because it was 
53 thought that the landing would be too dangerous. 
Griffiths was issued with instructions by Merriman who assumed 
the mantle of a sort of Minister of War. Frere's influence is to be 
seen particularly in the part of his instructions relating to booty and 
to the suppression of the more "traditional" aspects of colonial 
50. Molteno Papers, No. 654: Molteno and Merriman, Tel. Conversation, 
5 Oct. '77. 
51. C.1961, Encl. No. 49: Merriman Memo. on Cunynghame's military 
proposals, 1 Oct. '77. 
52. G.G.R. 13: Merriman to Frere, draft, 1 Oct. '77. 
Frere was equally alive to these dangers. C.1961, No. 44: 
Frere to Carnarvon, 3 Oct. '77, and Frere to Brownlee, 9 Oct. '77, 
quoted in Martineau, ii, 195-7. 
53. C.196l, No. 48: Frere to Carnarvon, 9 Oct. '77. 
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campaigning: all captured stock were to be allocated strictly, firstly 
to cover Government expenses, secondly, for commissariat purposes and 
only thirdly as booty. Griffith was authorized to make a summary 
distribution of booty in order to avoid waste, chicanery and dispute; 
he was strictly enjoined to suppress all irregular marauding and in case 
of Gcaleka non-combatants suffering, he was to aid them to resume their 
avocations or to proceed to the Public Works. 54 
Merriman also outlined Government intentions on the future of 
Gcalekaland. Those people and chiefs who had taken no part or only a 
small part in the disturbances were to be disarmed and resettled under 
British authority, the chiefs having no power other than that they were 
granted as Government appointed headmen. It was clearly intended to 
confiscate some Gcaleka territory, but members of the Government were 1n 
disagreement as to which parts should be confiscated and who to settle 
in these. 55 
Percy Nightingale, the Civil Commissioner of Victoria East devised a 
plan which envisaged Mfengu occupation of Gcalekaland with only a small 
area reserved for the resettlement of the Gcaleka. The valuable lands 
released by the Mfengu in this way in the Colony would be available for 
h . 56 w 1te use. Merriman, while agreeing that the Gcaleka ought to be 
punished for their 'wrong doing' by having some territory confiscated, 
54. G.G.R. 13: Merriman to Griffiths, draft, 3 Oct. '77. 
55. 
56. 
Prize money, of course, was an integral part of the volunteering 
system. Thea1, X, 64. Ex. C.M.R., p.92, states openly 
that the volunteers didn't profess to be disciplined and came 
for the sake of booty, but he rightly adds that many stayed on 
when there was no chance of booty and despite inadequate pay. 
Some, however, did leave (see below, p. 124) and Griffith, who 
frustrated these men by his attempts to follow his orders 
(Ex. C.M.R., p.l09) was in turn frustrated in his task by their 
activities. (~ee below, p. 122.) 
G.G.R. 13: Merriman to Griffiths, draft, 3 Oct. '77. 
Rhodes House Library, 
TranskeiAffairsby P. 
"Annexation", p.176. 
Mss. Afr.s. 23/3, ff. 110-4: Memo. re 
Nightingale, 23 Oct. 1877, quoted in Saunders, 
" 
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was strongly opposed to Mfengu settlement. The Mfengu had been far from 
blameless in the war, and were already 'cock-a-hoop' at their successes. 
Their being rewarded in such a way would only serve as an inducement 
to continue their high-handed behaviour towards their neighbours. 
Rather he proposed that the area to be confiscated be that between the 
Kei and the Qora rivers, since this had the advantage of serving as a 
buffer between the Colony and the Gcaleka resettled to the north. In 
this area he suggested that a settlement of German agriculturalists 
57 be placed. Having consulted with Schermbrucker who may have had a 
hand in the genesis of this plan, he was aware that there would be no 
shortage of applicants for grants. He felt that the success of the 
German agriculturalists in the King William's Town area proved their 
. b'l' 58 su~ta ~ ~ty. Unsupported by other Ministers, Molteno, who favoured 
59 Nightingale's plan, reluctantly agreed to Merriman's plan when it was 
amended to provide a smaller area for white settlement and a few grants 
60 to Mfengu. Eustace was later appointed Chief Magistrate of Gcalekaland, 
and held himself in readiness for the end of the campaign.6l 
57. Molteno Papers, No. 705: Molteno-Merriman, 3 Nov. '77. 
G.G.R. 46: Memo. on the proposed settlement of Gcalekaland, n.a., 
n.d. (Rhodes House Library, MSS. Afr. S. 23/3, ff. 104-6: 
Memo. on proposed settlement of Gcalekaland by J. Merriman, 
quoted in Saunders, "Annexationll , p.177, seems almost certainly to 
be the same document, and so identifies Merriman as the author of 
the document in the Cape Archives). 
58. Merriman Papers, 1877 file, No. 67: Schermburcker to Merriman, 
10 Oct. '77. 
59. Molteno Papers, No. 705: Molteno to Merriman, 3 Nov. '77. 
60. Molteno Papers, Merriman folder: Merriman to Molteno, 2 Nov. '77 
and Molteno to Merriman, tel., 12 Nov. '77, quoted in Saunders, 
IIAnnexation", p.178. 
61. See below, p.136. 
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5. Sarhi1i, the Reluctant Warrior 
The Government was determined to execute its strategy despite 
signs that Sarhi1i still wished to negotiate. Soga says that Sarhi1i 
attempted to wait behind after the battle of Ibeka so that he might 
explain himself to the whites when they arrived, but his councillors 
dragged him off saying: 
Where is your father Hintsa who was blamed for 
Gaika's cattle? Your father was not at war, he 
died for just this reason in the camp of the 
whites in whom he confided. 62 
However, Sarhi1i remained the reluctant warrior chief and sent to 
Brownlee on 3rd October to ask for terms. Brownlee replied that at 
this late stage in the proceedings, negotiation was out of the question 
and the Gca1eka were to be punished in terms of the,Governor's 
1 . 63 Proc amat~on. 
Indeed after issuing the Proclamation, Frere asked for the Attorney-
General's opinion on the precise legal status of Sarhi1i and the 
combatant Gcaleka: before what tribunals and under what laws could they 
64 be charged? Stockenstrom replied that Sarhili was in effect an 
independent chief despite the terms on which he had been allowed to 
re-occupy his land in 1865; and since the Gca1eka had not entered or 
fought within the Colony, they could not be charged under colonial law 
in colonial courts. He felt that Sarhi1i could, however, be imprisoned 
for breaking the 'good behaviour' clause attached to his reoccupation 
62. Soga, S.E. Bantu, pp.260-26l. Burton dates this on 9th October 
after the burning of Sarhili's kraal, but this does not affect 
the point in question. Cory Library, MS 14,254/13: Burton, i, 29. 
63. C.1961, Encl. 47: Brownlee note on his conversation with 
Sarhili's emissary, 5 Oct. '77. 
64. C.196l, Encl. B No. 84: Frere to Ministers, 9 Oct. '77. 
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65 
of Gcalekaland. In the meantime, Griffith was warned that pending 
further instructions, no assurances should be given to Sarhili, that 
would bind the Government in any way, except that his life would be 
spared and that punishment would be as mild as was compatible with the 
maintenance of peace. Surrender of chiefs or members of Sarhili's family 
h d b d " 1 66 a to e uncon ~t~ona . 
Although he was still unable to begin a general advance into 
Gcalekaland owing to a shortage of ammunition for the native levies, 
Griffith felt it was important that the Gcaleka should not be allowed 
67 to recoup their strength. Consequently, he arranged a four-prong 
attack on Gcalekaland aimed at converging on and destroying Sarhili's 
Great Place at Holela. Early on 9th October the four columns set out. 
In the North, Elliot and his Thembu with some F.A.M.P. and Queenstown 
Burghers attacked and destroyed Sitshaka's Kraal. In the South, the 
Gonubie and Maclean Town volunteers under Commandant Gray clashed with 
and eventually defeated a strong force of Gcaleka said to be under 
Kh ' 68 ~va. In the centre the Mfengu under James Ayliff converged at 
Holela with Griffith's column of F.A.M.P. and King William's Town 
Burghers under Commandant Bertram Bowker. There they surprised a large 
number of Gcaleka, shelled them out of the kraals, and after driving 
69 them off, burnt the whole complex of huts in the area. Soga says 
that Sarhili had withdrawn from his kraal a week before, fearing the 
65. C.1961, Encl. C No. 84: Opinion of Stockenstrom, 19 Oct. '77. 
66. C. 1961, Encl. A No. 84: Merriman to Griffith, 8 Oct. '77. 
67. C.196l, Encl. No. 61: Griffith to Military Secretary, 10 Oct. '77. 
68. Hook, p.239. 
69. C.196l,Encl. No. 61: Griffith to Miliary Secretary, 10 Oct. '77. 
Theal, X, 66 places Gca1eka casualties at over a hundred killed. 
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proximity of Ibeka (some six miles distant) but that Bhotomane had 
re-occupied it several days later and was there when the co19nial forces 
arrived. He retired and regrouped with Sarhili's sons, Sigcawu, 
Mcotoma, Yekanye and Mtoto who had their forces drawn up nearby, but the 
combined force was again driven off, Mtoto being wounded. During the 
battle, Sarhili sent a messenger to Bhotomane telling him to withdraw 
70 
and allow the kraals to be burnt. 
Griffith refused to pursue the fleeing Gcaleka army for fear that 
he might expose his relatively small force which was low in ammunition 
to the danger of sudden regrouping of the Gcaleka, and so he returned to 
Ibeka where the preparations for his field force were completed within 
·71 
a week. 
On 15th October two Christian Gcaleka were sent by Sarhili to ask 
Griffith to delay any troop movement until he had an opportunity of 
opening negotiations for peace. These messengers repeated to Griffith 
that Sarhili did not wish to fight the Government, but in a telegram 
to King William's Town Griffith reported that he thought that the mission 
was a blind. 72 Merriman replied repeating his instructions of 9th 
with the addition that Griffith could assure Sarhili that he would not 
be imprisoned in perpetuity. However, on no account was he to halt his 
movements. The Government could not let Sarhili's negotiations prevent 
them from moving against those whom he had admitted he could not control. 73 
70. Cory Library, MS. 14, 254/13: Burton, iv, Appendix VI. 
71. Griffith was much criticised for not pursuing the Gcaleka - many 
thought a golden opportunity had been missed. Ex. C.M.R., p.l09. 
72. C.196l, Encl. D No. 84: Griffith to Merriman, tel., 15 Oct. '77. 
73. C.196l, Reply to Encl. D No. 84: Merriman to Griffith, tel., n.d. 
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6. The Gcalekaland Cam~aign 
Griffith's campaign got under way again on 19 October. Gcaleka 
strategy was now to give way before the whites, avoiding open confrontation 
and resorting to guerrilla tactics. It is clear in retrospect that the 
Gcaleka, in traditional fashion, took their women and children and that 
portion of their herds not needed for food to safety in Bomvanaland 
74 
and Pondoland, before returning to continu0 the struggle. Some 
Gcaleka even avoided Griffith's columns and remained in hiding in 
75 Gcalekaland. The failure of Griffith's columns to come to grips with 
the Gcaleka was also attributable to the irrepressible greed for Gcaleka 
cattle. By the end of the campaign, Griffith exclaimed in exasperation: 
Hang the cattle: With such forces as I have 
at my command, it [sic] paralyses every 
movement. I wish there was not a cow in South 
Af ' 76 rlca. 
Brownlee, who correctly foresaw that Sarhili preferred death to 
delivering himself into the hands of the whites, gloomily watched 
Griffith vainly pursuing the Gcaleka towards the Mbashe. He felt that 
the guerrilla tactics of the Gcaleka would necessitate a far larger 
force and firmly recommended that 2 - 3 regiments of Imperial troops be 
74. Theal, X, 77. Hook, pp.248-9. 
Interview with Headman Qeqe, Butterworth, 20 Sept. 1977. Headman 
Qeqe's father was taken for refuge in Mpondoland. 
Interview with Mr N.C. Melane, Qwaninga Location, Willowvale 
District, 14 Sept. 1977. 
75. Melane says that Sarhili remained hidden in Gcalekaland at a place 
called Entweni Yomhlaba,wh~ he summond his warriors on Griffith's 
return to Ibeka. 
76. C.l96l, Encl. No. 19: Cunynghame to Secretary of State for War, 
5 Dec. '77. 
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sent out as reinforcements,77 a call which Frere and Cunynghame were to 
make increasingly 78 over the next few months. 
Moni was not able to stop the Gca1eka crossing the Mbashe even if 
he had wished it, and many Bomvana gave succour to the refugee Gc~leka 
and hid their cattle with their 79 own. Inevitably, there was friction 
between the Thembu levy and the Bomvana over cattle which the latter 
seized, claiming, probably with a measure of truth, that they belonged to 
80 Gca1eka. Even Nqwi1iso was unable to stop the progress of the Gcaleka, 
because he would have had to fight the Gcaleka and Gwadiso, the Khonjwayo 
chief and brother-in-law to Sigcawu with whom he had been feuding for 
some time, before the whites arrived. When Griffith arrived, Nqwi1iso 
did offer to mount a combined operation against the Gca1eka who were 
then sheltering with Mqike1a. 81 But Griffith, whose columns had reached 
the Mthatha River, decided against continuing the purs.uit any further for 
82 
several reasons. Firstly, the Gca1eka had lost at least 700 men killed 
including several chiefs, and upwards of 13,000 cattle not to mention 
77. Molteno Papers, No. 718: Brownlee to Molteno, 7 Nov. '77. 
78. Though, of course for slightly diffe:cent reasons. 
The First Crisis, pp.24l-52. 
79. G.H. 21/5: Cunynghame to Frere, 26 Oct. '77. 
Lewsen, 
G.H. 21/6: Elliot to Cunynghame, 2 Jan. '78; F. Brownlee, 
Transkeian Historical Records, p.34. 
80. G.G.R.I.: ? to Merriman, 4 Nov. '77. 
81. Macquarrie, i, 86. Gwadiso was doubly related to Sarhi1i, for he 
himself had married a daughter of Sarhi1i's: G.19-'86, p.7: 
Stanford Memo., 19 May '85. 
82.C.196l, Encl. No. 10: Griffith to Deputy Adjutant-General, 29 
Nov. '77. 
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83 
numerous other small stock. The enemy, defeated in all engagements 
were broken up and in flight from a country denuded of supplies and 
habitation. 84 Secondly, any pursuit of the Gca1eka into Pondo1and 
would almost certainly be extremely impolitic, considering the poor 
relations that existed with Mqike1a who was reported to be intriguing 
b h . h C d h G' 85 ot Wlt etywayo an t e rlquas. Thirdly, the Mthatha was in 
danger of flooding and Griffith wished to return before more rains set 
in. 86 Finally, the volunteers had had a long and arduous campaign, 
ff . f 1 f fl' . 87 su erlng requent y rom a au ty commlssarlat. They desired now 
to return to their homes and families and with no real prospect of 
capturing more booty, they pressured Griffith to allow them to return 
88 home. 
Griffith therefore set out on the return march to Ibeka, consenting 
to the return of the volunteers on 19th November. 89 Unable to guard the 
whole Mbashe against a return of the Gca1eka with the 500 police and 
83. Martineau, ii, 202. 
Moodie, ii, 177 estimates that 15,000 sheep and 20,000 cattle 
were captured. 
84. The Aborigines Protection Society complained that 
num erous villages and large quantities of 
provisions have been burned under circumstances 
which in ordinary warfare would justly be regarded 
not only as barbarous but as being certain to 
provoke savage reprisals. 
C.196l, No. 82: Aborigines Protection Society to Colonial Office, 
28 Nov. '77. Of course this was the traditional mode of warfare. 
The Gca1eka corn pits were certainly used as a commissariat for 
Mfengu levies - the Mfengu were often not issued with rations at 
all and lived off captured grain and cattle. 
G.R. 21/6: G1yn to Cunynghame, 15 Dec. '77. 
85. e.g. G.R. 21/7: Blyth to S.N.A., 11 Feb. '78. 
86. C.2000, Encl. No. 10 : Griffith to Deputy Adjutant-General, 29 Nov. '77. 
87. Ex-C.M.R., pp.131-3 is vocal in this respect. 
88. Rook, p.247. 
Thea1, X, 72 lists those volunteer groups that left and those that stayed. 
89. G.R. 21/5: Griffith to Cunynghame, tel., 19 Nov. '77. 
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remaining volunteers and Mfengu, he left a police and artillery contingent 
of 200 men at Fort Bowker to hold that post and patrol the Mbashe. Some 
police and volunteers were also left to guard the line of communication 
between Fort Bowker and Ibeka, at which latter post Griffith arrived on 
26th. 90 
7. The Maphasa/Makinana Affair 
In the meantime, another crisis had arisen. Maphasa had fled to 
Impetu in the Colony before the Gca1eka attack on Ibeka. There he was 
joined by Makinana, with 50 warriors. Makinana was the son of Mha1a 
the Ndlambe chief,and brother to Ndimba and Smith Mhala. Altogether 
Maphasa's followers numbered some 4315 people, including about 600 
f ' h ' 91 ~g t~ng men. Brownlee regarded Maphasa's defection as having an 
important political effect on the frontier, for other tribes would see 
that there was a split in the Gca1eka, and would fear the same thing 
were they to join in the disturbances. Others did not find Maphasa's 
presence so welcome. The colonists regarded him with the utmost suspicion 
and believed that he would commit treachery at the first opportunity.92 
Cunynghame shared this belief and strongly advocated the disarmament of 
93 Maphasa's men. There was the further problem that while located 
temporarily on two farms near Mpethu neighbouring farmers' stock was 
90. C.2000, Encl. No. 10 : Griffith to Deputy Adjutant General, 
29 Nov. '77. 
91. G.17-'78, p.207: Brownlee Memo., May '78. 
Theal, X, 60. 
If the warriors numbered only 600, then a considerable number of 
Tsonyana must have fought under Khiva and Mxo1i (see estimate of 
Tsonyana numbers p. 54 above, footnote 142). 
92. G.17-'89, p.208: Brownlee Memo., May '78. 
93. Sir A. Cunynghame: My Command in South Africa, 1874-8 (London, 
1879), p.3l6. 
'. 
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bound to be exposed to theft. Nevertheless, Brownlee successfully 
resisted pressures to disarm Maphasa, pointing out that such a move would 
be likely to have a negative effect on the Tsonyana. He did, however, 
tell Maphasa that at some future date he and his people (including 
Makinana) would have to surrender their arms as a token of their submission, 
and pay a fine for their part in initiating the disturbances. 94 
By early November, Gcalekaland was clear and Maphasa and Makinana 
could be resettled, not in their old area which was now intended for 
white or Mfengu settlement, but in the area between the Qora and Shixini 
rivers. Brownlee still felt it unwise to disarm Maphasa, but disarmament 
was beginning to emerge as one of the fixed points of Frere's settlement 
policy and Merriman, like Cunynghame, had always favoured it. 95 Brownlee 
was therefore over-ridden and was instructed to go and supervise the 
disarmament and collection of the fine prior to the removal of the people 
h K ' 96 across t e e~. Inspector Hutchinson, the second in command of the 
F.A.M.P. was deputed to effect Brownlee's orders with his troop of 
I ' 97 po ~ce. 
Brownlee arrived on 15th Novembe~t Mpethu and proceeded to mishandle 
the whole operation. Maphasa had already heard that he was to be 
94. G.l7-'78, p.208: Brownlee Memo., May '78. 
Cape Archives, Accession 459 (i): The Life of Sir E.T. Brabant, 
Typescript, p.52. Brabant, who had a farm close tc Mpethu backed 
up Brownlee's objection to disarmament on the grounds that it was 
likely to drive the Tsonyana and Makinana into rejoining the 
Gcaleka. 
95. Disarmament was part of the first Gcaleka settlement plan. See 
above, p. 11 7 • 
F~ere said in December 1877 that he would recommend the complete 
disarmament of the natives • The Cape Argus, 25 Dec. '77. 
Merriman had pushed the disarmament of the 'loyal' Ngqika - see 
below, p.161. 
96. Molteno Papers, No. 729: Merriman to Molteno, 21 Nov. '77. 
97. G.G.R. 14: Merriman to Hutchinson, draft, 12 Nov. '77. 
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disarmed and settled beyond the Kei, as Brownlee admits98 but Brownlee 
delayed for two days because of rain, allowing the rumours, fears and 
99 
suspicions of the Tsonyana and Ndlambe to mature. On Saturday, 17th, 
he informed Maphasa of the Government proposals. Maphasa objected 
strongly to being disarmed and deprived of his old land, saying that it 
was precisely to guard against the loss of his land, which he had 
foreseen would be the result of a clash with the whites, that he had 
deserted his countrymen. If he settled beyond the Qora, he would be 
placed in the midst of the Gcaleka who were now bitterly opposed to him, 
and being disarmed, he would be at their mercy. Brownlee over-ruled 
his objections, and told Maphasa that his orders were not negotiable. 
Maphasa, though clearly very unhappy at such arbitrary and harsh treatment, 
submitted, for he had so far committed himself to white support that he 
h d 1 ,100 a no'a ternatlve. 
It was otherwise with Makinana. Brownlee told him that he was to 
be disarmed, fined 200 head of cattle and resettled with Maphasa in the 
Transkei. Before the war, Makinana had on several occasions requested 
permission to move from Gcalekaland to stay with his brother Ndimba, 
who stayed in the Southern portion of the Ngqika location in the Colony. 
S h 'l' h d d h' b B 1 had turned them down. lOl ar 1 1 a supporte lS requests, ut rown ee 
N k ' b' 1 'd b h ' f h f' 102 d b' , ow Ma lnana, 0 V10US Y surprlse y t e Slze 0 t e lne an 0 Jectlng 
98. G.17-'78, p.209: Brownlee Memo., May '78. 
99. Molteno Papers, No. 731: Frere to Molteno,Private and Confidential,25 Nov.'77 
100. G.17-'78, p.209: Brownlee Memo., May '78. 
Fynn, p.16. 
101. N.A. 153: Ayliff to Brownlee, 17 Feb. '75. 
G.16-'76, p.44: AyliE to S.N.A., 2 Jan. '76. Some of Makinana's 
men had moved anyway. 
102. C.2000. Encl. 1 No. 38: Brownlee Memo., 14 Dec. '77, (this is the 
same memo. as prin~ed in G.17-'78 with more detail in places). 
Brownlee says th~c he fined Makinana so many cattle because many 
Tsonyana had de~iberately registered as followers of his to avoid 
paying the fin~. Theal, X, 74-5 says that Makinana, apart from 
the 60-70 Ndbmbe families living under him, 'also had a number of 
nominal Gcale.ka retainers, but adds that Makinana had fought in the 
initial disturbances,which is why Brownlee imposed the fines. 
,Z 
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just as strongly to disarmanent, asked Brownlee what he had done wrong 
that he was not allowed to go and live amongst his own people. Brownlee 
cut him short and told him to go and collect the arms of his people 
and the cattle for the fine. 103 
Brownlee had told Makinana and Maphasa that they were to collect and 
hand in the arms of their people, but he had also instructed Captain 
Von Linsingen of the German Volunteers to disarm any of the people caught 
moving about with arms. With the zeal that was not uncharacteristic 
of volunteers, Von Linsingen exceeded instructions and roughly searched 
104 
some of Makinana's huts, seizing arms in the process. Von Linsingen's 
action, following after what they felt were the harsh and unjustified 
orders of Brownlee, so alarmed Makinana's people that they began to 
believe that disarmament was but a prelude to their extermination and 
the seizure of their cattle. Consequently, Makinana secured a pass from 
Brownlee to go to the Ngqika location on a spurious search for lost cattle, 
and fled with his people at midnight on the Sunday to his brother 
d ' b' l' 'b h 105 N 1m a s ocat10n at Draa1 osc • 
Brownlee was almost immediately informed of all this by Maphasa who 
had been warned by Makinana before he fled of what he suspected their fate 
would be. Instead of allowing the obviously panic-stricken Ndlambe time 
to cool down and then reassuring them, Brownlee sent Hutchison and his 
police in pursuit with orders to disarm them and bring them back to Impetu. 
One of the troops of police duly confronted a large number of men with 
cattle going into the location at Draaibosch, but being outnumbered, the 
I , 11 d h h h' d ' , 106 po 1ce a owe t em to reac t e1r est1nat10n. The following morning, 
103. G.17-'78, p.210: Brownlee Memo., May '78. 
104. C.2000, Encl. 1 No. 38: Brownlee Memo., 14 Dec. '77. 
105. G.17-'78, p.2l0: Brownlee Memo., May '78. 
106. Ibid. 
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however, the same troop entered the location with the intention of seizing 
the cattle they then saw. They made no attempt to ascertain whether these 
were all Makinana's cattle or whether some of Ndimba's cattle were now 
. . . h h 107 m1xed 1n W1t t em. Not unnaturally, the police movement appeared to 
the Ndlamhe to be an attack on their property and both Ndimba and Makinana 
therefore resisted the advance of the police. Hutchinson arrived just 
in time to see the police securing the cattle and was aghast at what had 
happened. He told the Sub-Inspector in charge of the police troop that 
he ought not to have entered the location without first informing Wright 
and Sandile, and ordered him to return the cattle while Brownlee's arrival 
was awaited. Both Brownlee and Hutchinson had at least been aware of 
the importance of treating the Ngqika diplomatically and evidently hoped 
to catch Makinana before he arrived at the location, and claimed that the 
whole incident was due to a mistake over the precise boundary of the 
1 . 108 ocat10n. 
But the damage was done. The first conflict between black and white 
within the colony had been precipitated by precisely the sort of occurrence 
that Frere and Merriman had feared and had sought so assiduously to 
avoid. On Brownlee's arrival the following day, Ndimba refused to come 
and see him, saying he was too frightened, and when Brownlee sought him 
out, he found three armed groups overlooking Ndimba's kraal. Ndimba told 
Brownlee they were there because of the previous day's occurrences, 
because the police remained on the location border and because the police 
had now been joined by troops. Ndimba asked Brownlee why his brother 
had not been allowed to settle amongst his friends, and made it clear 
that he would not give up Makinana as Brownlee demanded at least until 
107. Ibid., p.2ll. 
108. Ibid., p.2l2. 
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the force threatening the location had been removed. Sandile's reaction 
was even more ominous. He angrily asked why he had not been consulted 
before the police entered the location, and observed 'A snake if trodden 
upon would bite,:109 
Brownlee thought Sandile's and Ndimba's words and actions were openly 
d· f' dId d h .' 110 e lant an conc u e t at war was lmmlnent. Superficially there was 
much to confirm his opinion. Since the war began, there had been an 
upsurge in stock theft, already at a high level. Both farmers and Mfengu 
in the areas surrounding the Ngqika location began to suffer huge 
111 losses. But an increase in stock theft is a difficult phenomenon to 
analyse. Peires has observed that a certain amount of theft is inevitable 
in a frontier situation. A sharp increase, he says, is indicative of 
special circumstances - here the drought, the absence of whites from 
their farms, the fact that the stock so temptingly left behind belonged 
to men who were fighting the Gcaleka brothers of the Ngqika, and Ngqika 
hostility to the Mfengu. Such an increase, Peires continues, also 
presupposes the complicity of the chiefs who would sanction large-scale 
h f f ' 1 1 11 k . h d '1 d 112 t e t or speCla reasons on y, we nowlng t e angers lnvo ve • 
The missionary, James Auld, who was stationed at Emgwali was able 
to observe the Ngqika closely and his views, recorded many years later, 
are illuminating. At first, he says, he was certain that the Ngqika 
109. Ibid. See p.59 above for Sandili's reaction to the police in 1876. 
llO. Molteno Papers, No. 731: Frere to Molteno, Private and Confidential, 
2S Nov. '77. 
Ill. Frere cites the example of Commandant·Gray, who lost 600 sheep from 
theft in one day. Gray believed that nothing but a war of 
extermination could save the farmers' property. 
Ibid. 
112. Peires, pp.l02-3. 
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intended to stay out of the war. Then in October, the young men began 
stealing from the Mfengu and despite the wishes of chiefs like Kona, 
Sandile refused to punish the guilty parties. From mid-October onwards, 
ld S d 'l' . 1 d' d d h . h d h' '11 113 Au says, an ~ e ~ncreas~ng y ~sregar e bot Wr~g t an ~s counc~ ors. 
But as was to become clear during the Makinana incident, the opinion 
of all the most influential councillors and chiefs was against war with 
h h · 114 t e w ~tes. Thus although the increased stock theft was an indirect 
form of warfare carried out by the 'war party' - the young warriors and 
Sandile - it did not signal an imminent recourse to overtly hostile 
behaviour. For the Ngqika to join the Gcaleka in a war against the 
whites would require a political decision of the whole people, and the 
evidence points to the fact that Sandile would not receive sanction for 
such a decision at that time, particularly as the position of the Gca1eka 
remained unclear. However, overtly hostile behaviour by the whites, 
was under the circumstances sure to be resisted. That was the lesson 
of the Makinana incident which Frere was quick to perceive. 115 
The pressure exerted by the colonists for strong measures, was 
immense. Brownlee returned to King William's Town convinced that the 
Government would have to use force to arrest Makinana for disobeying 
orders and resisting colonial authority.116 Merriman, although critical 
of Brownlee's handling of the whole incident, shared his assessment. 
Frere reported Merriman as 
for carry~ng matters with a very high hand, 
in a manner which must bring about a collision 
113. Cory Library: PR.1273, J. Auld in B1ythswood Review, Oct. 1924. 
114. Ibid. 
115. Molteno Papers, No. 731: Frere to Molteno, Private and Confidential, 
25 Nov. '77. 
116. Ibid. 
'. 
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with the Gaikas, a result which he avows he would 
not regret, as enabling us forcibly to break up 
the present Gaika location, and to deprive 
Sandili and the other chiefs of the power 
hitherto accorded to them by our acts of 
. 117 
neg11gence. 
Brownlee's habitual indiscretion resulted in his opinion reaching the 
118 papers. News of Makinana's flight and the subsequent clash with 
police, combined with Brownlee's opinion convulsed the frontier in a 
paroxysm of rage and panic. The wildest rumours flew about: 
The Gaika war cry had been sounded on all sides 
during the night. Mackinnon was making for 
the Amatolas. The Kaffirs were assembling on 
119 
all sides, and flocking to march on Komgha. 
Delegations swamped the Governor and his Ministers at King William's Town, 
demanding that firm measures be taken to safeguard the lives and property 
of frontiersmen and to punish the rebellious Ngqika and Ndlambe. 120 
Frere however, refused to bow to all these pressures. He pointed 
out in long letters to Molteno and Merriman that the Ngqika and Ndlambe 
were colonial subjects and that what frontier opinion contemplated was 
117. Frere to Carnarvon, 21 Nov. '77, quoted in Martineau, ii, 202. 
118. Frere was furious with Brownlee and was prompted to remark: 
He is fatally deficient in all that is required 
for administration of so important a Department 
[nerve, promptitude and judgement] ••• His 
proper place is as an under-secretary for Native 
Affairs in Cape Town. 
Molteno Papers, No. 731: Frere to Molteno, Private and Confidential, 
25 Nov. '77. 
119. C.1961, No. 102: Frere to Carnarvon, 21 Nov. '77. 
120. Ibid. 
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121 the launching of a ci viI war. He said he could not see "any call of 
duty to the use of force, unless these misgoverned people in their terror 
should attack us,,122 and pointed out that much of their behaviour was 
attributable to the deplorable panic by the colonists, frontier propaganda 
and the almost total lack of any preventative police force to combat 
stock theft. They had acted like rats in a trap in resisting the police. 
In fact, Makinana had committed no crime and had fled out of terror, not 
out of hostile intent. He therefore persuaded Merriman to set in 
, h 'd 'f l' ,123 d . h h' " mot~on t e rap~ extens~on 0 po ~ce serv~ces an W1t 1S m1n1sters, 
appointed W.B. Chalmers, at one time a Commissioner to the Ngqika and 
currently Magistrate at Cathcart, as a special Commissioner, entrusted 
with the task of settling the Makinana affair. Chalmers was instructed 
to tell Makinana that he only need pay the fine and hand in the arms of 
his people and then he would be allowed to settle where he wished. 124 
Chalmers arrived on 24th November at Ndimba's location and began a 
series of meetings with Ndimba, Makinana and Sandile. He found the 
location in an extreme state of excitement. The women, children and 
cattle had been moved across the Kubusi, and the men were under arms. 
Ndimba explained to Chalmers that the clash had resulted from his 
people's conviction that they were under attack and although apologising 
121. Molteno Papers, No. 731: Frere to Molteno, Private and Confidential, 
25 Nov. '77. 
122. Frere to Merriman, 21 Nov. '77, quoted in Martineau, ii, 205. 
123. G.G.R. 13: Merriman to various military and civil officers, dated 
the end of November. In Kaffraria, the popular and highly 
regarded Alan Maclean of the F.A.M.P. was appointed to head a 
Divisional Police force (G.G.R. 13: Merriman to Warren, 30 
Nov. '77) while other Divisions were pressed to set up such 
forces in terms of the 1873 permissive legiSlation providing 
for them, Act 8 of 73: The Divisional Police Act. 
124. Molteno Papers, No. 729: Merriman to Molteno, 21 Nov. '77. 
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for it, he expressed anxiety about Government intentions. Chalmer's 
assurances brought an immediate return to normality. Meeting next with 
Makinana, Chalmers was told that Brownlee had never made it clear that 
Makinana would in any way be punished for leaving Sarhili and desiring 
to 'come under Government', and that the terms announced to him on 17th 
were as unexpected as they seemed unjust. His flight, he told Chalmers, 
had been caused simply by fear at the sudden commencement of an enforced 
d . 125 l.sarmament. 
Proceeding to Sandile's kraal on 27th, Chalmers found that calm had 
returned to that area as well. After hearing Chalmers, Sandile said that 
he and his people wished to remain at peace with Government and that he 
would assist in getting Makinana to comply with Government demands. 
Although he admitted the prevalence of stock theft, he regretted the panic 
126 
amongst the whites which facilitated it and alarmed his people. 
There was some delay in Makinana's compliance with Government demands. 
It seems that apart from a natural reluctance to fulfil these, some 
Tsonyana retainers had recrossed the Kei with their cattle whilst others 
had scattered throughout the location, making the collection of arms and 
cattle a difficult task. When by 4th December Chalmers had collected a 
certain number of arms and half the cattle fine, he wisely decided to 
declare the matter closed.127 
Of course the resolution of the crisis was more apparent than real. 
Frere's remedy was prevention rather than cure, and Sandile had evidently 
125. C.196l, Encl. 2 No. 38: W.B. Chalmers to Merriman, 21 Nov. '77. 
Brownlee is adamant that Maphasa and Makinana had both been 
informed on their arrival in the colony of the possibility of 
disarmament: G.l7-'78, p.208: Brownlee Memo., May '78. 
126. C.196l, Encl. 2 No. 38: W.B. Chalmers to Merriman, 21 Nov. '77. 
127. Ibid. 
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not abandoned his desire to make one last bid to throw off colonial 
control and reassert his independence, but had merely temporised in the 
face of overwhelming opposition to his plans. Auld reports Tyala, 
Sandile's chief councillor and acknowledged leader of the peace party 
as accusing Sandile at this time of being glad to see the young men 
excited and eager for war, because it had long been his (Sandile's) 
desire to find a pretext for war. Auld also reports one of Sandile's 
sons (almost certainly Matlanzima judging from later events) as saying 
I have as yet done nothing that could praise my 
father's name. The spirit of my father speaks 
to me, and I shall let myself be known that I am 
a son of Sandile. 128 
A 'loyal' Ngqika told Brownlee the following January that Tyala had 
distinctly told Sandile at the first meeting held by the Ngqika over 
Makinana that 
if Sandilli did not implicitly obey all the 
orders of Government or if he did anything to 
bring trouble upon himself and the Gaikas, he 
must not look to Tyala and his party for 
assistance, that they would abandon Sandi IIi 
and would not again submit to suffer for 
his folly.129 
With Gcalekaland cleared and the campaign ended, the attention of 
the Government turned to finalising settlement plans. On 21st November 
an amnesty was offered to all Gcaleka who would lay down their arms and 
128. Cory Library, PR.1273: J. Auld in !lythswood Review, Oct. 1924. 
129. For a somewhat romanticised and sentimental picture of Tyala, see 
Brownlee, Reminiscences, pp.334-370. 
G.R. 21/8, Conduct of Sandilli file: Brownlee Memo., 11 Jan. '78, 
statement of Mkosana, a 'loyal'Ngqika before Brownlee, 10 Jan. '78. 
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. 1 . 1 A h .. 130 submlt to the Co onla ut orltles. The Makinana debacle did not 
interrupt the implementation of the Government plan. In the absence of 
Brownlee, West Fynn was delegated the duty of collecting Maphasa's fine 
and the arms of his people and of then delivering him into the hands of 
Eustace and Griffith for resettlement. 13l In the meantime Government 
notices in English and German had already appeared in the frontier press 
calling for applicants for grants of 300 acres in the western part of 
Gcalekaland between the Kei and the Qora. 132 
On 28th November Eustace was issued with his instructions by 
Brownlee and was told to start as soon as possible. The Idutywa 
Reserve and Gcalekaland were to be united under Eustace as Chief 
Magistrate with three sub-magistrates under him. Two of these, 
Schermbrucker and Donald McDonald were appointed on 1st December. The 
actual resettlement of the Gcaleka aimed at breaking down tribal tenure 
and feeling, and the establishment of the Government as the owner of the 
land and ruler of the country. In line with this policy, it was intended 
to settle the disarmed Gcaleka in carefully defined and supervised 
locations, each head of family being granted six acres of arable land 
on individual tenure, and access to commonage. As in the Colony and 
the Colonial areas of the Transkei, hut tax of 10 shillings per annum 
would be paid, and Government-appointed headmen could control villages. 133 
Although the Thuthura mission station was situated in a white designated 
area, Leslie was given permission to return and locate there any mission 
Gcaleka he found. 134 
130. C.196l, Encl. 3 No. 102: Proclamation signed by Merriman and 
Molteno, 21 Nov. '77. 
131. C.2000, No. 13: Frere to Carnarvon, 5 Dec. '77. 
132. e.g. Kaffrarian Watchman, 14 Nov. '77 . 
133. G.G.R. 13: Merriman to Leslie, 14 Nov. ' 77'. 
134. G.G.R. 13: Brownlee to Eustace, 28 Nov. '77 • 
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8. The Return of the Gcaleka 
The reappearance of the Gcaleka from across the Mbashe and from their 
hiding places within the Colony changed the complexion of the frontier 
situation completely. The change became only too apparent on 2nd 
December. On that day, Inspector Bourne of the F.A.M.P. was leading a 
patrol of police and volunteers, some 152 in number near the Qora, 
when they were suddenly confronted by large numbers of armed Gca1eka. 
The latter attacked at a place called Mzintzani where a trader named 
Holland kept a store, and were beaten off. Later that day between 
1000 and 3000 Gcaleka attacked the police camp, and a very fierce 
135 
engagement followed with heavy loss to the Gcaleka. Despite these 
losses, the fact that reinforcements had to be sent for must have 
136 
encouraged the Gca1eka, as Frere pointed out. That was in the North 
of Gca1ekaland. In the South, the same day brough~ confirmation that 
many Gcaleka had been lying low in Gcalekaland having eluded Griffith's 
columns. Maphasa and his son Xhoxho had just been put across the Kei, 
having been fined and disarmed by Fynn. No sooner in Gcalekaland than 
they reported to a Mr Raymond deputising for Fynn, that large parties of 
Gcaleka were gathering between the Qora and Khobonqaba Rivers with the 
intention of attacking them. Maphasa and Xhoxho told Raymond that unless 
a force was sent to protect them, they would have to recross the Kei. 137 
135. C.2000, Encl. 1 No. 22: Bourne to Griffith, 3 Dec. '77. 
Hook, pp.249-52. Hook says the 3000 Gcaleka were led by Bhotomane 
who surrendered a few days later, having not recommenced the 
attack since he thought reinforcements for the whites had arrived. 
136. C.2000, No. 22: Frere to Carnarvon, 12 Dec. '77. 
Moodie, ii, 170 confirms that the battle was a close shave for the 
whites, and Parr, p.74 says that the battle was represented as a 
great victory by the Gcaleka. 
137. C.2000, No. 13: Frere to Carnarvon,S Dec. '77. 
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By 5th December it was clear that the few small bands of Gcaleka who 
had taken advantage of the amnesty to surrender were the exception, and 
that the majority intended to continue to resist the presence of the 
whites in their territory. The news of the return of the Gcaleka and 
the fight at Mzintzani renewed the panic amongst the colonists and this 
in turn further encouraged those amongst the colonial blacks who were 
1 , b II' , h' 1 138 contemp at1ng a re e 10n aga1nst w 1te ru e. 
Griffith met the immediate crisis in Gcalekaland by sending the 
Idutywa garrison to reinforce Bourne and by re-enlisting the Mfengu 
levies. 139 He tried to avoid calling out the Thembu again, fearing 
that a second summons after their dilatory response to the first might 
be testing their 'loyalty' too far, but he was compelled to do so by 
sheer necessity.140 On 5th December he wired Cunynghame that he needed 
141 
another 700-800 men to secure Gcalekaland from the centre and the coast. 
But Cunynghame himself had just wired Griffith to send some police down 
south to protect Maphasa. Griffith replied explaining the impossibility 
of such a step - he needed all the men he had and in any case, the few 
police who had been fit for the campaign were now almost all unfit for 
, 142 
serV1ce. 
After all the remaining Imperial troops at Cape Town had been called 
up, there were scarcely enough men to garrison the frontier posts and to 
138. At a meeting at Kei Road, for example, the inhabitants threatened 
"to take the law into their own hands and shoot every nigger 
found on their farms". Moodie, i1. 170. 
139, C.2000, Encls 6 and 7 No. 19: Griffith to Merriman, Cunynghame, 
tels, 3 Dec. '?7. 
140. G.C. 21/7: Griffith to Cunynghame, tel., 6 Dec. '77. 
141. C.2000, Enel. 7 No. 19: Griffith to Cunynghame, 5 Dec. '77, 6.30 a.m. 
142. C.2000, Encl. 7 No. 19: Griffith to Cunynghame, 5 Dec. '77 • 
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send small detachments to Toleni and Ibeka. 143 The real need was for 
mounted men who were able to move quickly. Where were the necessary 
troops to come from, and what force should be used in the new Gcalekaland 
campaign? The Cabinet and Daily Council were split. Molteno and 
Merriman considered that Imperial troops were slow, cumbrous, expensive 
and unsuited to local conditions, and therefore rejected the notion of 
Imperial Reinforcements,and an Imperial Campaign. 144 Frere, Cunynghame 
145 
and Brownlee thought the converse. But in the absence of suitable 
local troops, Merriman despite a growing antipathy to Cunynghame whom he 
146 found unendurable, had to accede to an Imperial led campaign. 
to Molteno explaining the position: 
You seem to think that I rush into the arms of 
the military but you can little know what personal 
pain it causes me to have to confess that Griffith 
had blundered and that there seemed no course open 
but appointing some man [i.e. an Imp~rial office~ 
and giving him the assistance he required.... You 
ask me what I am doing to get volunteers. I 
enclose a copy of the regulations which I have sent 
to the various Civil Commissioners - but the real 
burgher, the man who has a horse, will not come 
147 forward unless he is compelled. 
143. C.2000, No. 22: Frere to Carnarvon, 12 Dec. '77. 
144. Molteno Papers, No. 758: Merriman to Molteno, 3 Dec. '77. 
He wrote 
145. Brownlee wrote in October when Griffith was seemingly routing 
Sarhili's forces, that the war would drag on for another 5-6 
months unless two to three regiments of Imperial Reinforcements 
were sent, because Sarhili would never surrender. 
A 24-'78, p.122: Brownlee Memo., 29 Oct. '77. 
146. Molteno Papers, No. 737: Merriman to Molteno, Private and 
Confidential, 3 Dec. '77. 
147. Molteno Papers, No. 758: Merriman to Molteno, 15 Dec. '77. 
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There was 'lots of jaw' amongst the public but no active support. 
Merriman aptly summed up for Molteno the situation as it then existed: 
Our strength lies in the weakness of our foe 
and our weakness lies in the utter and 
148 disgraceful panic among our own people. 
Colonel G1yn of 1/24th Regiment was therefore appointed to head the 
combined Imperial and Colonial forces in the Transkei, and Col. W. Bellairs 
k f h · . h .• W f h • 149 too over rom 1m 1n t e same pos1t10n est 0 t e Ke1. Two bodies 
under semi-military regulations and headed by Imperial Officers were also 
. d h 1 h' d· . . 150 ra1se to e p meet t e 1mme 1ate cr1S1S. 
9. Black responses 
It is hard to assess black ~~tentions and feelings in early December. 
It seems certain that Sarhili, possibly from within Gca1eka1and, had 
d d b k h G 1 k . 151 or ere ac t e ca e a warr1ors. He must have been.aware of the 
Government's plan to settle both Europeans and the treacherous Maphasa 
on his lands and a return of his warriors would at least prevent this while 
h d .. . . d d h d' d f . . 152 e opene negot1at1ons aga1n, as 1n ee e 1 soon a ter MZ1ntzani. 
148. Ibid. 
149. C.2000, No. 22: Frere to Carnarvon, 12 Dec. '77. 
Theal, X, 80. 
150. Theal, X, 84. Lieut.-Col. Pulleine of 1/24th enrolled four hundred 
footmen in a body that came to be known as Pulleine's Rangers and 
Lieut. Carrington also of 1/24th enrolled two hundred horsemen in a 
troop that came to be known as Carrington's Horse. 
151. G.H. 21/7 • Miscellaneous file: Griffith to Merriman, tel., 7 Dec.'77. 
Interview with Mr N.C. Melane, Qwaninga Location, Willowvale 
District, 14 Sept. 1977. 
152. See below, p. 144. 
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But at the same time, it seems likely that Sarhili and the Gcaleka 
expected help from the colonial blacks, and Stanford reported that he could 
153 be expected to try to contact them. Informants stress that Sarhili 
and Sandile would have kept each other constantly informed of their 
progress and intentions, and therefore Sarhili would have been aware that 
Sandile was willing if not eager to fight, but that opinion amongst the 
N "k f f "154 gql a was ar rom unanlmous. That Sarhili gave orders to the effect 
that colonial blacks should continue stealing, but should not attempt 
to break out in revolt until he had succeeded in drawing the Imperial 
h "" h f 1 " "bl 155 troops across t e Kel,ls t ere ore a so qUlte POSSl e. 
During December, the panic amongst the colonists and worsening 
relations with the Mfengu made it seem unlikely that the peace party 
amongst the Gcaleka would be able to restrain Sandile and the young 
bloods indefinitely. The scare, instead of quietening down after the 
resolution of the Makinana affair, continued to grow, fanned by papers 
156 
such as the Eastern Star, The Standard and Mail and the Cape Mercury. 
Merriman was exasperated by the panic which contributed to unrest amongst 
157 the blacks, and for once Frere seems to have contributed by declaring 
153. G.R. 21/7: Griffith to Merriman, tel., 7 Dec. '77. 
154. Interview with Chief S.M. Burns-Ncamashe, Rhodes University, 
1 Nov. 1977. 
Interview with Mr N.C. Me lane , Qwaninga Location, Willowvale 
District, 14 Sept. 1977. 
155. G.G.R.I.: Private L. Combes to Inspector Bailie, 8 Dec. '77. 
156. The Cape Argus, lead article, 29 Nov. '77. 
157. Merriman Papers, 1877 file No. 90: Merriman to Molteno, tel., 
4 Dec. '77. Merriman to Molteno, tel., 13 Dec. quoted in LewsQn, 
Selections 1870-90, pp.33-4. Molteno Papers, No. 758: Merriman 
to Molteno, Private and Confidential, 15 Dec. '77. 
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to a deputation after Mzintzani that the situation was "most critical.,,158 
A vocal minority of farmers publicly proclaimed that they would rather 
have war than suffer the continual stock 10sses,159 and there is some 
"d h f 11' d " " 160 eV1 ence t at a ew actua y tr1e to prec1p1tate war. The campaign 
of rumours directed against the Ngqika was particularly severe in the 
cases of Oba Ngonyama and Tini Maqomo, both of whom owned land in the 
Colony from which white farmers were anxious to see them ejected. 16l 
As so often in the past, Government investigation of the rumours and 
162 the farmers' claims, proved them to be exaggerated, if not unfounded. 
Wherever the white panic was greatest, there the black population, 
163 . 
although apprehensive, was found to be relatively peaceful, although 
there were exceptions, like Gungube1e, the Tshatshu Thembu chief whose 
special case is discussed in a separate chapter. 
158. Ibid. 
159. G.G.R.! Edward Phillips to George Meurant, 19 Dec. '77. 
Merriman Papers, No. 758: Merriman to Molteno, Private and 
Confidential, 15 Dec. '77. 
160. Percy Nightingale gives a vivid account of frontier panic and the 
161. 
162. 
163. 
activities of scaremongers: 
Whilst the Fingo-Gca1eka disturbance was in its first 
stage false reports were got up, and circulated by 
trader's and others regarding the loyalty of this 
tribe [Oba I sJt and creditors began to press for a 
settlement of their claims. The district became 
excited by mischievous agitators, conspicuous amongst 
whom were two or three individuals living in this town, 
and reason lost her sway; there was a clamour for 
guns, a general trek, and an outcry against all Kaffirs ••• 
As telegrams poured in day after day containing 
exaggerated accounts of Transkeian affairs and then 
were exaggerated again by those who retailed them 
from mouth to mouth, panic took possession of the land ••. 
G.17-'78, p.12l: Nightingale to S.N.A., 29 Jan. '78. See also 
C.2000, Encl. No. 77: Extract from Official Report of ML Liefe1dt, 
n.d., for evidence of attempts to precipitate war, and De Kiewiet, 
p.l72. 
See below, 
G.G. R. 2: 
G.G.R. 2: 
G.G.R. 2: 
p.186 et seq. 
Frost to Merriman, 22 Dec. '77. 
H.J. Elliot to P.B. Borchards, 15 De~. '77. 
B. Holland to Merriman, 21 Dec. '77. 
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The Colonial blacks were not only provoked by the war psychosis of 
the whites, but also by the arrogance of the Colonial Mfengu, who were 
. b· h . k . , 164 JU ~lant after t e~r Trans e~an counterparts success. Colonial whites 
demanded on the return of the Gca1eka that the Colonial Mfengu be armed, 
and the latter were only too willing to oblige. When most of the new 
stock and Divisional Police arranged by Merriman turned out to be Mfengu, 
resentment boiled over, and incidents fo11owed. 165 The Ngqika (and 
Thembu) increasingly as the month proceeded, showed their hostility to the 
Mfengu by stealing their stock, and in many areas, the Mfengu began to 
h 1 f h · b1 k . hb 166 separate t emse ves rom t e1r ac ne~g ours. Archdeacon Waters 
of St Mark's Mission Station, which was located in Emigrant Thembuland 
on the border of the Tshatshu Location, concluded that an anti-Mfengu and 
anti-white conspiracy was being hatched. 167 
Still, open rebellion for the Ciskeian blacks was, in their 
fragmented, depressed and weak state, an act of desperation. While it 
was clear from the Makinana affair that resistance would be offered to any 
threat to the people and their property by the colonists, it required 
some striking act or success by the Gcaleka to kindle the flame of open 
rebellion. 
164. G.G.R. 13: Merriman to W. Wright, 22 Oct. '77. 
165. e.g. N.A. 155: T. Wright to W. Wright, 3 Nov. '77. 
Mfengu police helped precipitate the Tini Maqomo revolt. See 
below, pp.204, 206. 
166. G.H. 21/7, Miscellaneous file: A KropsSen. to Brownlee, 3 Dec. '77. 
167. Merriman Papers, 1877 file No. 139~ Archdeacon Waters to Hon. 
C. Brown M.L.C., 6 Dec. '77. 
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DECEMBER 1877 TO JUNE 1878: THE XHOSA DIVIDED AND DEFEATED 
1. Sarhi1i, the reluctant warrior again 
On 19th December, Bhotomane, Wapi, Maki and a few other Gcaleka 
surrendered at M.zintzani and said that Sarhili was anxious to do the 
same, but was frightened and wished to know what terms he would be granted 
before he did so. The Gcaleka were especially anxious that Sarhi1i 
should be allowed to remain with his people, even if, as had been done 
with Sandile before, he was deprived of his chieftainship. But the 
Government h.ad no intention of allowing Sarhi1i to stay on in Gcaleka1and, 
for his presence and influence would negate much of their settlement 
policy. So, although Glyn guaranteed Sarhili's personal wellbeing, he 
made no new concessions. A six day armistice was granted for Bhotomane 
to convey the Government's terms to Sarhili, and to, bring back his 
1 
answer. 
Shortly afterwards, Sarhili sent to Eustace to hear the terms from 
him personally. A meeting was arranged for 24th December near the ruins 
of Holela. Taking elaborate precautions, Sarhili arrived on Christmas 
day accompanied by a large armed bodyguard. He defended his behaviour 
to Eustace, reiterated his constant desire for peace and said that 
the terms offered by Government were very hard, 
that he wished himself and his people to be under 
Government, and could not see why he might not 
2 live in his country. 
1. G.H. 21/7, Native Resident's file: Report of a meeting between 
Bhotomane, Captain Robinson and others, 19 Dec. '77. 
C.2000, No. 26: Frere to Carnarvon, tel., 25 Dec. '77. 
2. G.H. 21/7, Native Resident's file: Eustace to Frere, 25 Dec. '77. 
G.17-'78, pp.37-8: Eustace to S.N.A., 31 Jan. '78. 
" 
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Eustace's explanations were all in vain, and Cunynghame told Bhotomane 
the following day that there could be no further armistice and, with a 
reward of 500 cattle or £1000 being offered for Sarhili's capture, Glyn's 
3 
campaign got under way. 
The campaign was much like Griffith's, though the Gcaleka offered 
even less resistance. Glyn's forces were divided into four columns 
which drove the Gcaleka forces north and south. In the fortnight's 
operations up to 5th January, 120 Gcaleka were killed and some 2369 
4 
cattle captured.· Of those Gcaleka driven north, some took refuge with 
Thembu friends, whilst others passed through Mditshwa's territory to 
receive shelter with Mqikela. Those Gca1eka driven south fled for the 
. 5 
most part; into the Ty~tyaba Valley. This valley, densely forested and 
extending both sides of the Kei, was to become the refuge of Ngqika forces 
and their herds once they had broken out into open rebe1lion. 6 Black 
forces in this area were responsible for briefly laying siege to Forts 
Linsingen and Warwick, but these were relieved by Maphasa and Colonel 
7 Lambert of the 88th. Lambert was to be much criticised for abandoning 
Mpethu, and this was one of the examples of Imperial blundering that 
8 Molteno used to justify a separate Colonial Command. 
2. The attempt to forge Xhosa solidarity 
Khiva Xoseni, who had worked his way south, is the one Gcaleka who 
features prominently in contemporary despatches. By 14th December, he 
3. G.R. 21/6: Cunynghame to Frere, tel., 26 Dec. '77. 
4. C.2079, Encl. A No. 23: Glyn to Cunynghame, 5 Jan. '78. 
5. C.M.T. 1/58: Stanford to Elliot, 8 Jan. '78. 
Blyth reported that feeling in Pondoland was very sympathetic to 
Sarhili and antagonistic to British rule. G.R. 21/7, Miscellaneous 
file :Blyth to S.N.A., te1.,11 Feb. '78. 
6. Theal, X, 89. 
7. C.2079, Encl. 1 No.9: Bellairs to Cunynghame, 14 Jan. '78 and 
following enclosures. '. 
8. Schoeman, p.194. 
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was marauding close to the Kei and Merriman warned Griffith and 
Cunynghame of the necessity of engaging him before he could meet up with 
h ok 9 t e Ngq1 a. G1yn's armistice only applied to the Gca1eka north of the 
Qora River, but Khiva was not engaged. Cunynghame, on his way to Ibeka 
to help laun~h C1yn's campaign, actually witnessed his crossing the Kei, 
but failed to stop him, 10 a failure that provided much ammunition to 
the critics of Imperial military capabilities like Merriman. 11 
Khiva's mission poses a number of awkward problems. Bhotomane's 
peace bid certainly was a forlorn hope from the start as far as Sarhi1i 
was concerned, and Sarhili,aware of this, could have given Khiva the 
go ahead to cross the Kei and summon aid from the Ngqika as soon as he 
had word from Bhotomane that the whites refused to change the terms for 
peace. But the time that elapsed between Bhotomane surrendering on 
19th and Khiva crossing the Kei on the night of the,22nd is very short, 
while the distances between Bhotomane at Mzintzani, Sarhi1i on the Qora, 
and Khiva near the Kei were great. The fact remains that Sarhi1i was 
• ° h E h Kh o 1 dOh N Ok 1 • 12 meet1ng W1t ustace w en 1va was a rea y 1n t e gq1 a ocat10n. 
All informants are agreed that Sarhi1i sent Khiva and that Khiva 
was not on an independent mission. But they disagree on the message 
that Khiva took to Sandi1e. Mda-Mda asserts that Sarhi1i sent to say: 
9. A.54-'78, p.73: Merriman to Griffith, 14 Dec. '77. 
10. Cunynghame, pp.341-2, explained that this was because he was 
outnumbered, had no cavalry support, and did not wish to expose 
his guns to capture or destruction. 
11. C.2079, Encl. 85: Merriman Minute, 29 Dec. '77. 
12. Eustace found Sarhi1i near that'River on Christmas Day. G.17-'78, p.37~ 
Eustace to S.N.A., 31 Jan. '78. 
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Keep out! - we're involved in this war 
against our will and we don't think we'll 
succeed. We need a place of refuge and you 
, d h 13 are to prOV1 e tat. 
But the weight of evidence and opinion is against this version. Far 
more likely is the message that was reported by Siwani to Brownlee. 
According to this, Khiva told Sandile that he had been abandoned by his 
friends across the Kei and now,renouncing peace, he intended to fight 
in the Ciskei until he died. Sandile and all the other Xhosa must 
h f 'd h' 14 t ere ore prepare to a1 1m. 
Chief Burns-Ncamashe stresses that the Ngqika always regarded the 
ties of blood between themselves and the Gcaleka as overriding, in a 
crisis, the independence from the Gcaleka that they exercised in 
everyday affairs. 15 The Xhosa Paramountcy, as Peires has put it 
"possessed symbolic and emotional associations which transcended its 
narrow political foundations".16 Thus Sandile is reported as replying 
to advice to reject Khiva's mission: 
13. Interview with Mr Mda-Mda, Nyokana Store, Nyokana Location, 
Willowvale District, 17 September 1977. 
14. C.2000, Encl. 86: Brownlee report on Siwani, 28 Dec. '77. 
Sarhili was reported as saying that Komgha would be his first 
target, and indeed the first engagement in the Colony was sparked 
off by Khiva just outside that town, see below, p.155. 
15. Interview with Chief S.M. Burns-Ncamashe, Rhodes University, 
1 November 1977. 
16. Peires, p.72. 
" 
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How can I sit still when Rhili fights? If 
Rhi1i fights and bursts and is overpowered, then I 
too become nothing. No longer will I be a chief. 
Where Rhili dies. there will I die, and where he 
wakes, there will I wake. 17 
It was Sandile's desire to embark on a national war in one final attempt 
to regain Xhosa independence1but what Peires calls 'the ethic of 
lineage solidarity' was,after the 8th Frontier War, no longer an 
operating principle. 18 That this is so may be seen from the differing 
responses of the various Rharhabe peoples to the call to fight. 
Firstly, the Ngqika themselves were split down the middle by the 
question of trying to throw off white control. The response of Tyala 
during the Mekinana incident has been noted, and he was supported by the 
majority of the Ngqika chief and Headmen. 19 The peace party continued 
to vehemently oppose involvement in the war. Thus, ,when a meeting was 
summoned to Sandile's Kraal on the Kubusi, the four leaders of the peace 
party were not present, and it seems reasonable to interpret their 
absence either as a protest on their part, or an attempt to isolate 
them on the part of Sandi Ie. But the Ngqika at the meeting insisted 
that Sandile refer the question of Khiva's mission to the four before 
17. Interview with Chief F. Mpangele, Mgwali Location, Stutterheim 
District, 26 Aug. 1975, in Peires, p.72. Mr Mda-Mda quoted Sandile 
to almost exactly the same effect. 
18. Peires, p.2l5. 
19. Wright (p. 15~ below) mentions Chiefs Feni and Kona, and Headman 
Soga, one of Sandile's most respected councillors. Cumming adds 
the name of Sandile's brother, Dondashe, see below, p.157, footnote 55. 
" 
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d " " k 20 any ec~s~on was ta en. While Sandi1e sent his son Gumna to join 
Khiva, his young men to raid the Mfengu, to burn the Draaibosch hotel 
d 1 d" 21 h " d f" A an to oat tra ~ng stores, t e peace party rema~ne ~rm. t a 
general meeting of the Ngqika which Wright summoned on 29th December 
because Sandi1e had not yet consulted Tyala, Saga, Feni and Kana, 
Tya1a, acting as the spokesman of the tribe, said the decision of the 
tribe was: 
Kiva is to return from whence he came. Messengers 
are to go out at once to Kiva with the word of 
the tribe to this effect. Sandi1e said he was 
sincere in saying he wished to sit sti1l. 22 
Kona told Auld that he doubted Sandile's word,23 and the first clashes 
between Ngqika forces and the whites on 29th and 30th show that there 
was reaSOn to do that. 
But while the Ngqika remained divided, Sandi1e temporized, refusing 
to commit himself one way or another. On 1 January he sent for Feni and 
told him that Wright had invited him to meet him, but that he was 
afraid to go. He added that there was a further problem to his going 
because Adonis, a Mfengu headman who had tried to mOVe his cattle out of 
the location, had been murdered. Feni in reply warned Sandile to 
remember the people's decision.and urged him therefore to apprehend the 
murderers and to see Wright, adding that he would not join in any move 
20. C.2000, Enc1~ 86: Wright to S.N.A., 25 Dec. '77 and Craigie to 
Deputy Adjutant-General, 25 Dec. '77. 
21. C.2220, Encl. No.3: Brownlee Memo., n.d. 
22. G.H. 21/8, Conduct of Sandilli file: Wright to S.N.A., 8 Jan. '78. 
23. Cory Library, PR 1273: J. Auld in Blythswood Review, Oct. '24. 
'" 
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against the Government and that he regarded the murder of Adonis as 
24 
such a move. 
By mid-January, the split in the Ngqika was total, the Government 
having moved to separate the non-combatants from the combatants. 25 
Despite the extreme bitterness that existed between the two groups 
{members of the same families stripped each other of property before 
joining opposing camps~ the peace party regarded themselves as having 
acted honourably. Their stand had been publicly stated and accepted 
at meetings of the people and far from seeing theselves as abandoning 
26 their chief, they saw him as abandoning them. They did not turn 
traitor to their people as Maphasa did, nor did they aid the whites as 
he was later to do. In fact, when instead of being treated as loyal 
subjects, they began to suffer at the hands of the colonial commandants 
and colonists who regarded them as a potential menace, many were bitterly 
d · '11 . d 27 ~s~ us~one. 
There is a Xhosa tradition that says that when Sandile decided to 
join the war, he called a meeting of all the Ngqika at Bolo. There he 
told them that this was the last war that he would fight in, since he 
had had a premonition of his death. Re asked some of the Ngqika chiefs, 
especially those near the forests to be non-combatants and to act as a 
Xh .. 28 osa comm~ssar~at. 
24. G.R. 21/8, Conduct of Sandilli file: Statement of Feni before 
Wright and others, 12 Jan. '78. 
25. See below, pp.156-7. 
26. G.R. 21/8, Conduct of Sandilli file: Brownlee Memo., 11 Jan. '78, 
Statement of Mkosana, a "loyal" Ngqika before Brownlee, 10 Jan. '78. 
Cory Library, P.R. 1273: J. Auld In Blythswood Review, Oct. '24. 
27. See for example, N.A. 158: 
and reply, 24 April '78. 
the succession of raids on 
did not join the rebels. 
W. C~ing to W. Wright, 20 April '78, 
Cumming expressed amazement that after 
Tyala's people by Rorke's Mfengu, they 
28. Interview with Chief S.M. Burns-Ncamashe, Rhodes University, 
1 November 1977. 
'. 
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The evidence is that the decision of most of the Ngqika chief'''~ on 
whether to participate or not in the war, was determined by individual 
circumstances as much as by Sandile's orders. The case of the Rleke and 
Anta seems to support to some extent this tradition. There is evidence 
that the former supplied Sandi Ie from the Perie mission area when he was 
29 fighting a desperate war of resistance in the last stages of the war, 
and that the latter's location acted as a refuge for combatants and their 
cattle, particularly over the period of the disturbances in the North-
30 East. 31 But Anta was an old man (he died before the war ended) and 
some 3-400 of his young men participated in the Gungube1e revolt at the 
end of January, 50 it is clear that Sandile's desires were not the only 
reason for his behaviour and that of his people. 
32 In Tini Maqomo's case, which is discussed in a separate chapter, 
evidence does not support the suggestion that he an4 his people were 
acting as a commissariat for Sandi Ie, and his eventual revolt was 
certainly a response to particular pressures exerted on him. 
Dba's case illustrates the point that the influences of a white 
official or missionary was often the telling factor in the response of 
individual chiefs to the war. Dba had moved from the overcrowded 
location, like Tini, when he bought two farms in the Victoria East 
district in 1874. 33 By the time of the drought of 1877-8, the farms 
were overcrowded and overgrazed, there was a shortage of food and a 
29. See below, p.171,footnote 151. 
30. See below, pp. 186-202. 
31. Theal, X, 83. 
32. See below, pp. 203-213. 
33. G.17-'78, p.120: Nightingale to S.N.A., 29 Jan. '78. 
/ 
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great amount of stock theft and generally aba's people were in a desperate 
, h 'b1 1" 1 34 pl1g t and suscept1 e to po 1c1tca unrest. However, in December 1877, 
after months of pleading, Nightingale in a far sighted move, persuaded 
the Government to appoint G.M. Thea1 as Special Resident to aba's people. 
Theal was unable to effect an immediate improvement in their social and 
economic condition, but he was able for some months through his influence 
and aba's willing co-operation to prevent the restless young men of the -
'b f ,.. d'l 35 tr1 e rom J01n1ng San 1 e. 
As for the rest of the black inhabitants of the Ciskei, their 
responses were determined by their individual circumstances, interests, 
officials and predisposition of their chiefs. Burton quotes a 
servartt as saying that all the Ciskeian blacks except Kama would rise. 
He said: 
This ·time it is no work of M1anjeni or 'witchdoctorsj 
formerly we were peaceable and quiet; but since 
the white man came we have had nothing but war 
and are now penned up in circumscribed localities 
and will stand it no longer. We are determined 
to sweep the white men from the earth or perish. 36 
This statement, accurately pinpoints the feelings of most Ciskeian blacks, 
but exaggerates their unanimity of purpose. Sandile had sent to Siwani, 
the Mdushane chief living at Tamacha in the King William's Town district 
to tell him of Khiva's presence and his message, and requesting him 
to pass on the message to all his countrymen, by which Siwani understood 
34. Ibid., G.17-'78, p.127: Theal to Nightingale, 12 Jan. '78. 
35. Theal, X, 80. 
36. Cory Library, MS 14,254/13: Burton, ii, facing p.70. 
" 
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the Mqhayi chief Ja1i living near Berlin, Toyise the Gasela chief living 
on the outskirts of King William's Town, William Shaw Kama the Christian 
Gqunukhwebe chief who lived near the same town. and Seyo10, his own 
half-brother who lived at Line Drift. 37 The missionary who lived with 
Siwani, Rev. Nauhaus advised him to report these messages to Brownlee 
h · h h d1·d d .. 1 . h h h· 38 w 1C e an he began 1ncreaslng y to co-operate Wlt t e w ltes. 
Ja1i and Seyolo were both to fight. but only in March 1878, while Kama 
and Toyise stayed out with portions of their tribes joining in. 39 
In the East London District the main portion of the Gqunukhwebe 
under Delima were also not to join for some time. while it was with the 
blacks squatting on farms that immediate trouble was to come, not 
because of any feelings of black solidarity, but because of a dispute 
over stolen cattle. On 24th December Brabant who was investigating a 
stock theft, was defied by some Gqunukhwebe tribesmen on the East Bank 
of the Gonubie,and outnumbered, was forced to retire. Richard Tainton 
the Special Magistrate for Tamacha40 who was well known to and well liked 
by all the blacks in the King William's Town and East London District, 
persuaded Brabant not to try to seize the cattle and those involved 
with his colonial troops, but rather to let him mediate. Tainton 
stressed that the troops would have a provocative effect. Tainton went 
to mediate and was accompanied by his brother John and also 
Field Cornet W. Brown of the Divisional police and 50 of his Mfengu 
policemen. After locating the kraal where the stolen cattle had been 
37. C.2000, Encl. 86: Brownlee report on Siwani. 28 Dec. '77. 
38. N.A. 400: Von Linsingen to S.N.A •• 6 Sept. '78. See above p p. 147, 152. 
39. See below, pp. 175-6. 
40. A special post with responsibility for the blacks in the King William's 
Town District. Theal was appointed to this post in 1878. 
Theal, X, 137. 
'. 
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taken, they were promised that the cattle would be returned. Tainton 
and his force returned to their camp at St. Luke's Mission Station on 
the Kwe1erha River where, shortly afterwards on the same day, they were 
surprised by a number of armed men from the kraal they had just visited. 
The Mfengu police fled and the three whites were murdered. Immediately 
afterwards, all those blacks involved sent their cattle to the Kei and 
went to join the Ngqika rebe1s. 4l 
3. The White Response 
At first the Colonial Government had sought to persuade Sandile to 
reject Khiva's advances. Wright was telegraphed by Brownlee on 23rd 
December and was instructed to go immediately to Sandile to explain to 
him his duty as a British subject. 42 Accompanied by Rev. J. Auld and 
Lt. R.W. Craigie, R.N., Wright went to. Sandile's kraal on the Kubusi 
and found that Sandi1e had just, as he admitted, been addressing a 
meeting of his people on the subject of Khiva's visit. Sandi1e was 
in an aggressive frame of mind and told Wright bluntly that he resented 
that his neutrality should be called into question and that his people 
were armed because Government used force rather than consultation. He 
asked that the Government should take no action with Khiva until his 
people had made their own decision, and refused to move back to his 
Great Place on the Gqolonci River near Wright's Residence at Tembani as 
Wright requested. Sandi1e told Wright that he was going to consult 
43 his councillors and the other chiefs as his people had requested, but 
he had not done so by the 29th, by which stage the situation had deteriorated. 
41. Cape Archives, Accession 459(1): The Life of Sir E.Y. Brabant, 
typescript, pp.54-9. 
42. C.2000, Encl. No. 86: Brownlee to Wright, tel., 23 Dec. '77. 
43. C.2000, Encls.No. 86: Wright to S.N.A., 25 Dec. '77 and Craigie 
to Deputy Adjutant-General, 25 Dec. '77. 
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On 25th December the Mfengu began moving their cattle out of the 
44 Ngqika Location despite Ngqika attempts to prevent them. On 28th a 
Ngqika raiding party penetrated six miles into Fingoland burning huts 
and seizing cattle, while the hotel at Draaibosch, one of Sandile's 
favourite haunts, was burnt. A couple of local farmhouses were also 
burnt and a white trader was killed. 45 At the meeting which Wright 
had arranged for the 29th to force Sandile to a decision, Tyala announced 
that the Ngqika were for peace and that Sandile wished to 'sit still'. 
But at the same time Tyala significantly asked the Government to 'keep 
the Fingoes Quiet' and Kona told Auld that he did not think Sandi Ie 
, 46 
was s~ncere. 
" The de nouement came on the same day. Postriders had been prevented 
by numbers of armed blacks from carrying the mail from Komgha to the 
Transkei for several days. On 29th, Major Moore of 88th took a patrol 
of F.A.M.P. out from Komgha to clear the road. Two engagements 
followed, the first with 100 blacks who retreated, the second with 300 
who forced the patrol to retreat with the loss of one man. On the 
following day, Moore took out a stronger patrol to escort the mails and 
an ammunition wagon, and was confronted by 600 black infantry and 50 
black mounted men. A sharp engagement followed, but this time the 
blacks were forced to retire. 47 
Sandile denied that he had ordered the attacks and asserted that 
Ndimba's Ndlambe were responsible,48 but Ndimba was cleared of personal 
44. Cory Library, PR 1273: J. Auld in Blythswood Review, Oct. 1934. 
45. Molteno Papers, No. 803: Brownlee to Molteno, 29 Dec. '77. 
G.H. 21/8, Conduct of Sandilli File: Wright to S.N.A., 8 Jan. '78. 
46. See above, p.149. 
47. C.2000, Encls No. 90: Moore to Lambert, 31 Dec. '77 (2 reports). 
48. G.R. 21/8, Conduct of Sandilli file: Wright to Brownlee, 8 Jan. '78. 
" 
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49 involvement and responsibility at his trial the following October and 
evidence was led that implicated Makinana and his people. From what 
Soga says, it seems that Mathanzima and Khiva were the directing forces 
behind the attacks, and that it was Khiva's purpose to involve the Ngqika 
50 irrevocably in the war. 
Brownlee, before learning of the engagement of 29th, had already 
decided that Sandile was sympathetic to Khiva's overtures but was 
temporizing because of lack of support. Ris advice was to delay any 
action against Sandile and the war party so as to strengthen the hand 
of those who favoured peace. At the same time, he advised that the 
latter be given an opportunity to separate themselves from the former by 
concentrating at Emgwali Mission Station, where Wright could register 
them as 'loyal' citizens. Sl 
Brownlee's suggestion was adopted, and on 31 December, Wright sent 
messages to Sandile and other important Ngqika calling on all those who 
disassociated themselves from violence to concentrate at Emgwa1i Mission 
52 Station where they would be received and protected by Government. 
Wright's task was a difficult and complex one, made more so by the suspicion 
with which colonists regarded the so-called 'loyals', and also by the 
imprecise and even contradictory orders that he received from Merriman and 
49. The Cape Argus, Report on trial, 29 Oct. '78. 
50. Soga, S.E. Bantu, p.264. 
51. C.2000, Encl. No. 86: Brownlee Memo., 29 Dec. '77. 
52. G.R. 21/8, Conduct of Sandilli file: Wright to S.N.A., 8 Jan. '78. 
" 
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53 Brownlee. Wright was much criticized for being too lenient in his 
treatment of the Ngqika,54 but there is evidence that his tolerant and 
flexible handling of the whole issue encouraged many waverers not to 
b ' d h' 55 become combatants, ut to reg1ster un er 1m. . In the end Tyala, Feni, 
Kona and all their followers registerd, while Soga was the only one of 
Sandile's chief councillors to join him, and that out of loyalty rather 
h .. 56 t an conv~ct1on. 
4. The Black Elite 
As Saunders has pointed out, the case of the educated and Christian 
1.. . . 57 e 1te ~s an ~nterest~ng one. The practice of sending the sons of 
chief's to education institutions like Zonneb1oem and Loveda1e had 
53. Brownlee urged that those Ngqika who registered should not be 
disarmed and was prepared to prolong the registration period. 
G.G.R.4: Brownlee Memo., I Jan '78. Merriman, encouraged 
by his commandants, who were acutely suspicious· of the 'loyals', 
insisted on disarmament and a limitation of the registration 
period. 
See G.R. 21/8, Conduct of Sandi11i file :Wright to S.N.A., 8 Jan. '78. 
and A.54-'78, p.12: Merriman to Schermburcker, tel., 5 Jan. '78. 
A.54-'78, p.15: Schermbrucker to Merriman, tel., 15 Jan. '78. 
A.54-'78, p.2l: Schermbrucker to Merriman, tel., 10 Jan. '78. 
A.54-'78, p.24: Merriman to Frost, tel., 14 Jan. '78. 
A.54-'78, p.24: Frost to Merriman, tel., n.d. 
54. e.g. C.2079, No.9: Frere to Carnarvon, 9 Jan. '78. 
55. John Cumming the missionary stationed at Emgwa1i wrote to Rose-Innes 
after the war to say that the able way Wright had secured the persons 
and property of the "loyalU Ngqika greatly increased confidence in 
the Government and with the lead of Tyala and others, stemmed defection 
to the rebels. Cape Archives, Cumming Papers, folder 7: Cumming 
to Rose-Innes, 1 Feb. '79. 
56. Cory Library, PR 1274 Rev. J. Auld in Blythswood Review, Dec. 1924. 
Theal, X, 82. Thea1 gives the number of men who were registered as 1418. 
Brownlee asserts that some 2000 men who were Sandi1e's subjects 
registered under Wright, a very sizeable proportion of the tribe 
(according to the census of 1875, the total population of both Sandi1e 
and Anta's Locations was 33,000 - G.21-'75, p.63). G.17-'78, p.2l3: 
Brownlee Memo., May '78. 
57. Saunders, C.C.: "The New African Elite in the Eastern Cape and some 
late Nineteenth Century origins of African Nationalism" in Collected 
Seminar Papers on The Society of Southern Africa in the 19th and 
20th Centuries, Vol. I, pp.44-9. 
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resulted in the emergence before the war of an elite who were then 
employed as interpreters or clerks in Magistrates Courts. The few 
blacks who had reached positions of responsibility in the Church may also 
be classed as members of the elite. Whilst the great majority of such 
people remained 'loyal' to the Government, a few prominent examples 
resigned their posts and joined the rebels. The most notable examples 
are Dukwana, the son of Ntsikana , the first christian convert, who was a 
lay preacher at Emgwali; Gonya (Edmund), Sandile's. eldest son, who was 
c1er~ in the office of the Magistrate at Middle Drift, Mlindazwe (Bisset) 
, 
another of Sandi1e's sons who was an interpreter in the Civil Commissioners 
Office at Bedford, Nathaniel Mha1a,brother to Makinana and Ndimba,an 
, K' '11" 58 1nterpreter at 1ng W1 1am s Town. 
Of these four Dukwana and Nathaniel are the most interesting perhaps 
because more is recorded of them, although the pict~re that emerged of 
Gonya at his trial for treason in October was not one of a man of force 
or character. 59 Dukwana, who joined the rebels almost immediately, was 
an excellent marksman, and he accounted for many of the white casualties 
during the closing stages of the war. Continuing to hold services in 
the field,he is on record as saying that he was not fighting against 
Christianity or 'civilisation' but against the English who had robbed 
his people of their land. 69 
same skirmish as Sandile. 6l 
58. Ibid., p.45. 
Dukwana was killed in late June in the 
59. The Cape Argus, lead article, 2 Nov. '78. Thea1, X, 87 shared this 
view of Gonya. 
60. Lecture by Rev. R. Johnston, Port Elizabeth, 1878, in Cory Library, 
MS 14254/13: Burton, iv, Appendix XIII. 
Johnson who remembered Dukwana well from his missionary days, said 
he was the orator of the Ngqika and second only to Tiyo Soga in his 
moral influence on the people. 
61. See below, p.182. 
" 
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62 Correspondence of Nathaniel with Brownlee and others, a diary he 
kept at the time and the record of his tria163 provide a fascinating 
insight into the dilemma of an educated and religious black man who had 
close relatives involved 1n a struggle with a Government whose servant he 
was. On the one hand he felt the call of blood and race, on the other 
64 the call of religion, intellect and Victorian duty. His dilennna was 
intensified by the prejudice of white colonists. After the murder of 
the Taintons, every black man was the subject of suspicion and in early 
January, Nathaniel became the subject of a scurrilous campaign in the 
h · h d h' f b . . 65 Cape Mercury w lC accuse 1m 0 e1ng a tra1tor. The kraal of a 
correspondent of his, an Ndlambe headman, was ransacked by Bowker's 
Rovers acting without a warrant, in an attempt to find confirmation of 
his treachery. Nathaniel wrote to Brownlee explaining that he felt 
compelled to resign 
knowing .•• how madly enraged the demonstrative 
1S an English populace apt to be against one who 
66 is branded the enemy of peace. 
Brownlee offered to have him transferred to Cape Town but Nathaniel 
felt he ought to join his people in their time of trial. Nevertheless, 
he appealed to Brownlee to appoint a Resident to the Ndlambe and to show 
concern for their plight, otherwise, 
62. To be found in G.H.21/8, Conduct of Sandil1i file and N.A. 400. 
63. Both published in The Cape Argus, supplement, 30 July '78. 
64. C.2l44, No. 107: Frere to Hicks-Beach, 1 June '78. 
65. G.H.21/8, Conduct of Sandilli file: Nathaniel Mhala to Mvalo, 
3 Jan '78. 
NA.400: Nathaniel Mhala to Brownlee, 13 Jan. '78. 
66. Ibid. 
'. 
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Left all by themselves, with the highly provocative 
Fingoe, armed, with the idea that Government has 
forsaken them, cast them off and with the knowledge 
that their kinsmen are struggling for their lives 
under Makinana, there is no calculating to what 
steps of desperation they might be driven to by 
h ' d I' , , 67 t e~r ere ~ct s~tuat~on. 
Nathaniel went home to join his people, and although he did not join his 
combatant brothers, he went into hiding because he feared with the 
Government might do to him. During this time he wrote in his diary of 
his desire for a 'Saviour' for the blacks, and wished that they were 
68 
either united in war or peace, preferably the latter. 
Arrested and charged with High Treason as well as the murder of a 
farmer and some Mfengu, Nathaniel was tried before Judge Dwyer on 
15 July 1878. The first charge was withdrawn, an~ Nathaniel was acquitted 
of the second. Nathaniel applied to be readmitted to Government 
69 
service, but was refused. Frere wrote to the Bishop of Grahamstown, 
who had applied to have Nathaniel readmitted that this could not be, 
because Nathaniel had failed to learn 'civil obedience to law,.70 
This is curious, because in June, he was sympathetic to Mhala's case 
when he defended the educated elite from the charge that it was disloyal 
and attached to the traditional politics of the chiefdom. So too did 
Dr James Stewart of Lovedale and the role of missionaries in education by 
publishing Loveda1e, Past and Present. A Register of 2000 Names. 
Frere and Stewart were right in their assessment of the majority of the 
67. G.H. 21/8, Conduct of Sandi1li file: Nathaniel Mhala to Brownlee, 
9 Jan. '78. 
68. The Cape Argus, supplement, 30 July '78: Diary of Nathaniel Mhala. 
69, Cory Library, MS. 14,254/13: Burton, iv, V. 
70. Frere to the Bishop of Grahamstown, 23 Sept. '79, quoted in Martineau, 
ii, 215-16. 
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elite: after the war they abandoned the armed struggle and tried to 
. .. . . l' . . f h h' 71 ga1n a V01ce 1n the pol1t1ca lnst1tut10ns 0 t e w ltes. 
5. Divided White Strategy 
There was increasing division between Members of the Government 
on the steps to be taken to meet the crisis in the Colony. In December 
Merriman favoured a comprehensive disarmament of Ciskeian blacks as the 
72 
only means to ensuring future peace, but Molteno pointed out that such 
a step would be intensely provocative. 73 He continued to resist the 
idea of Imperial Reinforcements which Frere and Cunynghame favoured, 
preferring the proclamation of Martial Law as a means of speedily putting 
down any rebellion. He envisaged the ruthless application of drum-head 
court martials under such a proclamation. But when, for want of an 
alternative, Martial Law was proclaimed in the Districts of Stutterheim 
74 
and Komgha on 31 December, Frere insisted on a less arbitrary system 
of special courts with terms of hard labour, rather than execution, as 
punishment for blacks convicted of rebellion. 
On 1 January the Burgher Act was proclaimed in order to strengthen 
the number of available troops, but burghers were still inclined to 
negotiate the terms on which they served, and some refused to serve 
75 
under Imperial control, a point which Molteno made capital of when he 
arrived in King William's Town on 8th January. Molteno, determined to 
71. Saunders in Societies of Southern Africa, i, 50-1, notes 9 and 10. 
See especially C.2l44, No. 107: Frere to Hicks-Beach, 1 June '78. 
72. Merriman Papers, 1877 file No. 106: Merriman to Orpen, tel., 
28 Dec. '77. 
73. Molteno Papers, No. 796: Molteno to Merriman, 28 Dec. '77. 
74. C.2079, Encl. No. 86: Proclamation on Martial Law, 1 Jan. '78. 
For the controversy over Martial Law, see C.2l44, Encls,No. 69. 
75. Molteno Papers, No. 862: J.A. De Wet (M.L.A. Somerset East) to 
Colonial Secretary, tel., 1 Jan. '78. 
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have his way, announced on 11th that the Colony would undertake a 
'1' "h' h C· k . 76 separate m1 1tary campa1gn W1t 1n t e 1S e1. 
Griffith was appointed Commandant-General of all Colonial troops 
and thus two separate military establishments, including two competing 
commissariates, came into being. Merriman henceforth issued all orders 
for colonial troops on his own authority as a sort of Minister of War, 
while Bellairs, with Cunynghame in the Transkei, issued orders for the 
Imperial campaign in the Colony. Cunynghame had intended to first 
attack the Gcaleka in the Tyityaba Valley before turning 1n a combined 
. h N 'k . . h K b' 76a operat10n on t e gq1 a 1n t e u US1 area. Merriman and Molteno 
frustrated this plan by embarking on an immediate and independent 
campaign against the Ngqika. Briefly put, the Colonial campaign 
involved a sweep by Commandant John Frost moving from the Amatolas in 
conjunction with forces at Stutterheim, Bolo Drift and Draaibosch, to the 
Kubusi and Kei Rivers. The Imperial forces went ahead with the 
original plan; under Colonel Lambert of 88th they were to sweep the 
77 Tyityaba Valley. Frere was later to claim, with more than a measure 
of truth, that the Ngqika had been prematurely pushed into active 
revolt by a Colonial Campaign that was unable to deal with the 
. " d 78 s1tuat10n 1t create • 
The Imperial campaign began on 14th January. On the preV10US day, 
Khiva, who had moved down the Kubusi River with Sandi1e, went on ahead 
and crossed the Kei in an attempt to keep commun~ation open between the 
Tyityaba and Transkei, that is between the Ngqika and Gcaleka. 79 
76. Lewsen, Selections 1870-90, p.35, footnote 25. 
76 a. C. 2079, No. 42: Frere to Carnarvon, 24 Jan. '78. 
77. Ibid., A.54-'78, p.79: Merriman to Frost, tel. 11 Jan. '78. 
78. C.2079, No. 84: Frere to Carnarvon, 20 Feb. '78. 
79. C.2079, Encl. 84: Ayliff to Frere, 15 Jan. '78. 
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Maphasa was stationed with Captain Robinson F.A.M.P. Artillery at Ebb 
and Flow Drift and although Khiva eluded them, Robinson was able to report 
his move to Major Owen, the Commander of Glyn's right column who was 
encamped at the Nyumaxa River, four miles south west of Quintana 
Mountain. Glyn was stationed there and was able to reinforce Owen 
in time for the engagement. This was strangely like the second battle 
of Quintana (called the Battle of Kentani) on 7th February, only it was 
on a smaller scale. Veldtman's Mfengu used the same tactic as was to 
be used then of retiring and drawing the Gcaleka on to the rest of the 
force. Owen and Glyn,although greatly outnumbered)were so carefully 
deployed that they beat off the GcalekaAfter two hours of heavy fighting. 
The Gcaleka lost about 150 men with 200 wounded. 80 
After the battle, GlynIs column co-operated in Lambert's operations 
in the Tyityaba, which had begun early the same day. Lambert and Moore 
had a total of 400 white troops and 1000 Mfengu deployed in two columns. 
81 On the 15th they were joined by Brabant and his East London Volunteers. 
El 
Although 12000 cattle and 8000 sheep were captured, indicating that the 
valley had been used as a place of concealment for the herds of the 
Gcaleka and Ngqika, most of the blacks managed to escape the forces of 
the whites. Many including Makinana, eluded Maphasa and the people who 
were still guarding the drifts, and passed into Gca1eka1and. 83 
80. Cory Library, MS. 254/13: Burton, ii, 74. 
Theal, X, 185, gives the casualties as only 50 Gcaleka killed. 
81. C.2079, Encl. No. 25: Bellairs to Sec. of State for War, 16 Jan. '78. 
Cunynghame, pp.359-60. 
82. C.2079, Encl. No. 32: Bellairs to Cunynghame, 22 Jan. '78. 
83. Cape Archives, Accession 459(1): The Life of Sir E.Y. Brabant, 
typescript, p.62. Merriman transferred some badly needed Mfengu 
Levies from Lambert's command to Griffiths just before the campaign 
started, so it is not surprising relations between the imperial and 
colonial troops plummeted to a new low point. 
'0 
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Frost's campaign was superficially successful, but in reality had 
grave shortcomings which Frere pointed out. 84 Firstly, Frost may have 
'cleared' the Ngqika location, but he did not manage to engage his 
opponents to any significant degree, and they simply melted away and 
regrouped on the periphery. Most ended up on the Thomas River, which 
Frost 'cleared' in a second sweep starting on 25th,85 but the Ngqika 
were still in the vicinity to encourage and receive the Tshatshu Thembu 
in their resistance of a colonial attack at the end of the month. 86 
Thereafter many sought refuge temporarily in Anta's Location, before 
87 
crossing the Kei and joining the Gcaleka at the beginning of February. 
Secondly, the same scorched earth type of campaign as had been 
pursued in Gcalekaland, brought inevitable complications. The Colonial 
Mfengu levies-which had been raised since the end of December, were 
88 involved in several incidents and continued to provoke other blacks, 
while colonists were involved in the usual excesses. Merriman did try 
89 to exercise some sort of control, but his Commandants demanded freedom 
of action. Frost swept aside Wright's efforts to stop the burning of 
huts of loyal Ngqika and angrily wrote to Merriman: 
84. c.2079, No. 84: Frere to Carnarvon, 20 Feb. '78. Frere says he 
pointed out all these shortcomings at the time. 
85. G.G.R. 46: Merriman Memo., n.d. (c. end of January). 
86. See below, pp.196-8. 
87. See below, p.198. 
88. There were rumours amongst the Rharhabe of a concerted rising 
arranged by Sarhili against the Mfengu; G.G.R. 3: Statement of 
Frans to R. de la Tour Lonsdale n. d. (c. early Jan.) 
89. Merriman telegraphed Schermbrucker on 18th January about complaints 
that had been made of him burning huts of non-combatants round 
Isidenge. 
A.54-'78, p.29: Merriman to Schermbrucker, tel., 18 Jan. '78. 
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Only this morning received telegram from 
Wright which states that Government do not wish 
me to destroy huts in Quand and Bolo, this I 
have already done. I shall burn Sandilli's huts 
about there tomorrow. My instructions are to 
clear the country. Women must be ordered out 
or they will get shot. I must not now be 
90 hampered. 
What with the destruction of their homes and the seizure of food 
supplies there, the capture of the bulk of their cattle and the 
continuing drought, famine was becoming a distinct possibility for the blacks. On 
27 January, Deputy Commissary-General Strickland reported to Cunynghame 
that it would be absolutely necessary to. feed the starving blacks, not 
only women and children, but also the men. The Imperial Commissariat 
was already feeding Gcaleka and now officers had begun asking for 
instructions on Ngqika who were flocking around posts asking for food. 
He estimated that half the total population of Gcaleka and Ngqika could 
have to be fed for 3 months at a cost in excess of £70,000. 91 
Cunynghame agreed to this, but when Frere referred to his Ministers on 
29th January,92 the Imperial-Colonial quarrel broke out again. The 
Ministry was determined to crush the Rebellion as swiftly as possible 
by the traditional colonial methods of warfare. Merriman argued that 
the relief of any distress was a colonial matter which the military were 
not called to deal with. Since women and children were acting as a 
commissariat for their men, and since several Ngqika killed in skirmishes 
were found to be 'loyals', any relief provided would merely prolong the 
90. A.S4-'78, p.46: Frost to Merriman, tel., 27 Jan. '78. 
91. G.G.R. 3, E.H. 2. 770, Correspondence reo natives and approaching 
famine: Strickland to Cunynghame, 27 Jan. '78. 
Strickland to Cunynghame, 27 Jan. '78. 
92. Ibid., Minutes by Cunynghame, Frere,29 Jan. '78. 
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war indefinitely. The only relief that the Ministry was prepared to 
offer therefore was employment for all able bodied men, women and 
children on the Public Works; arrangements for this had already been 
made. The Ministry ordered 2000 tons of grain from Buenos Aires as 
emergency relief, but were not prepared to do more without the sanction 
f P I , 93 o ar l.ament. 
Finally, the separate commands exacerbated the jealousy between 
the Imperial and Colonial troops. Cunynghame might well have been 
, 1 bl 'h '1 94 f 1 d M ' , '" l.nto era e l.n t e Councl., some 0 Mo teno an errl.man s Crl.tl.C1Sms 
f I '1 T "f' d 95 b hI' 1 ' 1 o mperl.a roops were Justl l.e, ut t e mperla troops certal.n y 
h d d " d 'c' 'I W ' , 96 a lstlnct a vantages ln a lVl ar Sl.tuatl.on. The disastrous 
Gungubele campaign which extended the Colonial Civil War, enabled Frere 
to dismiss the Ministry on the grounds of their military policy, although 
as Lewsen and Gruber have shown, he was really motivated by the Minisry's 
refusal to co-operate in his confederal schemes. 97 
93. G.G.R. 3, E.H. 2.770, Correspondence etc: Merriman minute for 
Frere, 30 Jan. '78. 
94. See above, p.139. 
95. Cunynghame's allowing Khiva to pass through to the Ngqik~Location, 
and the unnecessary abandonment of Mpethu by Lambert after Forts 
von Linsingen and Warwick had been relieved early in January (see 
pp.145,146above respectively) spring to mind. 
96. See above, fP.114 .. 5. What Frere had pointed out in early October was 
borne out by events - one has only to look at the effects of the 
presence and often undisciplined behaviour of colonial troops in 
the Maphasa/Makinana affair, the Colonial campaign and the Tini 
and Gungubele campaigns to see the justness of Frere's arguments. 
97. The best discussion of the Constitutional Crisis that resulted in 
the fall of the Molteno Ministry and its replacement by the Sprigg 
Ministry in February 1878, is still to be found in P. Lewsen: 
The first crisis in Res onsible Government in the Ca e Colony 
(Archives Year Book, II, 1 Gruber, op.cit., follows Lewsen 
closely. 
" 
167 
DECEMBER 1877 TO JUNE 1878: THE XHOSA DIVIDED AND DEFEATED 
6. The Battle of Kentani 
Stanford~whose intelligence usually proved reliable and invaluable 
to the whites, reported at the end of the Ciskeian operations, that 
Sarhili had summoned all his men back to Gcalekaland and that they were 
returning fast from their places of refuge, some of which were in 
98 Gcalekaland. Soga confirms Stanford's report. 99 Glyn too, who had 
noticed Gcaleka crossing the Qora on the way to the Kei, had heard that 
Kreli has sent fresh messages to Sandile and 
said rather than fall into the hands of 
Government he would prefer death like his 
f h R' 100 at er ~ntza. 
Melane actually relates a discussion between Sarhili and Sandile before 
the battle of Kentani at a place called Nyumaxa which is particularly 
interesting in the light of the two chiefs' behaviour after the battle. lOl 
Sandile proposed that the Gcaleka and Ngqika should fight to the last 
man since the English could never be trusted even when they spoke of 
peace - his life's experience of the English, he said, bore witness to 
h ' 102 t ~s. Sarhili agreed on this point and said he would never 'speak' 
to the English again. Nevertheless, he was dubious of a fight to the 
last: one could not kill the English since they seemed to have an 
endless stream of reinforcements. In the end. though)Sandile convinced 
him to make a last stand with him and they chose the camp at Kentani as 
their target. 
98. G.R. 21/7: Native Resident Magistrate's file: Stanford to 
Deputy Adjutant-General, 26 Jan. '78. 
99. Saga, S.E. Bantu, pp.264-5. 
100. G.R. 21/7, Glyn file: Glyn to Cunynghame, tel., 28 Jan. '78. 
101. Interview with Mr N.C. Melane, Qwaninga Location, Willowvale 
District, 14 Sept. 1977. 
102. The most notorious was his imprisonment under, fa'lse pretext during 
the War of the Axe. 
c.2220, Encl. No.3: Brownlee Memo. on Sandile, n.d. 
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That the decision to fight the battle was an act of desperation 
seems clear. Gcaleka experience at Ibeka and recently at Quintana was 
not such as to recommend the strategy of a direct attack on a fortified 
" 103 pos~t~on. Maphasa reported on 5 February that a major attack for 
the purpose of getting ammunition was imminent, and his report was only 
h f ' 'f ,104 t e con lrmat~on 0 many SlgnS. With forewarning Glyn was able to 
strengthen both Ibeka and Capt. Upcher's camp at Quintana, where Upcher had 
a total of 436 white officers and men, 560 Mfengu levies under Veldtman 
and Smith Poswa as well as the support of Maphasa's people under 
Xhoxho. 105 
Tradition has it that Ngxito with Sigcawu and Khiva advised Sarhili 
that the best strategy would be to make an early morning dash to 
overwhelm the post and thereby obtain the crucial ammunition and food. l06 
At any rate Ngxito doctored the Gcaleka army of some 3-4000 men and 
107 gave them the usual charms. 
Early on the morning of 7th February, the Ngqika under Khiva and 
Sandile advanced on the camp from the Kei, while the Gcaleka army 
103. Frere to Carnarvon, 17 Feb. '78, P.R.O. c.o. 879/13, confidential 
Print African, 150, quoted in C. Saunders: "The 100 years war: 
Some reflections on African Resistance on the Cape Eastern 
Frontier" (Unpublished paper in Jagger Library, University 
of Cape Town~pl'.Frere had said of Kentani that the battle had 
demonstrated not only the superior fire power of the whites, but 
the fatal error of the "new" tactic of the blacks in attacking the 
whites in the open in mass formation. 
104. G.H. 21/7, Glyn file: Glyn to Cunynghame, tel., 5 Feb. '78. 
105. C.2079, Encl. 1 No. 81: Glyn to Deputy Adjutant-General, 12 Feb. '78. 
C.2079, Encl. lB No. 81: Upcher to Glyn, 8 Feb. '78. 
106. Cory Library, MS. 14,254/13: Burton, iv, V 
107. Theal, X, 93. 
" 
169 
DECEMBER 1877 TO JUNE 1878: THE XHOSA DIVIDED AND DEFEATED 
approached from the sea under Dalasile, son of Gxaba, chief of the 
lOS 109 Velelo clan. Together the two forces numbered some 5000 men. 
It seems the attack was to have been a combined one but Sandile had 
been followed from the Kei by Maphasa who took up a position on a hill 
above him. So Sandile sent a message to Sarhili saying he was unable 
to attack with Maphasa threatening his flank. 110 
Therefore the Gcaleka advanced alone. As at the first battle 
of Quintana they were lured on to the awaiting artillery and rifles 
of the whites by a company of 1/24th and Carrington's Horse. The 
Gcaleka advanced bravely under a withering fire of nine pound and seven 
pound guns, rocket tubes and Martini-Henry's, but gave way after 20 
minutes, whereupon, according to order~ the Mfengu under Veldtmanpursued 
and harried them. Veldtman drove some Gcaleka as far as the Qolora 
killing 54, while Carrington's Horse pursued others, up the Mnyameni. 
In the meantime Sandili's force advanced, but were attacked both 
from the front and by Xhoxho in the rear. Regrouping briefly on a 
nearby conical hill, the Ngqika were scattered by the white artillery. 
108. Soga, S.E. Bantu, p.265. 
C.2079, Encl. lB No. 81: Upcher to Glyn, 8 Feb. '78. 
109. C.2079, Encl. 1 No. 81: Glyn to Deputy Adjutant-General, 12 Feb.'78. 
110. Soga, S.E. Bantu, p.265. 
Melane related that Sandile had suggested attacking Maphasa, but 
Sarhili (curiously, but perhaps typically) had refused to exact 
revenge on him for his treachery. Now the Ngqika were seriously 
embarassed by Maphasa in their rear, particularly since, being 
jealous of Khiva's prowess, they had been enxious to prove 
themselves. 
Interview with Mr N.C. Melane, Qwaninga Location, Willowvale 
District, 14 Sept. 1977. 
Thealrelates another version. He says the Ngqika were in favour 
of a raid on Fingoland for booty, and when Sarhili would not 
agree, resolved to let the Gcaleka take the lead in the attack and 
watch the result. 
Theal, X, 93. 
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The whole action was over by midday, having cost the Gca1eka and 
Ngqika forces a staggering three to four hundred killed. White and 
Mfengu casualties were two Mfengu killed, seven wounded and two whites 
wounded. The enormous difference in casualties between the two sides 
was, as usual, not due to want of valour, but rather to the inferior 
arms of the blacks and their inability to use them with any effect. 111 
The battle made a deep impression on the Gca1eka and confirmed 
Sarhi1i's belief in the pointlessness of continuing the armed struggle. 
To all intents and purposes therefore, the Transkeian campaign ended 
with the battle, and although a few armed bands continued to wander in 
Gca1ekaland,they all, save for Khiva who maintained his reputation, 
offered little resistance. 112 After the battle, Sarhi1i made for his 
headquarters on the Qora River where he was joined by Khiva. Ngxito 
travelled with them, but was reported shortly after to be seriously 
ill in Pondo1and. Makinana fled- t.O Bomvana1and: he appears to have 
113 been a coward for he was described by blacks as a good runner. 
Ngubo was arrested by Nqwi1iso in early May and was sent to Robben 
Island as a state Prisoner, being released in 1888 under Sprigg's 
114 
amnesty. 
But when active resistance on the part of the Gca1eka ended, 
passive resistance to colonial rule began. The great majority refused 
to surrender to Eustace who established himself at Ibeka as the 
111. C.2079, Encl. 1B No. 81, Upcher to G1yn, 8 Feb. '78. 
Soga, S.E. Bantu, pp.365-6. 
Theal, X, 93-5. 
112. Khiva and three of his younger brothers were killed on March 15 
by PattIe and his Mfengu. Cory Library, MS. 14,254/13: Burton, 
iii, 103. 
113. Soga, S.E. Bantu, pp.365-6. 
Cory Library, NS. 14,254/13: Burton, ii, 78. 
114. N.A. 44: Scott to S.N.A., 9 May, '78. 
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representative of Government authority. They declined to enter 
Gcalekaland and settle until peace was proclaimed. Some sought 
refuge with other chiefdoms, others wandered around in small armed bands 
necessitating the continued military occupation of Gcalekaland. 
They all refused to take advantage of the Public Works, preferring to 
alleviate their own distress by offering their services in helping 
neighbouring chiefdoms collect their harvest, or in the case of women, 
even going to the extent of entering domestic service under the Mfengu. 
Those who found no work lived by thieving. lIS 
Sarhi1i made several more attempts to arrange terms for surrender: 
he sent to E.J. Warner in April to ask him what to do as he wished to 
give himself up as long as he was granted his life and liberty.116 
He also sent to West Fynn twice to ask to see him about surrendering, 
but West Fynn was out of favour, and William Ayliff, the new secretary 
for Native Affairs, decided that Sarhili must deal directly with 
Eustace. Fynn disregarded orders and arranged to see Sarhili, but as 
he subsequently learnt, Inspector Hook of the F.A.M.P. learnt of the 
attempt, and attracted by the reward of £1000 for Sarhili, tried to 
capture him and so frightened him away.117 
us. 
Moving through Bomvanaland where Moni had accepted British rule 
N.A. 2: 
N.A. 1: 
N.A. 44: 
N .A. 2: 
Eustace to S.N.A., 26 April '78. 
Memo on letter of Chief Magistrate of Fingoland regarding 
occupation of Gcaleka1and, n.d., 31 May '78. 
Scott to S.N.A., 14 June '78. 
Eustace to S.N.A., 18 June '78. 
116. N.A. 400: E.J. Warner' to W. Ayliff, 27 April '78. 
117. Cory Library,MS. 2016: West Fynn to Cory, 1 Aug. 1920. 
Fynn, p.21. 
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118 .. .. 
under pressure in January, Sarh1l1 sought shelter w1th Gwad1so. 
But in September Nqwiliso reported his presence and that of three of 
his sons and he narrowly escaped the attempt to capture him. This 
was largely because Gwadiso persuaded a troop of the Cape Mounted Rifles 
(as the F.A.M.P. were now known) to place themselves in a position 
where they were safely out of the way, while he feigned an att~ck on 
119 Sarhi1i and allowed him to escape. 
7. Desperate black resistance and the war of attrition 
The Ngqika, although from the start weaker militarily than the 
120 Gca1eka, were roughly in the same situation as the Gcaleka had been 
in November the previous year. They were not totally defeated and had 
many potential Xhosa allies in the Col?ny who were hostile to colonial 
rule, sympathetic to their cause and in a despa,rate economic situation. 
118. Elliot, instructed by Frere and Cunynghame a~nounced to Moni on 
17 Jan., that the Government found it necessary to occupy 
Bomvana1and militarily for the duration of the war, and 'suggested' 
that he might like to accept British rule. 
F. Brownlee, Transkeian Historical Records, pp.34-5. 
Elliot himself encouraged the Government to press the issue. He 
wrote to Cunynghame on 2 January: 
The Govt. [sic] in my humble opinion should be 
very firm with Fynn and Moni otherwise our efforts 
will be fruitless. (G.H. 21/6: Elliot to Cunynghame, 2 Jan. '78) 
Brownlee had contemplated extending British rule over Bomvanaland 
at the same time as over Thembuland, and it was W.R.D. Fynn 
who pointed out that Brownlee himself had recognised Moni as 
Sarhili's subject, and that such a step, which he considered 
undesirable anyway, would need Sarhili's permission. 
See above, p.36, footnote 53. 
119. N.A. 44: Elliot to S.N.A., 19 Sept. '78. 
120. Whereas the Gca1eka probably marshalled 9-10,000 at their peak 
during the early stages of the war, Sandile does not seem to 
have been able to raise half that number even when supported by 
the other Rharhabe peoples. See figures quoted above 
pp.54, footnote 142, 7~ footnote 34, 
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The Ngqika's own country was devastated and militarily occupied, and 
121 there was no prospect of any terms except total surrender. Sandile 
therefore determined to carry on the struggle after Kentani. He 
appealed to the other Rharhabe peoples to join him and worked his way to 
join his sons Mathanzima and Gonya who had been operating in the North 
East since the outbreak of the Civil War. 122 There on 22 February 
his sons and Gungubele were involved in a major action with Griffith's 
Field Force at Bacela's Kraal at the junction of the Swart and Wit Kei 
Rivers. Like the engagements in early February between the Colonial 
Thembu and Griffith's force, it was a disaster for the blacks, and they 
lost 128 of their force of 1000. 123 
After the fight, Griffith's force, reinforced from King William's 
Town by Colonial Troops, attempted to surround Sandile and the Ngqika. 
They attacked on 8th March, killing 70 Ngqika and ~apturing 1200 cattle. 
But Sandile with 800 followers, managed to slip between two columns and 
entered the Perie Bush between Keiskammahoek and Izeli. 124 This 
mountainous area of about 286 square miles, broken up by boulders and 
ravines, and covered by dense bush, was traversed by only two passable 
roads 17 miles apart, one leading from Izeli to Stutterheim via 
Frankfort Hill, the other from Bailies Post to Keiskamma Hoek. 125 
The Perie Bush was therefore absolutely ideal for guerrilla tactics, and 
121. See below, p.179. 
122. Cory Library, MS. 14,254/13: Burton, ii, 96-9. 
123. C.2l00, Encls No.9: Reports by Captain Harvey and Captain 
Nettleton, 25 Feb. '78. 
124. C.2l00, Encl. No. 43: Thesiger to Sec. of State for War, 12 March '78. 
W.C.F. Molyneux: Campaigning in South Africa and Egypt (London, 
1896), p.Sl. 
12S. C.2l44, Encl. 1, No. 126: Thesiger to Sec. of State for War, 
26 June '78. 
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Sandile who well knew this, having never left the area during the 8th 
Frontier War,126 obviously determined to conduct a war of resistance 
from there. 
While the nature of the war was in the process of changing, the 
command of the white troops changed too and reinforcements arrived. 
Cunynghame was replaced, as the Duke of Cambridge explained to him. at 
the end of January, becuase of the 'want of cordiality' between him and 
the Molteno Ministrysthough what he did not explain was that even 
f d h l ' b'l' b h 'I' 'I d 1" 11 127 Frere oun Cunyng arne a ~a ~ ~ty at ml ~tarl y an po lt~ca y. 
Lieis,ul-Genera1 F .A. Thesiger, later Lord Chelmsford of Zulu war fame, 
formally took over the command on 4th March. 128 Frere left the frontier 
soon after Cunynghame, to return to Cape Town where the Parliamentary 
, dId b .. 129 seSS10n, e aye y events, was ~mm~nent. Soon after Thesiger's 
arrival, 450 men of 90th Regiment, 112 of the Royal Artillery and the 
second battalion of the 24th Regiment arrived ~n King William's Town, 
130 
while 100 men of 88th returned to Cape Town. 
Thesiger immediately set about constructing two east-west roads in 
the Perie Bush, one from Isidenge to Mount Kempt and another from Bailie's 
Post to the Gazo Heights. Between 11th and 17th March, he arranged a 
series of pickets around the whole area to try and hem Sandile's men in, 
He had a force of 555 infantry, 1185 mounted troops and 1159 Mfengu 
(2900 in total) but, since Sandi1e's force was constantly being augmented 
126. C. Hummel (ed.): The Journal of Major John North Cradock 
(unp. typescrjpt), p.44. 
127. G.H. 21/5: Duke of Cambridge to Cunynghame, 29 Jan. '78. Gruber, 
p.286. 
128. C.2100, Encl. No. 56: General Order signed by Cunynghame, 4 March '78. 
129. Thea1, X, 107-8. 
130. A.24-'78, p.27: Cunynghame to Frere, 11 Feb. '78. 
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from the Ciskei, Sandile having between 2-4000 men, Thesiger's force was 
inadequate for the job whichhe set himself. This was particularly true 
of Mfengu levies who were the only troops who could or were prepared 
really to get to grips with the Nqika in such terrain. Thus the 
operations Thesiger conducted from 18th March to 5th April, produced 
131 few results. Thesiger also had difficulty welding the Colonial 
and Imperial troops together into an effective whole: when Brabant for 
example, disobeyed orders on 18th by leaving his post to capture a herd 
of Ngqika cattle, he ruined the combined movement arranged for that 
day: on the other hand, Commandants Meurant and Schermbrucker who 
later obeyed orders, sat and watched 2000 Ngqika and their cattle pass 
below them. 132 
Just when the rebel's cause seems to have been most hopeless, 
Sandi1e's calls for aid seemed to have finally persuaded some of the 
Rharhabe chiefs to join the revolt against colonial rule. In recent 
weeks they had been alarmed by the activities of the Mfengu and the 
expedition which the colony had launched against Tini Maqomo. Tini 
had escaped a bush campaign in which there were many irregularities 
to eventually join the Rharhabe forces at the Intaba kaNdoda}33 
On 28th March Commandant Von Linsingen with three hundred volunteers 
and six hundred Mfengu were despatched to the Chalumna area, east 
of the lower Keiskamma to deal with the Gqunukhwebe who had risen under 
Delima, son of Phato. The Peddie Mfengu lined the Keiskamma to prevent 
the Gqunukhwebe escaping to the Fish. On 31st March and 1st April, 
131. C.2l44, Encl. No. 20: Thesiger to Sec. of State for War, 25 March '78. 
C.2l44~ Encl. 1 No. 126: Thesiger to Sec. of State for War, 
26 June '78. 
132. Graham's Town Journal, 20 March '78. 
133. See below, pp.210-211. 
" 
176 
DECEMBER 1877 TO JUNE 1878: THE XHOSA DIVIDED AND DEFEATED 
engagements were fought in which 3000 cattle were captured and 30 
Gqunukwhebe killed. 134 
At the same time the Mqhayi under Jali and the Mdushane under 
135 Seyolo rose. On 3 April pursuing Government instructions to find out 
whether Seyolo was a rebel, Von Linsingen together with Rev. Nauhaus, Siwani's 
missionarY, tried to inverview Seyolo. Von Linsingen succeeded 
only in talkingwith Mjesu, Seyolo's son, who, when asked why he was in 
arms against the Government, replied "because you are in arms against 
me, 
~36 
and I intend to defend the army.' He and Seyolo nl.anaged to give 
Von Linsingen·the slip and headed for the Perie Bush, but they were 
confronted on 5th April by Warren and the Diamond Field Horse at Debe 
Nek. In the engagement that followed, Seyolo lost at least 58 of his 
1200 men, including Mjesu and another of his sons. The following day 
he and the Mqhayi and other forces in the area lost a further 78 men. 
Seyolo, a warrior renowned for his bravery from the days of the 8th 
Frontier war, was particularly conspicuous in repulsing two Mfengu 
attacks on 6th. 137 On 7th Jali was killed. 138 
On 15th April Kama's people were disarmed after some had joined the 
139 
rebels in burning Mfengu huts, but the Graham's Town Journal reported 
that they had been seriously provoked by the Mfengu and colonial troops. 
134. C.2l00, Encl. No. 71: Precis of operations by Capt. H. Spalding 
3 April '78. 
Theal, X, 125. 
135. Ibid. 
136. Kaffrarian Watchman, 15 April: "The Affair of Seyolo". 
137. C.2l44, Encl. No. 29: Thesiger to Sec. of State for War, 10 April '78. 
C.2144, Encl. 1 No.126: Thesiger to Sec. of State for War, 26 
June '78. 
Theal, X, 126-7. 
Hummel, pp.76-8. 
138. F. Streatfeild 
pp .192-3. 
Reminiscences of an Old 'Un (London, 1911), 
139. Graham's Town Journal, 4, 19 June '78. " 
Hununel, p.63. 
Theal, X, 126-7. 
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Kama, who had protested at the disarmament, was offered a place on 
Thesiger's staff if he would raise a levy, but he declined the offer. 
Many of his followers and those of the aged Toyise who died on March 
30th were known to have joined the rebels in the Peri (though Theal 
states that Toyise's people went into customary mourning and so were 
prevented from joining in, though they would probably have stayed out 
anyway). 
Oba who had been summoned again by Sandile was expected to lead 
the Mbalu, the Mdange (two small Rharhabe fragments which had almost 
been destroyed by the cattle killingf40 , as well as his own followers 
and those of Kama. Having great difficulty in restraining the young 
men, he devised the plan of surrendering himself to Nightingale, after 
which Nightingale called on his followers to surrender their arms. 14l 
Just under a third of Oba's followers refused to ob~y Nightingale and 
joined Sandile in the Perie, including Oba's brother Kokwe 142 who 
had remarked to Theal in January that if Sandile had gone into the Perie 
other Ngqika would join him. 143 Theal settled with Oba and his 
followers at Calderwood where they were presented to Frere on his way 
to Cape Town. Thereafter Theal was appointed to oversee the employment 
of native labour in the Western Cape and Oba was housed in a military 
140. Brownlee, Reminiscences, p.179. The Mdange of Peelton Mission and 
the Ntinde of Berlin, both professed to be 'loyal'. Theal, X, 125-7. 
141. N.A. 400: Nightingale to S.N.A., 24 May '78. 
Cape Argus, 13 April '78, Telegrams. 
142. Cape Argus, 18 April '78, Telegrams. Thea1's contention that 
not a drop of blood was spilt by Oba's people (x, 80) is 
incorrect. 
143. G.G.R. 3: Lonsdale to Merriman, 28 Jan. '78, 
'. 
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k ' b 144 barrac 1n W~l erg. There is an interesting postscript to the 
f h ' f 145 story 0 1S arms. 
While Ciskeian blacks streamed to support Sandi1e, Thesiger's 
campaign ran into several problems. Sprigg had ordered Mfengu 
reinforcements from the Transkei on 21 March. But the Transkei Mfengu 
who had prospered in the war, felt they had done their fair share 
whilst not always receiving adequate compensation. They therefore 
at first refused to come, and agreed only when James Ayliff personally 
exerted pressure on them and accompanied them to the scene of operations. 
When they arrived, they contributed to the failure of Thesiger's grand 
sweep of the Perie Bush on 5th April by their half-hearted scouring 
and waste of ammunition, and Thesiger was forced to send them home. 146 
At the same time, most of the colonists elected to return home since 
147 their three month tour of duty was completed. Thesiger therefore 
had a chance to reassess his tactics both in the light of his previous 
operations and in the light of Government policy. 
144. Thea1, X, 80, 107. 
145. In May, the owners who had only been paid £2100 out of £3,300 
purchase price, attached the farms. Nightingale, who was 
at sea on his way to England on leave, wrote to W. Ayliff 
to protest and urged that Government should recognise Oba's 
service. He, like Hemming in the case of the farm Gungube1e 
purchased, complained that the price charged was outrageously 
high. Although the Sprigg Ministry allowed the farms to be 
sold, they seem to have accepted Nightingale's argument, 
for after the war, Oba was granted the farm Aberdeen in the 
Victoria East district in recognition of his services. 
However the several hundred families of his followers were, 
like all other \'loyals ~' relocated across the Kei in the new 
district of Kentani. 
146. C.2l44, Encl. No. 29: Thesiger to Sec. of State for War, 10 April '78. 
On 5th April, 1000 Transkeian Mfengu were issued with 60 rounds 
each, which they totally expended in killing 10 Ngqika! 
Molyneux, p, 64. 
147. C.2144, Encl. 1 No. 126: Thesiger to Sec. of State for War, 
26 June '78. 
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There was a feeling amongst some in the Cape in which Th~ Cape 
Argus took the lead, that the war was developing unnecessarily into a 
war of attrition and that an amnesty should be proclaimed to end a war 
which did not need to continue. The Cape Argus in Harch and April in 
calling for an amnesty argued that the colony had made its point and was 
, d" d' " 1 h 148 not ~ntereste ~n ~n 1scr~m1nate s aug ter. But Sprigg had come 
into office promising a 'firm' native policy that looked to the complete 
149 
sub;ugation of the blacks. He therefore refused to entertain pleas 
for amnesty and was only willing to grant Sandile terms of unconditional 
surrender. When Sandile,whose forces suffered te.ribly during 
Thesiger's second campaign,sent to Brownlee on 15th May to ask what 
terms he might have, Brownlee replied that the Government's terms were 
unconditional surrender because 
Government is determined to adopt new 
measures with you, and prevent your chiefs 
f k ' 150 rom ma ~ng any more war. 
Sprigg's policy only served to force the black population into 
more desperate resistance: not only had many Rharhabe chiefs joined 
Sandile, but there is evidence that many "loyal" Ngqika and school 
151 blacks provided clandestine aid to the rebels. Then the women and 
148. The Cape Argus, lead article, 13 March, 13 April '78. 
149. See his statement of policy quoted on p.215, below. 
150, Brownlee, quoted in The Cape Argus, 16 May '78, Telegrams. 
151. C.2l44, Encl. A No. 55: Wood to Deputy Adjutant-General, 18 May '78. 
Hummel, pp.69, 89. Despite Ross's protests, the men of Perie 
Mission were convicted on several occasions of aiding the Ngqika 
rebels. The black clerks at the Alice Telegraph office were 
involved in several incidents in which they were suspected of 
betraying information. Molyneux, p.75 cites the example of 
messages routed through Lovedale being passed on to the Ngqika. 
Streatfeild: Reminiscences, p.187-8 refers to similar incidents. 
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children acted as a commissariat force for the rebels and often 
obtained food from Imperial camps which they then passed on to the 
152 
soldiers as well, it seems, or intelligence that they had gleaned there. 
Though there were many applications in the Colony for labour under 
153 Ayliff's notice of 25 February 1878, the blacks not involved in the 
war evinced no desire to go and work for the whites, particularly when 
this meant moving far from home. They therefore remained in areas where 
they were subject to the pressures which had driven so many of their 
, , b II' 154 compatr~ots ~nto re e ~on. 
Thus, in order to crush the hostile black population, Thesiger 
and the Ministry decided to adopt tactics similar to those employed 
in the Second Anglo-Boer War. Captured women and children were sent 
h f . d 1 b 155 to t e Western Cape or ~n enture as a ourers. The scorched 
earth type campaign had already devastated the territory of many of the 
Ciskeian blacks and they had been driven into an inaccessible area from 
which they conducted a guerilla war of resistance. Thesiger elaborated 
his system of co-ordinated sweeps. He divided the Perie Bush area into 
152. C.2l44, No. 21: Frere to Hicks1Beach, 16 April '78. 
153. See below, p.216, for details. 
154. Oba's followers are a prime example. Theal struggled in vain 
to persuade them to go to the Public Works or to the Western 
Province to alleviate their misery. In this way, the Ciskeians 
were similar to the Gcaleka. A.3l-'78, pp.1-37. 
155. Theal, X, 123-5. 
Thea1 relates the fate of the just under 4000 women and children 
sent to the Western Cape. After entering service in the Western 
Province, most deserted as soon as the winter was over, and 
walked back to the frontier, where, many of them widowed, they 
either journeyed on to Kentani, or entered service, or attached 
themselves to Ngqika clans. In 1879 those remaining in the 
Western Cape were sent back by the Government. 
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11 districts, each under its own commandant and garrison. These had to 
sweep each district in a co-ordinated movement allowing for the immediate 
reinforcement by neighbouring forces of any garrison that made contact 
with the enemy. In each sweep, troops were to be stationed to prevent 
escape and Mfengu levies were to be used to harry the blacks and 
. f d l' d 1 156 capture the1r 00 supp 1es an catt e. 
The bitterness of the struggle that ensued may be gauged from the 
fact that in drives from 30th April to 8th May, 328 bodies were 
counted. The Ngqika resolutely refused to surrender. But, deprived of 
food and chased continually, the Ngqika and their allies began leaving 
the forests in small parties. These were, however, attacked as they 
emerged from the bush, and a further 169 were killed in this way up to 
157 28th l1arch. Seyolo and Tini abandoned Sandile at this time, Seyolo 
joining Delima in the Fish River Bush, and Tini rerurning to his old 
haunts in the Schelmkloof. It was reported that the chiefs had 
quarreled over Sandile's leadership and that he had become capable of 
. 11' h' d k 158 any act10n at a oW1ng to 1S run eness. Tradition denies that 
this is true and has it that Sandi1e abandoned drink at the start of 
159 
of the rebellion and was a determined leader throughout the war. 
Nevertheless, it seems likely that as prisoners reported, the morale of 
156. C.2l44, Encl. No. 11: Spalding's Diary for Frere, 17 April '78. 
Theal, X, 128-9. 
157. Theal, X, 129. 
158. C.2l44, Encl. 1 No. 126: Thesiger to Sec. of State for War, 
26 June '78. 
The Cape Argus, 16 May '78, Telegrams. 
The Cape Argus, 2 Nov. '78, Evidence at the trial of Edmund and 
Bisset Sandile. 
159. Theal, X, 87 asserts that the war led to a 'complete change' in 
the character of Sandile - he became sober and determined. 
Informants generally bear out this view. 
" 
182 
DECEMBER 1877 TO JUNE 1878: THE XHOSA DIVIDED AND DEFEATED 
the rebels was low, and that they were suffering from a desperate 
shortage of food, so that Tini and Seyolo had reason enough to abandon 
the Perie, without taking into account any quarrel with Sandile. 
The Cape Argus continued to call for an amnesty, asserting that the 
war was dragging on unnecessarily and critising Thesiger's campaigns 
It said that the Imperial troops were slow and cumbrous and the 
colonial troops were no longer composed of patriots but of idlers and 
profiteers who benefitted from the continuation of the war. It drew 
attention to the open supplying even of munitions of Sandile from 
King William's Town and had hard words for the frontier shop keepers 
who were turning such a good profit from the war. 160 
But, on 29th May, Sandile was shot alongside his able marksman, 
Dukwana, by an Mfengu patrol and what little spirit was left amongst 
the rebels promptly deserted them. Even Theal refers to the last weeks 
of the campaign as a sordid period when the confused and leaderless 
rebels were rooted out and shot like jackals by colonists impatient 
to return to their homes. 161 Sandile had been on his way to join Gonya 
and Mathanzima who had again returned to the Thomas River. 162 The 
latter two, after trying to make terms with T. Liefeldt, their old 
magistrate, were captured hiding at Stokwe Ndlela's Kraal on 30th 
163 June. Tini Maqomo was taken prisoner in the Schelmkloof, where Oba's 
brother Kokwe and Tini's brother Ngaha wer~ ki1led. 164 Ndimba 
160. The Cape Argus, lead article, 16 May '78. 
161. Theal, X, 133. 
162. C.2220, Encl. No.3: Brownlee Memo., n.d. 
163. N.A. 158: Levey to S.N.A., 1 July '78. 
164. C.2144, Encl. 1 No. 77: Thesiger to Frere, 2 June '78. 
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165 
surrendered on 11th June at Komgha. Seyolo, the valiant old warrior 
whose blanket was reputed to be full of holes, was shot near the Fish 
166, 167 River ~n early June. Anta d~ed a natural death on 10th June. 
Only Delima and a few fragmentary forces remained to engage in desultory 
skirmishing, but he too surrendered on 30th July.168 
With the war so obviously at an end, there were renewed calls for 
an amnesty. Mr George Blaine M.L.A. for King William's Town, urged 
on 25th June that an amnesty be proclaimed, arguing that while he had 
lost more property and friends than almost all other Members of the 
Assembly, he felt that further prosecution of the war would be 
gratuitous and inhumane. He pointed out too, that there had been no 
wholesale massacres during the war as in previous wars, that almost all 
farmers were warned by their servants of impending danger, and that 
those left at the mercy of the rebels had almost without exception been 
169 left alone. Sprigg responded by proclaiming an amnesty on 30 June 
for all involved in the rebellion save prominent chiefs, headmen and 
'11 d '1 d' d 170. counc~ ors an any men ~nvo ve ~n mur er cases. 
165. C.2l44, Encl. 2 No. 99: Summary of Events by Capt. Spalding, 
12 June ' 78. 
166. C. 2144, Encl. 1 No. 110: Thesiger to Sec. of State for War, 
18 June ' 78. 
167. C .2144, Encl. 2 No. 99 : Summary of Events by Capt. Spalding, 
12 June ' 78. 
168. The Cape Argus, Summary for the Year 1878. 
169. Cory Library, PRo 1234: Question by Mr George Blaine, Sr., H.A' I to 
Colonial Secretary reo granting amnesty to native rebels, 25 June 
1878. 
170. Cory Library, MS. 14, 254/13: Burton, iv, Appendix IV. 
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8. The Aftermath 
Tini, Gungubele, Sitokhwe Tyhali and Mfanta were all tried for 
High Treason in July in accordance with the Ministzy's intention of 
making examples of the leaders, but a popular revulsion of feeling of 
the first two made it expedient for Sprigg to ask Frere to commute the 
d h 'd 171 eat sentences ~mpose • When therefore Sandili's four sons, 
Gonya, Mathanzima, Gumna and Mlindazwe, and Ndimba were tried on 
23 October before Sir J.D. Barry in King William's Town, they were only 
h d ' h hI' f d" 172 c arge w~t t e esser cr1me 0 se 1t10n. Mathanzima openly 
acknowledged his guilt, if, as he said, it was guilt to follow his 
father. d 1 'd 172 He was sentence to twenty years pena serv1tu e. Gonya 
claimed that he had joined his father to persuade him to surrender, 
but evidence was led that while pursuing a non-combatant role, he had 
increasingly taken over the reins of power as the d~moralised Sandile 
turned in desperation to drink. Consequently he was sentenced to penal 
servitude for life. Gumna received a lighter sentence of 15 years and 
Ndimba one of only 6 months because it seemed clear that he had been 
the victim of circumstance, had never personally been engaged in the 
military activities of the rebels and had done his best to protect the 
property and life of Macdonald, the Draaibosch hotel owner. Mlindazwe 
was discharged for lack of evidence. 
The official casualty figures give no real indication of the cost 
in human lives of the war. The blacks were reported as having lost 
171. See below, pp.202,212. 
172. Cape Argus, 29 Oct., 2 Nov. '78, Reports of Trials. 
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3680 killed and 45,336 cattle captured, while white casualties were put 
at 60 killed and those of their black allies, 137 killed. 174 Theal 
estimates that the official death toll of the blacks represents 
about half the total numbers of blacks actively involved in the war -
. ,175 
an exceptionally high proportlon. Mr G. Blaine calling for an 
amnesty on 25 June said that black losses were greater than the a 
176 
aggregate of the wars of 1835, 1846 and 1851, Certainly, if the 
number who died of wounds and starvation, including women and 
children be included, this must be true. The War of Ngcayecihi in 
terms o.f casual ties then, was far from the insignificant little war 
h 'h 'b 'd d 177 t atlt as sometlmes een conSl ere, 
174. C.2l44, Encl. 3 No. 110: Deputy Adjutant-General to Military 
Secretary, 21 June '78. 
175. Thea1, X, 133. 
176. Cory Library: PR 1234: Question by Mr George Blaine Sr., H.A. 
to Col. Sec. re granting amnesty to native rebels, 25 June '78. 
177. W. MacMillan, The Road to Self-Rule (London, 1959). p.135, 
quoted in C. Saunders: The Transkeian Rebellion of 1880-81", 
South African Historical Journal No.8, Nov. 1876. 
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It is convenient to consider the war in the North-East separately, 
not only because the area of operation was removed from the main theatre 
of the war, but also because the three separate cases of resistance to 
white rule illustrate almost all the facets of black-white relations on 
the frontier at the time. The rebellions of Gungubele and Tini Maqomo 
point to the deep insecurity of the blacks over land. In both cases, 
white pressure on their land, a basic rejection of colonial rule and 
white panic and hostility, drove peoples who were determined only to 
resist aggression, into open rebellion. The case of Sitokhwe Tyhali, the 
only chief living in Thembuland to go into rebellion in 1877-8, illustrates 
how the temperament of individual chiefs determined the response of 
chiefdoms and clans to colonial rule. 
1. Gungube1e and the Tshatshu 
Gungubele was the son of Maphasa, the Tshatshu Thembu Chief who had 
joined the Xhosa against the British in the 8th Frontier War. l As a 
result of the war (in which Maphasa was killed), Cathcart created the 
new district of Queenstown out of the confiscated Thembu lands. 2 The 
Thembu were relocated in the Glen Grey area, an area between the Swart 
and Wit Kei Rivers including the Staa1k1ip, Pauline, Gwatyu, Xelana and 
Madikana districts. 3 The swop of Transkeian lands for the Colonial 
1. F. Brownlee, Transkeian Historical Records, p.Z3. It is important 
when considering Gungube1e's case, to remember that the Tshatshu had a 
tradition of military co-operation with the Xhosa. " I", 
2. A.E. Du Toit, pp.70-74; F. Brownlee, Transkeian Historical Records, p.23. 
3. C.O. 1065: "Re Gungube1e and Tambookieland Rebellion", encl. in 
Acting Clerk to the Solicitor-General to Attorney-General, 15 
Aug. '78. 
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Location failed in 1865 when only some of the Colonial Thembu moved, 
despite Colonial assurances that colonial law would apply in the location 
whereas it would not across the Kei. 4 However, colonial rule of the 
location was extremely lax and for many years it was like other colonial 
5 black areas, neglected. 
When conflicting land claims arising out of the confusion of a 
haphazard land tenure policy induced the Government to appoint a Commission 
in 1870, it was found that the influx of blacks into the location had 
brought numbers back to their pre-1865 level. The Commission divided 
the location between the Wodehouse and Queenstown Districts with some 
European farms providing a buffer between the two parts. Land tenure 
policy was still not consistent, some farms being held on individual tenure, 
others on communal tenure under the Government headmen appointed by 
6 E. Judge, the Civil Commissioner at Queenstown. 
Because of the contiguity of the independent Emigrant Thembu and 
because of the poor quality of supervision, it was hard to persuade the 
colonial Thembu Chiefs that the Government could not legislate as it 
desired in the location. Gungubele told Judge that only he as the chief 
had the power to appoint headmen, and after 1870 Gungubele, his councillors 
and people opposed the authority of the headmen, even threatening and 
1 · h . 7 assau tlng t em on occaS1on. With the history of military co-operation 
4. See above, p. 
5. Griffiths,pp.36-44. 
6. c.o. 1065: "Re. Gungubele and Tarnbookieland Rebellion", encl. 1n 
Acting Clerk to the Solicitor-General to Attorney-General, 15 
Aug. '78. 
7. Ibid. 
'. 
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, b 8 d d' 'f ' 'h 1 '1 I h w~th the Rharha e an ~ssat~s act~on w~t co on~a ru e, t ere was, as 
Griffiths concludes, little doubt that any black unrest elsewhere would 
9 be reflected amongst the Tshatshu. It was not surprising, therefore, 
that Brownlee found the Colonial Thembu to be the most dissaffected 
people in his tour of the frontier during the 1876 war scare, and that he 
found the focal point of dissatisfaction to be the erosion of the power 
f h h ' f ' h' 10 o tee 1e ta~ns 1p. What was true of 1876 was even more so of 1877 
when the actions of Gungubele brought increased pressure on him and his 
people from the colonial authorities. 
In November 1876, Gungubele purchased one of the supervening farms 
named 'Mapassa's Poort' from a Mr W.C. Bouwer for the sum of £2,200. 11 
John Hemming, the Civil Commissioner and Resident Magistrate of Queenstown, 
and Mr R. Driver, the Superintendent of the Thembu Location tried to 
dissuade Gungubele, pointing out inter alia that the price of the farm 
was inflated and that he did not realise how large a sum £2,200 was and 
would, even with contributions from his several hundred followers, be 
unable to pay it. But Gungubele was determined, particularly as the 
farm was part of his father's former territory; and as the transaction 
was perfectly legal there was nothing, Hemming thought, that could be 
12 done. A down payment of £200 was made and the second instalment of 
£800 
full 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
became due on 1st January 1877. Gungubele was unable to pay the 
amount and so Bouwer applied in October for a provisional order of 
See above, p. 186, footnote 1. 
Griffiths, p.44. 
See above, pp.45,49. 
G.17-'78, p,188: Messrs. Bell and Shepstone to Hemming, 26 Nov. '77 • 
G.17-'78, P .188: Hemming to Merriman, 26 Nov. '77 . 
It is interesting to note that Oba also bought farms for inflated 
prices which he could not meet. See above, p.1 78, footnote 145. 
" 
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sequestration and a summons was issued on Gungube1e to show by 12 January 
1878 why the order should not be made final. 
£1200 fell due. 13 
Meanwhile the balance of 
Hemming was especially anxious that the sequestration should not 
go through, because Bouwer would receive as part settlement a farm in 
the Transkei, title to which Gungube1e held but had not taken up. This 
would create a precedent and possibly lead to future alienation of land 
from black owners. Bouwer, probably therefore under pressure from 
Hemming, offered to cancel the sale, keeping only the £500 already paid 
for his expenses and trouble, but Gungubele refused to accept,though 
pressed by Hemming, saying he could not understand why Bouwer should keep 
14 both the money and the farm. 
Unable to get assistance from his followers, Gungubele told them that 
the matter was now a Government one and he would be arrested for not paying. 
It is difficult to know whether he really believed this or whether it was 
an attempt to force his people to assist him, but his statement greatly 
excited his people and they said they would resist any attempt to arrest 
h . 15 1m. 
The evidence presented in the papers laid before Parliament in the 
1878 session, and that heard in the preliminary examination and trial of 
Gungubele in July 1878, is somewhat contradictory.16 The former gives 
the impression that Gungube1e, being keen to fight, actively sounded out 
Sandile and other surrounding chiefs, with a view to co-operating with 
13. G.17;'78, pp.188-9: Messrs.Bell and Shepstone to Hemming, 26 
Nov. '77. 
14. G.17-'78, p.189: Hemming to Merriman, 26 Nov. '77. 
15. Merriman Papers: 1877 file No. 112: Digest of evidence in the 
Gungubele Rebellion. 
16. The former published as an appendix, pp.188-202, of the Blue Book 
of Native Affairs G.17-'78, the latter various correspondence and 
memoranda in c.o. 1065. 
'. 
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them. The latter presents a picture of a Gungubele unwilling, or at 
least hesitant, to fight, being sounded out by Sarhili and Sandile and 
others and being coerced into a defiant posture by his councillors. 
Two opposing tendencies perhaps explain the discrepancy. The 
first is the propensity of Colonial officials to misunderstand the 
democratic nature of tribal societies, and so to assign more power to a 
chief than was his, consequently blaming him for the actions and decisions 
of a tribe. The second is the tendency of blacks to shield their chiefs 
from responsibility for calamaties that had occurred. 17 In retrospect 
it seems that Gungubele was caught up in a situation he could not control: 
hostile to British rule, entangled in the legal complexities of a system 
he did not understand and subject to pressures from his councillors, his 
people and surrounding chiefs, he was prepared to offer indirect resistance 
to colonial rule, but was not yet pr~pared for op,en rebellion when a 
colonial expedition sent against him forced him into that. 
On the outbreak of war, Tshatshu messengers to the Ngqika were told 
by Sandile that he did not intend to join Sarhili. Later, when Sandile 
changed his mind, Gungubele was told at a council meeting of the Tshatshu 
that if he continued to see Hemming and refused to fight the English he 
would be deposed. Mshweshwe, his cousin and the step-brother of 
Ngangelizwe, was reported to Anta as saying that Gungubele had agreed to 
fight with the Ngika. But the same Mshweshwe reported Gungubele's 
supposed intentions to Hemming. Gungubele got to hear of Mshweshwe's 
treachery through Dondashe, one of Hemming's interpreters, who added that 
Gungubele was to be arrested. The same rumour reached Sandile via his 
son Gonya (Edmund). clerk to the court at Middledrift but this time the 
18 intention of the whites to arrest Sandile and Anta was also rumoure.d. 
17. For a similar case see Soga, Ama-Xosa. p.114. Peires, in 
18. 
conversation with the author confirmed that this was a frequent occurence. 
C.2079, Encl. No. 53: 
John Hemming. 27 Jan. 
C.O.1065: Preliminary 
11 April '78. 
Statement of Hendrick "(alias Bamba) before 
, 78. 
examination of Hendrick (Bamba) before Semming. 
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Despite reassurances about Government intentions that Hemming sent 
to Gungubele through a missionary in whom he confided, Gungubele refused 
H ' ,19 to see emmlng agaln. Sandile and Mfanta, a brother of Ngangelizwe 
resident in the location and at feud with him,20 had both advised him 
against doing so. Mfanta was reported to be keen on war. At the end 
of November and beginning of December, dissatisfaction over the farm 
issue and suspicion of the intentions of the whites had progressed so 
far that the war cry was sounded on several occasions both at Gungubele's 
and Mfanta's kraals. Gungubele told Driver on 2nd December that the war 
cry had been sounded the previous night because some of his people had 
h d ld h d b b h ' 21 ear at Ty en t at a comman 0 was a out to e sent to arrest 1m. 
But the Tshatshu behaviour went farther than mere preparation for 
defence. In addition to military preparations, the Tshatshu now refused 
to pay any further taxes and violent depredations on neighbouring tribes 
22 
and on those Tshatshu against war began. 
Dwyer, writing to Sprigg after Gungubele's trial commented: 
It is quite clear from the evidence, even from 
the prosecution that the convitt Gungubele did 
all he could to avoid rebellion. 23 
While this is true to the extent that Gungubele's intentions were limited 
at this stage to defending his property against Government seizure,24 
19. Ibid. 
20. Theal, X, 90. 
21. G.17-'78, pp.196-8: Driver to Hemming , 3 and 4 Dec. '77. 
22. G.17-'78, p.190: Hemming toMerriman, S Dec. '78. 
G.17-'78, pp.199-202: Depositions before Hemming, variously dated. 
23. C.O.106S: Dwyer to Sprigg, 17 Aug. '78. 
24. C.l7-'78, p.197: DrivertoHemming, 5 Dec. '78. 
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Stanford asserts that stock and grain stolen from Mfengu, surrounding 
tribesmen and 'loyal' Tshatshu were placed in charge of headmen at 
Gwatyu by Gungubele's orders, indicating Gungubele's complicity, if not 
direction, of the thefts. 25 
Hemming who shared Stanford's opinion that Gungubele was at the root 
of all the trouble in the area, wrote to Merriman on 5th December, 
26 
recommending that Gungubele 'be brought to account'. He thus rejected 
Driver's eminently sensible suggestion that the farm issue be settled by 
the Government buying the farm for Gungubele in return for the Transkei 
farm. Then, having removed one of the major causes for fighting, 
27 Gungubele and his headmen could have been punished for raising the war cry. 
On 11th December Hemming went to Bolotwa to hold his monthly court 
and to obtain information on the state of the location. He had warned 
Gungubele especially to attend, but he did not appear and Hemming had to 
go and find him. Having had no reply from Merriman, Hemming took matters 
into his own hands by issuing Gungubele with an ultimatum, saying that 
he must apprehend those responsible for the several crimes committed 
recently or himself be held responsible. 28 On his return, Merriman 
telegraphed him warning him that before Gungubele could be 'brought to 
account' there would have to be some specific charge which might justify 
a warrant for arrest and which would stand up in court. He reminded 
him in this connection of Nehemiah Mshweshwe's case. 29 
25. G.17-'78, p.193: Hemming to Merriman, 5 Dec. '77 • 
26. Ibid. 
27. G.17-'78, p.197: Driver toHemming, 5 Dec. '78. 
28. G.17-'78, p.194: Hemming to Merriman, 14 Dec. '77 • 
29. Merriman Papers, 1877 file No. 102: Merriman toHemming, tel., 
17 Dec. '77 • 
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Gungubele's progress was intimately connected with black responses elsewhere 
to the war situation. When Sandile heard of Hemming's threat, he was 
reported to be very angry and to have told Gungubele 'to catch' Hemming. 
He told Gungubele that he, Anta, Sitokhwe Ndlela, Sitokhwe Tyhali, Mfanta 
and a 'whole stripe' of chiefs were going to fight. Mfanta sent a 
similar message detailing further participants - Morosi the Basotho Chief, 
Dalasile and Adam Kok (he must have meant the Griquas since Kok had died 
in 1875). Sarhili would assist them, while Anta would act as a decoy 
'to blind' Thomas Liefe1dt his magistrate. 30 However, Sarhili is 
reported to have told Gungubele, like Sandile not to break out yet, but 
to first help him with the Mfengu. On the receipt of these messages, a 
Tshatshu Council was held and it was decided to fight. At this meeting 
Gungubele said he had no aggressive intentions against the whites, but 
31 
was determined to resist any aggression by them., 
Gungubele had already decided to deal with Mshweshwe in which 
decision Mfanta supported him,32 but it appears that the Tshatshu young 
blood jumped the gun, because an attempt to seize Mshweshwe failed and 
33 Gungubele angrily exclaimed that he was not yet ready for war. 
30. C.2079, Encl. No. 53: Statement of Hendrick (alias Bamba) before 
Hemming, 27 Jan. '77. 
C.O. 1065: Preliminary examination of Hendrick (Bamba) before 
Hemming 11 April '78. 
31. Ibid. 
32. C.O. 1065: Evidence of Herman Kube, 20 April '77. 
The very bitter feeling which existed against Mshweshwe is celebrated 
in D.L.P. Yali-Manisi' s poem "Indabi'Lasegwatyu" in a collection by 
the author entitled Inguqu, published by Khundulu Methodist School 
Bolotwa, 1954. I am indebted to Prof. J. Opland for drawing my 
attention to this poem and for giving me a rough translation of it. 
331• C.O. 1065: Preliminary examination before Hemming of Hendrick (Bamba) 
11 April '77. 
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Nevertheless, marauding continued; a body of Ngqika joined the Tshatshu 
in early January and were involved in an attempt to break through into 
Emigrant Thembuland, but were driven back by Ndarhala, abandoned trading 
stores were looted and the arming, drilling and doctoring of men continued. 34 
In one of the most telling remarks made by any black participant in the 
war, Mfanta is reported as saying that he urged the burning of a shop 
at the Bolotwa 
because it was the way of the Englishmen 
to establish one shop. Then another followed, 
and presently there was a town like Queenstown. 34a 
On 11th January, Hemming reported the increasing lawlessness of the 
Tshatshu and said that although Gungubele was not directly implicated, 
he was convinced of his indirect implication. He therefore suggested 
that special constables be sworn in, armed and sent to arrest the 
criminals. He added: 'I am quite confident they will meet with armed 
resistance, and be fired upon' and recommended therefore that a large 
force be sent so that Gungubele could be driven against Frost's force, 
where they could be disarmed. 35 Merriman agreed with Hemming that 
Gungubele was trying to raise a rebellion with neighbouring tribes against 
the Government, and so he agreed with Hemming's plan, and issued him 
with instructions on 14th January. He told Hemming to treat Gungubele 
as a British subject who had either committed acts of violence or incited 
others to do so, and to therefore take out warrants for specific charges, 
34. Ibid; also Merriman Collection, 1878 file No. 158: Levey to 
Hemming, 20 Jan. '78. 
34a. C.2079, Encl. No. 53: Statement of Hendrick (alias Bamba) before 
Hemming, 27 Jan. '78. 
35. G.17-'78, p.l95: Hemming toMerriman, 11 Jan. '78. 
'. 
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and to serve these or attempt to serve them. He warned Hemming to hold 
his men back and not to provoke violence, but authorised him to use force 
if resisted. In the event of resistance he was to disarm the 
Tshatshu. In any event, he was to occupy the area with his police 
d " h d" b 36 urlng t e current lstur ances. 
These instructions may be criticised on several grounds, as they 
37 
were indeed by Frere. Merriman did have a difficult decision: if he 
stayed his hand, the colony would be caught on the wrong foot in the event 
of an outbreak; on the other hand, the expedition was tantamount to a 
declaration of war by the colonists on fellow subjects on somewhat shaky 
legal grounds, and was sure to spread the Civil War. Brownlee, whose 
part in the whole affair remains obscure, had clearly warned in November, 
that while they would not commit aggression, they would certainly resist 
"t 38 1 • Considering the imminent opening of a major ,campaign against 
the Ngqika to the South, complicated by a~ispute with the Imperial 
troops, such an extension of the war was highly inexpedient. But 
Merriman had not even taken adequate precautions to ensure that the 
expedition would be able to deal with the explosion it was sure to 
unleash. He had approved Hemming's accompanying the expedition in his 
civil capacity, but left the appointment, or rather delegation of the 
military command, to Hemming. Further, apart from instructing Hemming 
to 'on no account take an insufficient force', he left the composition 
f h f "1 H" " h "1" "39 o t at orce entlre y up to emmlng, a man Wlt out ml ltary experlence. 
Hemming gathered about 400 volunteers and Burghers and marched to the 
36. G.G.R. 46: Merriman to Hemming, 14 Jan. '78. 
37. Merriman Papers, 1878 file No.9: Frere Minute for Ministers, 
28 Jan. '78. 
38. Merriman Papers, 1877 file No. 85: Frere to Merriman, 24 Nov. '77. 
39. G.G.R. 46: Merriman to Hemming, 14 Jan. '78. 
t , 
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Bolotwa River. There he was joined by about 250 native levies. 40 He 
gave overall command of the expedition to Jeremiah Thomas, the magistrate 
at Gatberg, by virtue of his military experience. Early on the 
morning of 24th January, the force marched to the Gwatyu. The 
surrounding heights were manned by armed blacks, and as Hemming's force 
unsaddled they were fired upon. 4l Battle was immediately joined. In 
the two hours of severe fighting, the Tshatshu lost 150 dead. Mshweshwe 
who had acted as a guide for the whites was found dead with 32 assegai 
42 
wounds. Hemming learnt that amongst the blacks who fought, there 
were 300-400 Ngqika who fled into Anta's location after the fight. 43 He 
concluded his report by saying: "It was quite impossible to restrain 
the Native Contingents from burning a few huts and capturing a little 
stock.,,44 No wonder he was certain the rebellion was spreading! 
Rather belatedly, Merriman now admitted the necessity of a firm and 
experienced command, and so ordered Griffith up to the Thembu Location, 
instructing him to 'crush all disaffection', and to arrest the leaders 
45 thereof. 
Griffith arrived on 28th to hear that Mfanta had joined the rebellion 
46 by sweeping off 50 horses from Hemming's camp earlier that day. Hemming 
told him that Khiva was said to have joined Gungubele between the Swart 
40. G.17-'78, p.196: Hemming to Merriman, 22 Jan. '78. 
41. C.2079, Sub.Encl. 5 No. 46: Hemming to Merriman, 24 Jan. '78. 
42. Cory Library, MS 14,598 (16): Burton Notebook no. 16, p.ll. 
43. C.2079, Sub Encl. 16 No. 46: Hemming to Merriman, tel., 27 Jan. '78. 
Bamba confirms that these were Anta's people. 
44. C.2079, Sub Encl. 5 No. 46: Hemming to Merriman, 25 Jan. '78. 
45. G.G.R. 46: Copy Merriman to Griffith, 29 Jan. '78. 
46. A.54-'78, pp.48-9: Griffith to Merriman, teL, 29 Jan. '78. 
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and the Wit Kei with about 800 men. Gungubele had 600 men while 300 
of Anta's men were reported to be there as well as Mfanta's 300 men, 
making 2000 in all. 47 
Colonel Charles Warren, riding down frim Kimberley with the Diamond 
Field Horse, gave a vivid picture of the atmosphere in the area before 
the final dispersal of the blacks (as well as a clue to the identity of 
the two chiefs Mfanta plaintively complained had deserted him in his 
hour of need): 
Tambookies between this and Dordrecht in a very 
disturbed state, and likely to rise at any moment 
if opportunity offers. Kaffir scouts have watched 
our progress from Bethulie, and signal fires have 
heralded our progress ••• Tambookies desired to 
intercept our progress and mounted men watched 
our camp last night... Baragwanath reports 
Umfanta's people armed and in possession of Bengu 
heights. Women, children and cattle trekking 
across border. Burghers in Dordrecht district 
called out. Fingoes fled from Xalanga. 
Little doubt about intention of Stokwe or 
I . 48 Gece 0 to rlse. 
The first three days of February saw severe fighting in the Thembu 
Location, but on 4th, the 2000 Colonial troops Griffith had mustered, 
completed the dispersal of the black forces at great cost to them. 49 
Gruber has calculated that the cost in black lives of the fighting in 
the area over five days was greater than in five months of fighting 
in Gcalekaland. 50 
47. 
48. 
49. 
50. 
A.54-'78, p.S3: 
A.54-'78: Warren 
4 Feb. '78). 
A.54-'78, pp.48-9: 
Gruber, p.305. 
Hemming to Merriman, tel., 29 Jan. '78. 
Assistant Adjutant-General, tel., n.d. (c. 
Griffith to Merriman, tel., 29 Jan. '78. 
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After the final battle, the Tshatshu were completely broken Up, 
some seeking refuge with Anta, some with Mfanta51 who fled through 
Emigrant Thembuland to join the rebellious Sitokhwe Tyhali. Gungubele 
made his way with others to the Thomas River area, where he joined the 
Ngqika who had returned there after the battle of Kentani. 52 
The battle had a decisive effect on the rest of the neighbouring 
Thembu of Emigrant Thembuland and the Engcobo district. 
2. The Thembu and Sitokhwe Tyhali 
In November Levey had reported that, as in 1876, there was 
considerable dissatisfaction over the erosion of the independence of 
53 the Emigrant Thembu. The feelings of Dalasile towards both Ngangelizwe 
and British rule were well known, and Sitokhwe Tyhali, the turbulent 
Vundhle chief was known by the Thembu as igeza (madman) for his open 
d f ' f 11 h' 54 e lance 0 a aut orlty. 
As the Gungubele affair came to a climax, Stanford reported to 
Brownlee: 
Matters are not going well in Emigrant Thembuland. 
The location beyond Stokwe Ndlela has declared 
for war, Gecelo cannot be trusted ••• Ndlela's 
cattle are already coming this way - it is likely 
Dalasile will receive them. Stokwe Tyali is 
ready to join the war party any moment. Dalasile 
cannot be trusted and the cattle belonging to 
disaffected tribes are working towards the 
, , h f d' , 55 mountalns ln t e upper part 0 my lstrlct. 
51. G.G.R. 4: Commandant J. Thomas to Griffith, 10 Feb. '78. 
52. G.G.R.4: Inspector JamesSurmonto Griffith, 20 Feb. '78. 
53. Merriman Papers, 1877 file, No. 85: Frere to Merriman, 24 Nov~'77. 
54. Macquarrie, i, 57. 
55. N.A. 44: Stanford to S.N.A., n.d. (clearly January). 
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Indeed as has been seen, there had been continuing consultation between 
the chiefdoms of the North-East, particularly the Thembu and Thembu 
affiliated ones, and Sandile and Mfanta expected Sitokhwe Tyhali, 
56 Dalasile, Sitokhwe Ndlela and possibly even Gecelo to join any revolt. 
But when intra-tribal jealousies and differing responses to 
colonial pressures had prevented unity of action amongst the relatively 
stable and disciplined Gcaleka where tradition still flourished, it 
was highly unlikely that the fragmented Thembu groupings would be able 
to effect any unity of action. Levey's Emigrant Thembu Society for 
the Promotion of Civilization had already in its short life span been 
responsible for the emergence of a strong class of peasant agriculturalists 
h f d b 'l' 57 w 0 avoure sta ~ ~ty. Then each of the four Emigrant Thembu chiefs 
had come across the Kei in 1865 so that he might exercise individual 
independence. Levey was able in the crisis of 1877 to foster jealousies 
between the four chiefs, and between each of those and ambitious relatives 
d ' 1 58 an r~va s. The lesson of what might happen had been clearly 
demonstrated with Sitokhwe Ndlela. This man, the most hostile of the 
Emigrant Thembu to colonial rule, had been involved in a continuing 
clash with Brownlee and in January 1877 Brownlee gave half of his location 
to Sitokhwe's brother for Sitokhwe's continuing 1awlessness. 59 
Thus when the Tshatshu became involved in a struggle with colonial 
troops, individual interests weighed stronger than the still relatively 
light burden of colonial rule. Ndarhala had already openly manifested 
his opposition to any rebellion or resistance, for which he was attacked by 
56. See above, p. 193. 
57. N.A. 158: Levey to S.N.A., 24 May '78. Levey refers to the considerable 
progress made in the short life of the Society both here and in his 
annual report to Brownlee, G.12~'77, pp.lOO-106. 
58. The Cape Argus, lead article, 6 July '78. 
59. N.A. 158: Levey to S.N.A., 1 July '78. 
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the Tshatshu and the Ngqika on several occasions. 60 Mathanzima, the 
most powerful of the Emigrant Thembu chiefs, warned Gungubele to submit 
to the Government over the issue of his farm and refused to safeguard 
his cattle for him. 6l Gecelo, who had reported gun-running activities 
62 from Queenstown in November, but whose people had been disturbed by 
the events in the Colonial Thembu Location, evidently came to the same 
conclusion after seeing the swift and brutal suppression of the 
Tshatshu revolt. Dalasile, while giving refuge to the rebel's cattle, 
decided that the scale was weighted too heavily in the whites' favour. 63 
It seems that Sitokhwe Tyhali might never have been attacked by the 
whites had he not fired on a patrol sent out by Stanford. The crushing 
of the Colonial Thembu Revolt had given pause to his warlike activity and 
while his people began to disperse in small parties, he reported the 
presence of Mfanta to Ngangelizwe. But Stanford ,thought this a ruse 
d h f ' , h 1 h f' d h' .. 64 an t e ~r~ng on t e patro must ave con ~rme 1S op~n~on., Thus 
when Sitokhwe refused to give himself up to the colonial authorities 
Sprigg and Ayliff concluded that the time had come to 'call him to 
65 
account' • 
60. G.G.R. 4: Levey to Sprigg: 6 March '78. 
Merriman Papers, 1878 file, No. 157: Levey to Hemming, 
20 Jan. '78. 
61. G.17-'7a, p.197: Driver to Hemming: 5 Dec. '77. 
62. G.G.R. 13: Merriman to various, draft tels., 5 Nov. '77. 
63. He had paid the fine of 200 cattle imposed on him for not 
contributing to the Thembu Levy raised in September and, with ill 
grace, had sent some men to the one raised in December. 
N.A. 43: Stanford to S.N.A., 6 Dec. '77. 
N.A. 44: Stanford to S.N.A., n.d. (early Jan.). 
64. N.A. 44: Stanford to S.N.A., 6 March '78. 
65. 
Sitokhwe had refused to serve in or contribute to either of the 
Thembu Levies and had threatened whites in his area, forcing 
them to leave. 
N.A. 43: w. Cumming to 'Stanford, 13 Dec. '77. 
N.A. 44: Minute by Sprigg, 19 March, '78. 
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Elliot was instructed to assemble a force, and on 23rd March he 
advanced with three thousand burghers, volunteers and native levies 
(chiefly Thembu). By the advice of Thomas, the Magistrate at Gatberg, 
he was able to corner Sitokhwe and his 4-500 followers against the mountain 
side at Maxongo's Hoek. Hidden in the dense undergrowth Sitokhwe was 
able to keep Elliot's force at bay until night, when he fled over the 
mountain, having lost 60 men, 1200 cattle and 2500 sheep and goats to 
only 4 colonial dead. 66 
Elliot's expedition decisively ended all resistance in the North-East. 
Gungubele was captured at the end of March, and brought a prisoner to 
67 Queenstown. Mfanta was captured two weeks later, and Sitokhwe was 
captured on 13th April by Mhlontlo who handed him over to Thomas. 68 
It seemed therefore that when the Emigrant Thembu Society for the Promotion of 
Civilisation met on 24th May and had a successful meeting, that normality 
69 had returned to the area. But the Emigrant Thembu grievances remained. 
Sitokhwe Nd1ela did not attend this meeting,70 and in fact Gonya and 
Hathanzima (Sandile' s sons) were found sheltering at his kraal on 30th 
June after the final collapse of the Ngqika. Mathanzima,it seems, although 
h dh ' 'd' h' 71 e reporte t e~r presence, tr1e to g1ve t em t1me to escape. 
Gungubele was tried on charges of High Treason in King William's Town 
on 24th July 1878 by Justice Dwyer. Sprigg's Ministry had indicated by 
not extending the amnesty to leaders of the colonial blacks who had 
66. C.2220 Encl. 1 No. 11: Elliot to S.N.A., 29 March '78 and annexures. 
67. Theal, X, 128. 
68. The Cape Argus, 18 April '78, Telegraphic News. 
69. N.A. 158: Levey to S.N.A., 24 May '78. 
70. Ibid. 
71. N.A. 158: Levey to S.N.A., 1 July '78. 
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72 
revolted, that they wished to make examples of them. The trials that 
followed were conducted rather hastily on the state's part, and without 
too close a reg?rd for legal niceties. In one particular case, a 15 year 
old boy from Lovedale who had joined the rebels, was tried and convicted of 
murder: he was no more guilty than hundreds of Ngqika who surrendered 
after the amnesty and who were not punished or others who had been 
sentenced by the special courts under Martial Law to a period of hard 
labour. 73 
Against this background Dwyer, although he was compelled to sentence 
Gungubele to death because he was technically guilty of the charge, felt 
obliged to recommend that his sentence should be commuted. Writing to 
Sprigg, he gave both particular and general reasons for his recommendation. 
Firstly, the civil proceedings instituted against him had acted as a 
provocation to resist: secondly, on the evidence before the Court 
Gungubele was in the hands of his councillors who had been the ones to 
promote rebellion while he resisted it; thirdly, to execute him would 
be to create a martyr; fourthly, a life sentence was regarded as a heavier 
punishment than execution by the blacks and three of the jurors had 
entered a plea for mercy; and lastly the victory of Government was 
complete and there had been enough slaughter without further bloodletting. 74 
Upington, the Attorney-General, took a strictly legalistic approach and 
°d h ld f 0 75 b S . , 0 0 sa1 e cou see no reason or commutat10n, ut pr1gg s M1n1stry was 
taken by surprise by the change of feeling in favour of Gungubele that 
took place. Petitions for clemency flowed in, not only from the 
72. C.O. 1065: Frere memo. on Dwyer's trial notes, 10 Aug. '78. 
73. C.O. 1065: voluminous correspondence re case of Myassi. 
The Cape Argus, 6 Aug. '78. 
74. C.O. 1065: Dwyer to Sprigg, 17 Aug. '78. 
75. C.O. 1065: Minute by Upington in case of Regina v. T. Macomo, 
9 Aug. '78. 
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Aborigine's Protection Society76 and Church Institutions, but from those 
very townspeople who had been baying for Gungubele's blood earlier in the 
77 year. Consequently Sprigg found it expedient to ask Frere, who was 
sympathetic to Dwyer's arguments and disturbed by the casual and hasty 
conduct of the trials,78 to commute Gungubele's sentence to life 
imprisonment. This Frere duly did. 79 Gungubele in fact served only 
ten years, being released by Sprigg in an amnesty for all prisoners from 
the war in· 1888. 
3. Tini Maqomo 
The case of Tini Maqomo is remarkably similar to that of Gungube1e. 
The major difference is that the local officials who urged action against 
Tini and so drove him into revolt were motivated by a conviction that for 
the good of the district, Tini should be driven from his lands and 
replaced by Europeans. 
Tini, the son of the renowned Ngqika warrior Maqomo, bought two farms 
in the Fort Beaufort area in the early 1870's and settled there with his 
followers. Subsequently some of these became tenant farmers in the 
B f D ' • 80 Fort eau ort 1str1ct. As elsewhere OL the frontier, overcrowding 
soon brought its attendant problems, overstocking and overgrazing, and 
81 
stock was stolen from neighbouring whites to pay rents. In 1876 
and 1877 these problems were exacerbated by the drought and the war 
76. C.2220, No. 36: 
4 Sept. '78. 
Aborigines Protection Society to Hicks-Beach, 
77. C.O. 1065: Encls. in Hemming to Sprigg, 9 Aug. '78. 
78. C.O. 1065: Frere memorandum on Dwyer's trial notes, 10 Aug. '78. 
79. The Cape Argus, lead article, 9 Sept. '78. 
80. Thea1, X, 27. 
81. A.S2-'78, p.lO: W.B. Chalmers to Col. Sec., 18 Feb. '78. 
G.17-'78, p.SO: Holland to S.N.A., 29 Jan. '77. 
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situation. Blacks and whites became mutually suspicious andoiten 
mutually hostile. 82 
In December 1877, the return of the Gcaleka and Khiva's mission 
focussed the spotlight of colonial fears on Sandile and the other Rharhabe 
chiefs. Maqomo's exploits in the Waterkloof were remembered and it was 
83 
noted with apprehension that Tini could muster 1000 warriors in the area. 
The districts of Stockenstrom and Fort Beaufort, as has been noted, 
became particularly infected with colonial panic. 84 On 2nd December 
Adelaide farmers reported that Tini intended to join Sandile85 and on 
6th Tini was reported to have attended a meeting at Oba's place where 
86 Kama and Edmund Sandile were also present. But Tini was equally 
suspicious of the whites. He heard that he was to be sent to Robben 
Island, which naturally had a particular dread for him since his father 
had died there in 1873, and he enquired of a Rev. van Rooy, a local 
missionary, whether this was true, and also what volunteers were doing 
near his farm. Van Rooy reassured Tini,87 but the use of Mfengu in 
the newly appointed stock police militated against Tini's attempts at 
that time to co-operate in suppressing theft. W.B. Chalmers was to 
admit later: 
There is no doubt that the employment of Fingoes 
against the Kafirs is most irritating to the 
82. As with Oba, panic stricken whites, and those who wanted to 
precipitate a confict, played a major role. A.24-'78, p.24 
Merriman Memo. for Frere, 8 Dec. '77. 
83. Theal, X, 119. 
84. See above, P.142. 
85. A.52-'78, p.l: Nightingale to Holland, 4 Dec. '77. 
86. G.G.R. I: Private L.M. Combes to Inspector Bailie, 8 Dec. '77. 
87. A.52-'78, p.2: Holland to Merriman, 10 Dec. '78. 
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Kafirs and that a great deal of mischief is thus 
created where mischief would not otherwise arise. 88 
Soon Tini and his people were reflecting the rise in tensions in 
the Ngqika location. When Tini went to give evidence in a case of 
theft at Fort Beaufort, he was accompanied by 200 armed retainers. 
The Fort Beaufort Advertiser thought Tini's attitude 'insolent' but it seems 
far more likely that it was one of apprehension. 89 Tini was reported 
to have told a meeting which he held just after this that he did not 
, . d f k d d 'd ,,90 des1re war, but was afra1 0 attac an was eterm1ne to res1st 1t. 
White actions must have seemed hostile to him: during December, there 
had been an exodus of whites and by the beginning of January several 
districts were entirely without whites,including Blinkwater. Most of 
the whites had gone to the towns or the Free State, but some were 
91 leagered, and the area around Tini's farm was patrolled by armed white 
92 
volunteers. A memorandum drawn up by Merriman for Frere bears 
witness to the state of the Fort Beaufort District: Holland, the 
Magistrate, was new and so his opinion carried little weight, while 
Blakeway, the Inspector of Divisional Police was not popular with the 
farmers; the town was split into antagonistic cliques, particularly 
susceptible to panic and to a belief that the Ministry were doing 
nothing to safeguard their interests. Merriman recommended that a 
88. A.52-'78, p.9: W.B. Chalmers to Sprigg, 18 Feb. '78. 
89. Fort Beaufort Advocate, 28 Dec. '77, quoted in A.52-'78, p.2. 
90. Fort Beaufort Advocate, 4 Jan. '77, quoted in A.52-'78, p.3. 
91. G.G.R. 3: T. Atmore to P.B. Borcherds, 7 Jan. '78. 
92. G.G.R. 3: Report of a ~atrol of Beaufort Rangers on Friday, 
11 January, by Lt. J. Richards. 
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well-known officer be appointed to restore confidence, but it apears 
that nothing was done for over four critical weeks. 93 
Tini responsed to the pressures on him, that now included a serious 
h f . d k h £. d 94 s ortage of ood, by arm1ng, an stoc t e t 1ncrease • On the side 
of the whites, Holland was anonymously informed that Tini was concentrating 
his men in the Waterkloof to seize cattle or attack Fort Beaufort. 95 
Faced by a situation that threatened to get out of control, Holland 
recommended on 9th January that Tini and his followers ought to be 
disarmed, even if this meant bloodshed as he expected it would, and 
that the Mfengu in the area should be armed. 96 Fortunately, Merriman 
seems to have had the sense not to launch yet another campaign by 
acceding to these requests. 
On 2nd February though, it was decided that the unabated theft of 
stock necessitated the stationing of some of Blakew&y's police on the 
farm next to Tini's. Most of these were Mfengu. This was too much 
for Tini: he told the commander of the troop, Inspector Booth, whom he 
met when the latter was on the way to his post, that he, Tini, was the 
Government of the area, and that he would not give up his cattle. 
Booth, testifying later, admitted that Tini appeared drunk at the time. 
Later that evening, Tini arrived with about 100 armed followers at the 
farmhouse where Booth was stationed. He ordered the police to leave, 
93. G.G.R. 3: Merriman Memorandum for Frere, 4 Jan. '78. 
94. Fort Beaufort Advocate, 11 Jan. '77, quoted in A.52-'78, p.3. 
denied that there was a shortage of food, but the evidence seems 
overwhelming that the whole Ciskei was suffering from the 
drought in 1878. 
95. G.G.R. 2: Holland to Merriman, 9 Jan. '78. The informant remained 
anonymous, Holland commented, because the exposure of a white 
rumour monger by Nightingale in Alice the previous week had caused 
a stir on the frontier. 
96. Ibid. '. 
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threatening to kill them if they did not. 97 Holland, on hearing of the 
incident, telegraphed Merriman for instructions, but Merriman, more 
cautious after the Gungubele affair, told him to take out a warrant for 
Tini's arrest, but to defer serving it for a few days, and to be very 
f 1 f d · b 98 care u not to create a new area 0 1stur ance. Sprigg followed 
suit by telegraphing Holland immediately on assuming office, on no 
account to serve the warrant (or that which had been taken out against 
Tini's brother, Ngaka.)99 At the same time, Sprigg appointed W.H. 
Chalmers, the Ngqika Special Commissioner, to act again as a Special 
100 Commissioner in investigating the situation in the Fort Beaufort area. 
Tini apologised profusely to Chalmers for the incident, saying he 
only asked on whose authority the police had been sent there, since he 
had not been consulted. 101 
But in the meantime, the existence of the warrants became known, and 
Tini reacted by moving around under armed guard, while blacks flocked 
from Adelaide to help him resist any attempt to arrest him. Tini and 
his followers began to sleep in the fastnesses of the Schelmkloof rather 
102 than in their kraals. As excitement grew, so did lawlessness. 
The police were constantly hindered in their work. On 16th February 
97. A.52-'78, 
A.52-'78, 
A.52-' 78, 
Police, 4 
p.5: 
p.25: 
p.6: 
Feb. 
Holland to Merriman, 3 Feb. '78. 
Booth to Holland, 3 Feb. '78. 
Deposition of H. Nel, sergeant in 
'78. . 
98. A.52-'78, p.5: Merriman to Holland, n.d. 
99. A.52-'78, p.8: Sprigg to Holland, n.d. 
100. A.52-'78, p.29: Holland to Sprigg, 27 March '78. 
Blakeway's 
101. A.52-'78, p.8: Holland to Sprigg, n.d. (between 8th and 18th Feb.) 
102. A.52-'78, p.9: W.B. Chalmers to Sprigg, 18 Feb. '78. 
'. 
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police tracing a spoor to Tini's farm were surrounded and told that the 
next policeman to set foot on the farm would be ki11ed. 103 A previous 
attempt to execute a writ for debt had caused a near riot. 104 Increasingly 
Tini openly repudiated Government authority and began to punish the 
thieves who brought pressure on his people from the whites, by fining 
105 them cattle and guns. Tini's attitude is summed up in the report of 
a speech he is said to have made to his people: 
He did not recognise Government. He said he 
had been long living in the mountains; that the 
white people would not let him rest; they had 
been hunting for him and he was tired of the bush. l06 
Chalmer's conclusion is crucial: he told Sprigg, after recommending 
Tini's apprehension and punishment even if this meant bloodshed, that 
whatever happened, the black owned farms in the area ought to be 
purchased and sold to Europeans. It had been a mistake to allow the 
Ngqika back into the Waterkloof. l07 Reiterating this theme constantly 
in his reports over the next few weeks, Chalmers found an ally in Holland, 
who was to write: 
Whatever interested parties may say to the 
contrary, I feel convinced that this movement 
[the expedition against TiniJ has been a 
splendid thing for the country generally, and 
103. A.52-'78, p.12: Evidence of "Margan" before Holland, 18 Feb. '78. 
104. A.52-'78, p.14: Statement of Thomas Clarke, Chief Constable of 
Fort Beaufort. 
105. c.o. 1065: Preliminary examination of Tini Maqomo before Holland, 
31 May' 78. 
A.52-'78, pp.23-4: Depositions of various witnesses. 
106. A.52-'78, p.26: Statement of Kandi1li, one of Blakeway's Police, 
3 Feb. '78. 
107. A.52-'78, p.9: W.B. Chalmers to Sprigg, 9 Feb. '78. 
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will be the saving of the district if the 
country is permanently occupied by a number 
lOB 
of Europeans. 
Sprigg agreed with Chalmers on the basis of his report that it was 
necessary to suppress the lawlessness and 'rebellion of Tini' immediately -
he would either have to surrender completely and be disarmed or else he 
would have to be forced to do so. Consequently Sprigg sent to 
Cunynghame to have a Colonel Palmer appointed to command all the forces 
. h 109 ~n t e area. On 20th February, a warrant for Tini's arrest on the 
110 grounds of sedition was drawn up. But Chalmers realised, perhaps 
after the Gungube1e affair, that it would be impossible to serve the 
warrant without sacrificing the lives of the servers. He therefore 
planned to surround the Blinkwater, Sche1mkloof and Waterk100f with a 
111 force sufficient to quell any resistance at one fell swoop. This 
was an impossible undertaking - the radius of a circle encompassing the 
area was B miles and the terrain ideally suited to guerrilla warfare. 112 
Tini got early warning of the plan when one of the tenant farmers asked 
for his rents early, explaining to the blacks that he was doing this 
113 because they would be attacked next week. Consequently when Chalmers 
surrounded Tini's kraal on'the morning of the 4th March with a force of 
lOB. A.52-'7B, p.30: Holland to Sprigg, 22 March '7B. 
109. G.H. 21/5: Sprigg toCunynghame, Copy, 19 Feb. '7B. 
110. A.52-'78, pp.13-l4: Varrants signed by Holland. 
111. A.52-'78, p.26: Chalmers to Sprigg, tel., 23 Feb. '78. 
112. See map, opp. p. 2<12.. 
113. A.52-'78, p.13: C.P. Owen, before J. Sweetnam, J.P., 2 March '7B. 
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114 1700 men, Tini had already fled to the Waterkloof. Here Tini 
steadfastly refused Chalmer's offers of a safe passport out of the area 
for his men and his stock if he surrendered. lIS But it was small wonder 
that Chalmer's offers were spurned. Although no formal decision seems 
to have been taken on the future of Ngqika occupation of the area, his 
messages informed Tini and his people that 
On account of the great trouble which the 
Kaffirs in Schelmkloof and Waterkloof have 
given for a long time past, the Government is 
determined that these fastnesses shall no longer 
be occupied by Kaffirs. 116 
Surrender on such terms would have involved not only material loss, but a 
loss of dignity too. 
There followed the ludicrous spectacle of a f~ll scale campaign 
involving several thousand Government troops and including the intensive 
bombardment of kloofs, to induce Tini and his few hundred followers who 
had committed no overt act of rebellion, to surrender. III The campaign 
might well have persuaded blacks in the surrounding areas to hand in 
their 118 but the forces were unable to catch Tini, who fled to arms, 
114. A.52-'78, p.29: Holland to Sprigg, 27 March '78. 
115. A.52-'78, pp.4l-9: Chalmers to Sprigg, 2 April ' 78. 
116. A.S2-'78, p.S4: Chalmers to Sprigg, 2 April '78, Appendix B. 
117. The various reports in A.52-'78 give a picture of a futile 
campaign in which needlessly harsh treatment was handed out to 
innocent blacks in pursuit of Tini's few hundred followers. 
the 
The Cape Argus, 18 July '78 says only 300 men followed Tini into 
rebellion. 
118. A.52-'78, p.Sl: Chalmers to Sprigg, 2 April '78. 
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Perie bush, where he reappeared in April with Seyolo in the Intaba 
kaNdoda area. Further the campaign brought to light some notorious 
cases of excessive zeal on the part of colonial troops. There had been 
no declared rebellion, nor any formal declaration of war, nor was any 
warning given as in the case of the Ngqika so that those who did not 
wish.to fight might separate themselves from those who did. Instead, 
Palmer's force treated every black in the Fort Beaufort area as a rebel, 
and blacks on private farms were taken prisoner, their huts burnt and 
property confiscated as the colonial forces 'cleared' the country.119 
The Argus exposed these excesses and Saul Solomon called for a 
Commission of Enquiry both through the medium of the Argus and in 
Parliament. Solomon argued that if it had been desirable to destroy 
120 the location, that ought to have been openly stated and legally done. 
Chalmers had a hard time justifying the actions of s9me of the forces 
and indeed of the whole operation. He claimed that he had learnt that 
Tini's plan was to set up a base for Sandile and to get provisions for 
121 him by raiding surrounding farms, but on the evidence a more realistic 
explanation of Tini's conduct is the desperate shortage of food of his 
people and a deep suspicion and fear of white intentions, particularly 
over his land. Chalmers even considered appealing to the public through 
the press to justify his actions, but Charles Mills wrote hastily to him 
119. A.52-'78, p.30, et seq. 
The Cape Argus, 18 July '78. 
120. The Cape Argus, lead article, 26 March '79. 
W.E.G. Solomon: Saul Solomon (Cape Town, 1948), pp.222-5. 
121. A.52-'78, p.49: Chalmers to Sprigg, 2 April '78, 
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to him to say that the Government was 'perfectly satisfied' with his 
conduct in connection with the expedition, and that consequently no 
122 
appeal would be necessary. 
The Government indeed did appear satisfied that a Commission was 
unnecessary, and Tini was, like other leaders, brought to trial after 
his arrest. After fighting several actions in the Intaba kaNdoda, 
Tini became disenchanted with Sandile's leadership and returned to the 
123 Schelmkloof where he was captured in early June. 
Tini was tried before Judge Dwyer on 19th July in King William's 
Town. He was accused of High Treason in that on six separate occasions 
he, as a subject of the Queen, had levied and made war and rebellion on 
124 the Queen's forces. But as many of the witnesses for the prosecution 
failed to support depositions made before the trial, counsel for the 
prosecution felt obliged to drop five of the charges, and concentrate 
only on the one referring to 6th March when Tini had been seen to resist 
h f h " 125 t e orce sent to capture ~m. Apart from this change of front 
amongst the black witnesses, the same revulsion of feeling in favour of 
Tini as had happened with Gungubele took place after his conviction. 
Two petitions from Fort Beaufort inhabitants, secure now that the blacks 
had been cleared from their midst, pointed out how Tini had tried to stay 
at peace and how it was only when the column moved against him that he 
122. A.52-'78, p.62: Charles Mills to Chalmers, 17 April '78. 
123. c.o. 1065: Preliminary Examination of Tini before Holland, 
31 May '78. 
124. C.O. 1065: Copy of charge sheet. 
125. c.o. 1065: J. Brown (prosecutor) to J. Rose-Innes, n.d. 
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, d 126 res1ste • Dwyer's recommendation for commutation of the death 
sentence to life imprisonment was based on similar grounds: he agreed 
it was clear that Tini had resisted the action of Government and had 
1 '1 'h h d' ,127 on y taken an act1ve ro e 1n t e war w en r1ven to 1t. 
So Tini's fate was the same as Gungubele's. Sentence was commuted 
by Frere on 18th September to life imprisonment, 128 and Tini was 
released from Robben Island under the same amnesty in 1888. 
126. C.O. 1065: 2 Petitions, one forwarded by Harry L. Watkins, 
Fort Beaufort, 31 July '78. 
127. C.O. 1065: Dwyer to Col. Sec., 17 Aug. '78. 
128. The Cape Argus, lead article, 19 September '78. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE TRANSKEI 1878-1881: SETTLEMENT AND UNSETTLEMENT 
1. The Sprigg Ministry's Native Policy 
Benyon unfavourab1y compares the vigour of Sprigg's policy with 
the "pragmatism" and "sensible laxity" of the Molteno Ministry's 
l ' 1 po ~cy. It is tempting to contrast the two too starkly and to gloss 
over the many shortcomings of Brownlee in particular. The laxity to 
which Benyon refers, was not so much sensible, as the result of the 
Molteno Ministry's lack of interest in native policy and the overwhelming 
attention paid to Railways and Public Works. 2 Brownlee, indeed, had 
set out with a cautious, flexible approach to his "civilising mission", 
but he had allowed himself to be rushed by Orpen and Bowker, and the 
pressures which he and his colleagues applied to Sarhili and the Gcaleka 
were amongst those which were responsible for the war. The neglect of 
the Ngqika, which Brownlee did nothing to remedy, was also partly 
responsible for the rebellion of that people. Brownlee's handling of 
the Maphasa/Makinana affair, and Merriman's advocacy of disarmanent and 
precipitation of the Tshatshu rebellion, highlight the fact that the 
Sprigg Ministry's native policy was more of a continuation of elements 
of the Molteno Ministry's policy than a radical departure from it. 
Nevertheless, there were differences. Sprigg made "vigour" 
and "firmness" official policy, and being beholden to its Eastern Cape 
1. Benyon, p.372. 
2. De Kiewiet, p.168. 
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. .. 1 b· 3 b d fl Const1tuents, h1s ent1re y Eastern Cape Ca 1net was oun to re ect 
the attitudes and prejUdices of that area, attitudes and prejudices 
which the Molteno Ministry had often criticised and resisted. 
Soon entering office, Sprigg announced the immediate aims 
of the Ministry: the war was to be brought to a conclusive end and the 
blacks were to be completely subjugated. Sprigg told his East London 
constituents that 
He was determined that the Kaffir war should be 
put down not in the manner of the former Kaffir 
wars but that the Kaffirs should be made to know 
and feel that the white man was master of the 
land. This land would not be worth living in 
unless such was the case ••• There will be no 
patched up peace this time - the Kaffirs will 
be effectually conquered and the white man 
4 henceforth be master of the land. 
Soon afterwards William Ayliff the new Secretary for Native Affairs 
elaborated. He emphasised firstly, that because the blacks weXe 
responsible for the war,they would have to atone for their guilt. 
Secondly, using an argument so de.ar to frontier hearts, he explained 
how the blacks s once subjugated and punished, were to be civilised 
3. The Ministry consisted of: 
John Gordon Sprigg, M.L.A. East London, Premier and 
Colonial Secretary 
John Miller, M.L.C. for Eastern Province, Treasurer 
John Laing, M.L.A. for Fort Beaufort, Commissioner of 
Crown Lands and Public Works 
William Ayliff, M.L.A. for Fort Beaufort, Secretary for 
Native Affairs. 
Thomas Upington, for whom the Colesberg seat was found, 
Attorney General. Theal, X, 105-6. 
Brownlee was appointed as Resident Commissioner of Native Affairs, 
a sort of deputy to the Secretary, based on the frontier at King 
William's Town. Saunders, "The Cape Native Affairs Department", p .33. 
4. Kaffrarian Watchman, 11 Feb. '78. 
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5 through labour. Routes hitherto used to escape labouring for the 
whites, such as squatting and stock theft, were to be closed and 
labourers were to be sent to the West and the Midlands, where 
by long periods of contract and apprenticeship, 
with constant contact with civilised men, they 
[might] acquire a preference for civilised life. 
In this scheme of things only a simple education was to be offered to 
blacks as an inducement lito labour for a higher form of life .11 6 
On 25th February, Ayliff launched his labour scheme in a Government 
Notice. Adult blacks were to enter a contract for three years, while 
children were to be apprenticed up to the age of 17 and 18 in the case 
of girls and boys respectively. Colonists who applied for labourers 
through their civil Commissioners were subject to conditions laid down 
to try and ensure the retention of family units and the proper treatment 
of those 
. 7 
labouring. 
Within a couple of weeks, Sprigg revealed further details of his 
settlement plan. The complete subjugation of the blacks, the guiding 
principle of his policy, was already clearly in operation on the 
battlefield. Now he announced that, after military defeat, any remaining 
power the blacks retained was to be broken by disarmament and detribalisation 
and a strict system of colonial control. There was to be no return to 
the pre-war position of independence through neglect as had obtained with 
Sandile. 8 
5. Hence De Kiewiet, p.157: 
It cannot be seriously disputed that in the native 
policies of the two major British colonies, the desire 
to tap more profitably the resevoirs of labours ••••• 
played a leading role. 
6. Kaffrarian Watchman, 25 Feb. '78. 
7. yovernment Notice No. 222, 25 Feb. 1878. 
8. Kaffrarian Watchman, 13 March. 
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Thus the blacks were to be disarmed by an Act of Parliament, 
because Sprigg said, like the Irish, they could not be trusted with arms 
which they only needed for war. Sprigg did not however, explain which 
blacks were to be disarmed, although after disarmament had been much 
criticised, he said that he did not have in mind the wholesale disarmament 
9 
of the blacks. Then the tribes were to be broken up and the people 
resettled as British subjects in small locations on a non~tribal basis. 
Colonial rule was to be enforced through magistrates and government 
appointed and paid headmen. Individual tenure would replace communal 
tenure, removing much of the chief's power. It was envisaged that each 
individual would be settled in small villages and would be granted a 
small allotment, while commonage would be available to each village. 
For more effective control, the locations thus established would be 
controlled by an inspector of locations, while neighbouring locations 
would be separated by a buffer area occupied by whites. Finally, apart 
from this implicit promise of confiscated lands, Sprigg announced that 
rebel lands would be confiscated and 'perhaps' given to whites who had 
10 fought in the war. 
Sprigg's plans came ~n for much adverse criticism. Sprigg was 
warned against considering disarming the "loyal" blacks. l1 Opposition 
9. J.T. Jabavu to Somerset Advertiser, n.d. reprinted in The Cape Argus, 
10 Dec. '78. 
10. Kaffrarian Watchman, 13 March. 
It must be remembered that Sprigg's Defence Commission of 1876 had 
constantly stressed that the colonists needed more land. 
De Kiewiet, p.172. 
11. E.g. The Cape Argus, lead article, 14 March '78. 
Merriman dryly wrote to his sister: 
You may well imagine a native policy carried out by W. Ayliff 
. with Brownlee as his right hand man. Alternate bursts 
of spasmodic energy and laissez-faire indolence. 
Merriman to Julia Merriman, 26 March '78 quoted in Lewsen, 
Selections 1870-90, pp.43-4. 
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to the conduct of the war and the transportation of women and children 
12 has already been noted; now the Argus and the Aborigine's Protection 
Society turned their interest to Ayliff's labour scheme, criticising 
particularly the indenturing of children. 13 Even the Kaffrarian Watchman, 
which had often criticised the Molteno Ministry for not taking a firm 
enough line in native policy, now warned against what seemed to be a 
certain racialism and desire for revenge infecting the Ministry's 
14 plans. 
Much of the impact of such criticism was dulled by the great issue 
of the Parliamentary Session, the dismissal debate, which together with 
Defence Bills and the taxation measures needed to finance the war and 
the proposed Defence measures, occupied the major portion of the 
S . 15 eSS1on. Nevertheless, it is most interesting to note that Sprigg's 
disarmament plans were presented 1n the form of a permissive non-racial, 
non~discriminatory measure entitled the Bill for the Preservation of 
Peace within the Colony (commonly known as the Peace Preservation Bill).16 
Article 1 of the Bill provided that the Governor, by and with the 
advice of the Executive Council, could 'proclaim' certain districts or 
areas of the colony where it would not be legal to possess arms except 
12. See above, pp.182-3. 
13. The controversy raised by the issue continued into 1879 and 1880. 
See C.2482, No.5: Aborigines Protection Society to Hicks-Beach, 
28 June '79. 
J.T. Eustace: Letters addressed to the Secretary of the Aborigine's 
Protection Society, (Cape Town, 1880). 
14. Kaffrarian Watchman, lead article, 25 Feb. '78. 
15. Theal, X, 115-6. The relevant Acts were: Act 5 - '78, The Cape 
Yeomanry Act; Act 7 - '78, The Burgher Act; Act 9 - '78, 
The Cape Mounted Rifles Act; Act 10 - '78, The Volunteer Act. 
16. C.2220, Encl. No. 68: Text of the Peace Preservation Act. 
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by licence. Article 2 provided t~at every such proclamation 
would be published in the Government Gazette and in local newspapers. 
The remaining articles laid out the procedure for the handing in of arms 
in proclaimed areas, the issue of licences and the payment of compensation 
for arms handed 1n and not returned under licence. 17 
The facade of the Bill was soon shattered. Merriman said during 
the Debate on the Bill that the measure did not go far enough because 
he was opposed to the Mfengu retaining arms since they could not be 
trusted with them. lS Sprigg, in replying, agreed with him. He 
justified his position by saying that the safety of the blacks, in the 
light of the ill-feeling between them and the Mfengu, necessitated such 
. 19 
a step. As the debate continued, Members of the House began to 
speak openly about the 'disarmament of the natives,.20 
The stricter control of locations and the clampdown on squatting 
that Sprigg had promised, were embodied in Amendments to the Native 
Locations Act of 1876. The new Act redefined a location as any 
collection of more than 5 huts per square mile on private property 
occupied by non-employees of the owner of the property. Existing 
locations were allowed to remain, but the Government could and did 
abolish them by proclamation. There was a procedure for the creation of 
new locations, but this was difficult because it required Government 
sanction. Superintentants of locations were empowered to hear all 
civil cases while Magistrates heard criminal cases unless they went to 
21 the Supreme Court. 
17. Ibid. 
18. The Cape Argus, IS May '78, Assembly Report for 15 May. 
19. The Cape Argus, 21 May '7S, Assembly Report for 17 May. 
20. See Assembly Reports in The Cape Argus for this period. 
21. Averill, p.114. 
Theal, X, 136. " 
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The measure was almost immediately brought into operation and its 
application in the East London District serves as another example of the 
'vigour' of Sprigg's policy. Black squatters and tenant farmers were 
ruthlessly evicted in this area without any alternative land being 
provided. This resulted in the increased congestion of existing 
locations and the absorption of more and more blacks like Dba's people 
into the labour market. From the whites' point of view, this was a 
most satisfactory result - land that was urgently needed for the German 
and Scottish settlers, who had arrived in 1877, was released, and at the 
. h h fIb . 11 I' d 22 same t1me t e s ortage a a our was part1a y re 1eve • In the 
long run, however, Sprigg was to find that the problem of resettlement 
became so pressing that waste Crown Lands had to be used for the creation 
of new Locations, a policy officially embodied in the Native Locations, 
Lands and Commonage Act of 1879. 23 
2. The confiscation of the Ngqika Lands 
The eventual outcome of Sprigg's plans for the settlement of the 
Ngqika and Gcaleka was similarly affected by the sheer weight of numbers 
and the existing land shortage on the frontier. The traditional 
policy of confiscation of black lands therefore faced severe limitations 
from the start. Under the Molteno Ministry, the area between the Kei and 
the Qora had been marked down for white settlement and only the return 
of the Gcaleka in December 1877 had prevented the implementation of the 
24 
scheme. We have seen that Sprigg had already indirectly promised 
22. The Cape Argus, 11 June '78. 
De Kiewiet, pp.176-7. 
Theal, X, 136-7. 
23. Averill, p.114. 
24. See above, pp.117-B, 136-7. 
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rebel Ngqika lands to the colonists. In the debate on the annexation 
of Gcalekaland during the session, while confirming his promise of Ngqika 
rebel lands, Sprigg seemed to be backtracking on white settlement in 
25 Gcalekaland. Averill cites evidence that the change was due to 
pressure from Frere, who was planning his Transkeian Council, and to a 
Cabinet split, Laing,the Commissioner of Crown Lands being strongly 
opposed to a white settlement. Sprigg, realising how unpopular the 
abandonment of the scheme would be, did not shut the door on white 
settlement in Gcalekaland until the last day of the Session. 26 Then 
he announced that the Government proposed to move the "loyal" Ngqika of 
Chiefs Feni, Kona and the recently deceased Anta as well as the followers 
of Tya1a, across the Kei. Because their lands were to be divided into 
European farms, there would be no European farms in Gcaleka1and. 27 
But the opposition from Parliamentarians and colonists to the loss 
of prospects in Gcaleka1and was so great, and apart from anything else 
Sprigg sympathised with their view, that Sprigg indicated on a tour 
of the Eastern Districts that he undertook after the Session, that he had 
reverted to a policy of white settlement in Gcaleka1and. 28 
Soon after the prorogation of Parliament, two Land Boards were 
appointed, the one to arrange for the division of the Ngqika location 
into European farms and the other, chaired by Colonel Eustace, to 
demarcate Gca1ekaland into European farms and black locations. 29 In 
25. Saunders, "Annexation", p.i83. 
26. Averill, pp. 115-6. 
27. The Cape Argus, 6 Aug. '78. 
28. Averil1,pp.1l5-6. 
29. The Cape Argus, 10 Sept. '78. 
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Gcalekaland all planning was to be carried out with the defence of the 
European population in mind, a twelve.mile wide belt along the Fingoland 
border extending from the Kei to the Mbashe being established for white 
settlement, while a similar buffer area was to be established from the 
Kei to the first of the locations. These locations were to be limited 
to 20,000 acres in size, situated in open country to facilitate policing, 
30 
and to be separated one from the other where possible by European settlements. 
The Minstry had difficulty in justifying the removal of the 'loyal' 
Ngqika convincingly. Ayliff was to suggest in all seriousness that 
the main reason for the move was the necessity of removing the Ngqika 
from the influence of drink,31 while Sprigg was later to say that the 
advantages of the new system of village settlement, closer magisterial 
supervision, and the imminent introduction of individual tenure outweighed 
any emotional attachment to their old land that .the Ngqika might have 
had. For the black man, he said, conditions in South Africa were 
better "than in any other country of mixed European and African 
population".32 Sprigg was certainly determined to push the mOve through 
and so instructed Wright and Brownlee who were in charge of the move not 
33 to allow the Ngqika to "talk" or delay a season. 
.. " . . The loyal Ngqlka who had not been consulted about their prospectlve 
removal, did not agree with Sprigg. When Wright informed the Ngqika 
at Grey town of their fate on 6th August, they expressed their amazement 
at the arbitrary nature of the Government's plan and the bluntness with 
30. The Cape Argus, 3 Sept. '78. 
Averill, p.ll7. 
31. C.2482, Encl. 4 No. 152: Ayliff Memo., n.d. (1879). 
32. Saunders, "Annexation", p.226. 
33. The Cape Argus. 3 Sept. '78. 
Averill, p.1l7. 
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which it was conveyed, particularly that they were expressly forbidden 
to discuss the move. 34 Tyala said that he would rather die than be 
moved, and in fact the tragic old man died the day before the move 
35 began. Anta's people informed by Brownlee of the move later in the 
36 
month, were similarly aghast. A Free Press Correspondent reported 
that they looked on themselves as cowards for not fighting (as indeed 
they were regarded by those who had fought) and regretted their 
I ' 37 neutra l.ty. John Cumming, the missionary at Emgwali reported that 
perhaps half the total number of 'loyal' Ngqika scattered and sought 
refuge on Ciskeian farms in order to avoid the move. 38 
Unmoved by opposition from the press and Ngqika alike, the Government 
went ahead,and consequently the comfort of their charges suffered at the 
expense of the attempt to meet the deadline. 39 In early September 
the Grey town people were settled in 2 locations ,of 20,000 acres each 
in the new district of Kentani, and Anta's people followed to two other 
locations of the same size later in the month. In all, a total of 
7664 people including 1019 men, and 6665 cattle, were settled in the 
40 
new area. Land was set aside for those who were working On contract 
34. The Cape Argus, 3 Sept. '78. 
35. Cape Archives, Cumming Papers, Correspondence Box, folder 5 1846-83: 
Cumming to Dr MacGill, printed in circular from United Presbyterian 
Mission House, 7 Nov. '78. 
Brownlee, Reminiscences, pp.364-5. 
36. C.2220, Encl. 79: C. Brownlee to S.N.A., 5 Sept. '78. 
The Cape Argus, lead article, 17 Sept. '78. 
37. The Cape Argus, 17 Sept. '78. 
38. Cape Archives, Cumming Papers, Correspondence Box, folder 5 1846-83: 
Cumming to Dr MacGill, printed in circular from United Presbyterian 
Mission House, 7 Nov. '78. 
39. Ibid. Averill, p.117 suggests the rush was required because Sprigg 
wished to call an election, before which he wanted the Ngqika 
location cleared and the way to European farms open. 
40. N.A. 2: Wright to S.N.A., 28 Sept. '78. 
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ln the Colony. Matthew Blyth was appointed Chief Magistrate of the new 
district of the Transkei, an area comprising Fingoland, the Idutywa 
41 Reserve and Gcalekaland. 
Since the move had been hurried, the Ngqika were not forced to 
immediately adopt the village system but were allowed to erect temporary 
42 huts while the surveying of the ten acre lots proceded. Blyth 
announced the new regulations to the assembled Ngqika on 30th September 
on the occasion of the introduction of M.B. Shaw, son of Rev. William 
Shaw, as first magistrate of the District of Kentani. No liquor 
sales were to be allowed. Certain rights connected with circumcision 
and initiation were prohibited. A strict pass system was to be enforced 
and a hut tax of 10 shillings was to be imposed from June 1879. There 
was to be a district police force and the government was to receive fines 
in civil cases, effectively ending the chief's imisila. All cases were 
to be heard by the magistrate, and in order to bring a case a complainant 
would have to deposit 10 shillings and a further ten shillings if the 
case went on appeal. The loser of the case would pay the court dues. 
41. Sprigg did not bring into force the Act for the annexation of 
Fingoland, the Idutywa and Nomansland which had received Royal 
Assent early in 1878, for he hoped to be able to introduce legislation 
for the annexation of Gcalekaland, Bomvanaland and Thembuland soon. 
Thus Sprigg's government rationalised its administration of areas 
under its control East of the Kei without regard to the stages they 
had reached along the road to annexation. Apart from the Chief 
Magistracy of the Transkei, the Chief Magistracy of Thembuland was 
formed out of Thembuland, Bomvanaland and Emigrant Thembu1and, and 
the Gatberg and Xesibe territory was added to Nomansland to form 
the chief Magistracy of Griqualand East. 
C.0.3299~ Under Secretary of Native Affairs to Col. Sec., 12 Dec. '78. 
Saunders, "Annexation", p.183. 
42. Thea1 comments that ten acres was "much more than was necessary, as 
the district was one of the most fertile in South Africa." 
Thea1, X, 137. Nevertheless, the blacks did not take up the ten 
acre lots, and the history of labour migrancy would tend to suggest 
that, with popUlation increase, the land granted was no more than 
was necessary to ensure an adequate flow of labour. 
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Finally, those people who had been permitted by Wright in January to 
. h' Id h b . d' 43 reta1n t e1r arms, wou now ave to su m1t to 1sarmament. 
The Ngqika were too shattered by the war to think of resisting, 
but their attitude was clear from the general silence with which the 
regulations were received and the odd muted protests that were raised. 
Chief Feni asked to be allowed to purchase land explaining that the blacks 
did not wish to live in villages but to live as they had always done 
in the open. In the following years, opposition to the village system 
. d 44 rema1ne constant. 
Although the Government did provide seed and ploughs, feeding the 
Ngqika before their first crop was a problem. But in line with 
previous practice, Ayliff had given Blyth instructions that there were 
to be no charity hand outs to any able bodied adults - they were to 
obtain food only for labour. Ayliff went as far as to instruct Blyth 
only to handout food to the disabled on a promise of repayment at the 
first harvest. He did however, make some concession to the plight of 
the Ngqika, asking Blyth not to exact the 10 shillings court dues while 
h 1 . d' . h d' 45 t e peop e rema1ne 1n stra1g tene clrcumstances. 
3. The resettlement of the Gcaleka 
After the Battle of Kentani, still acting as Chief Magistrate of 
Gcalekaland, Eustace located himself at Ibeka and settled Bhotomane and 
Maphasa's people in locations close by. In June there were 229 people 
in Bhotomane's location and 1381 in Maphasa's.46 There had, however, 
been more Gcalekas who had surrendered to Eustace and had been resettled 
43. N.A. 1: Blyth to S.N.A., 2 Oct. '78, and attached minutes of meeting. 
44. Ibid.; C.2482, EnclLNo. 138: Blyth to S.N.A., 7 July, 8 Sept. '79. 
45. N.A. 1: W. Ay1iff to Blyth, 16 Oct. '78. 
46. N.A. 2: Eustace to S.N.A., 18 June '78. 
'. 
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earlier in the year, but who had subsequently dispersed again because of 
hunger. It is instructive to note that the Gcaleka preferred working 
for neighbouring tribesmen rather than on the Public Works and that the 
women even went to the extent of working for the Mfengu. Migratory 
Labour as it came to be known, was resisted for as long as possib1e. 47 
In May, William Ayliff complained that so few Gcaleka had given 
themselves up, and recommended that they be given a short period of 
grace before which the rest of the land would be given out. 
I 
His brother 
James, now Chief Magistrate of Fingoland, suggested that Mfengu be 
allowed to occupy this land, but William said thAt he had serious 
reservations about contributing further to the arrogance of the Mfengu. 
He was only prepared to consider such a proposal if the Mfengu exchanged 
land in the Colony for their new land. Otherwise he favoured European 
agriculturalists placed in the Transkei for the ,purpose of frontier 
48 defence. The idea of using the Transkei as a dumping ground for 
unwanted Ciskeian blacks 1n order to release land for Whites, was fast 
taking hold of tha official mind. 
In June Eustace wrote to Ayliff pleading for instructions. He 
complained that he had received no instructions at all since his 
appointment in December as Chief Magistrate of Gcalekaland and explained 
that conditions were driving away those who had surrendered. He argued 
that the Government owed it to Maphasa's people, who had suffered 
extensively during the war for their support of the Government, to 
give them some certainty of tenure. He recommended that they should 
not again be removed, but should be allowed to resettle where they were, 
47. Ibid; N.A. 2: Eustace to W. Ayliff, 26 April '78. 
48. N.A. 1: Memo. on letter of Chief Magistrate of Fingoland regarding 
the occupation of Gca1ekaland, 31 May '78. 
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especially since he had assumed that the land from the Qora to the Mbashe 
was for Gcaleka settlement and had consequently assured the Gcaleka that 
they would not be moved for some time, if at all. 49 
In reply, Ayliff informed Eustace that Thesiger had been instructed 
to move the Gcaleka in question back to what had been Seyolo's location 
in the Colony. He said this move was part of overall military strategy 
which aimed to prevent the elusive Sarhili being informed of military 
50 
movements. Eustace objected to the move, but in the meanwhile new 
orders had been issued. This time Eustace himself was to take cha~ge of 
move of the Gcaleka to Jali's old location and not Seyolo's location. 5l 
52 With ill grace, Eustace effected the move in August. But the removal 
was in the long run only temporary, for Maphasa was relocated by 
Brownlee in 1879 at Thuthura where he had resided before the war. 
Bh d W . . . d h f h G 1 k . K . 53 otomane an ap1 J01ne t e rest 0 t e ca e a 1n entanl. 
Although the Gcalekaland Land Board under Eustace surveyed white 
54 farms in several areas of Gcalekaland, very few were ever taken up. 
In Kentani the Ngqika locations rapidly filled up and then overflowed. 
First the women and children prisoners of war who had been shipped to 
the West, . 55 returned. Then the several hundred families of Oba's clan 
had to be resettled after the sale of Oba's farms. 56 Rebels who had 
49. N.A. 2: Eustace to S.N.A., 18, 21, 22 June ' 78. 
50. N.A. 2: Eustace to S.N.A. , 21 June ' 78. 
5!. N.A. 2: Eustace to S.N.A. , 5 July '78. 
52. N.A. 2: Eustace to S.N.A., 23 July, 26 Aug. ' 78. 
53. D.S.A.B., i, 504. 
G.19-'86, p.8: Stanford Memo., 19 May '85. 
54. In 1883, there were 10 Scotch immigrants near Nthlambe. G8-'83, p.129. 
55. See above, p.l8D , footnote 155. 
56. See above, p.178 , footnote 145. 
" 
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surrendered under amnesty were also allowed to settle there, as were those 
who had completed their sentence of hard labour. Finally refugees 
continued to stream back from all parts of the Transkei and even the 
57 Colony. By 1881 pressure on the land was so great that the Ngqika 
were granted an additional 30 sq. miles of territory adjoining their 
upper locations. The Ngqika petitioned for even more land, claiming 
that they had been promised all land between the Kei and the Qora and 
had never been informed before their move of areas for European settlement. 
The Scanlen Ministry handed over much of the land designated for European 
occupation indicating that they had decided to accept the inevitable 
and give up the idea of European settlement. With the passage of time 
village settlement and individual tenure, steadily resisted by the 
58 Ngqika, were also abandoned. 
The settlement of the northern half of Gcalekaland, or the District 
of Wi110wvale as it came to be known, followed the same pattern as 
that of Kentani. On 2 January 1879 F.N. Streatfeild, a commander of 
Mf L · d' h . d f' . 59 f engu eVles urlng t e war, was appolnte 1rst Maglstrate a ter 
Eustace, disgusted at his treatment, refused to take the post. He 
established his magistracy on the site where he later surveyed and laid 
out the village of Wil1owvale. 60 Lindinxuwa, Sarhili's younger brother, 
settled 1n the district in 1879. 61 Sarhi1i, having fled through 
57. Thea1, X, 139. 
58. G.3-'84, pp.l08-9, 115-6. 
59. Theal, X, 139. 
60. G.13-'80, p.161. 
61. G.20-'80, p.46: Streatfeild to Chief ~agistrate of Transkei, 31 
Dec. 1880. Lindinxuwa's sons maintained that the land was given to 
their father in token of his loyalty, which is interesting in the 
light of Melane's story (see P'105, above). 
Cory Library, M.S. 1861: ? to Cory, 9 March 1910. 
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Bomvana1and in 1878, was received by Gwadiso, the Khonjwayo chief. 
Sarhi1i remained about a year in Pondoland, but with growing pressure 
from the Mpondo, he decided to recross the Mthatha into Bomvana1and, 
where he went into hiding with a few followers. 62 In 1881 Blyth was 
instructed by the Scan1en Ministry to offer Sarhi1i terms of free and 
unconditional pardon and relocation with his family and immediate 
followers on the Qora, near Hole1a. Blyth says he refused, being 
advised by many of the rebels from the Transkeian Rebellion of 1880-81 
who had attached themselves to him, and who thought that Sarhili's skill 
in diplomacy would eventually win back his whole country for him. 63 
Sarhi1i certainly continued to petition for relocation in his old 
country, and the Colonial Government became more and more worried by his 
influence. In 1883 Sarhi1i was pardoned anyway and was allowed to 
settle in the Mbashe valley below the Ncehana River. 
However, the presence of Sarhili and 300 Gcaleka in their country 
paying no taxes while they were taxed, made the Bomvana very discontended. 
The Colonial Authorities anticipated an impossible situation developing 
once annexation, which was imminent, took place, and so in 1885 they 
reconsidered the whole question of Sarhi1i's position. 64 They 
considered it would be impolitic to let Sarhili back into his old 
country not only because of the influence'he still wielded, but also 
because his authority might devolve on his heir, Sigcawu. 
wrote, indirectly paying tribute to th"e ageing chief: 
62. G.19-'86, p.7: Stanford Memo., 19 May '85. 
63. G.19-'86, p.7: Blyth Memo., 9 May '85. 
64. G.19-'86, p.1. 
" 
W.E. Stanford 
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It will be said that Kre1i's influence over the 
Amaxosa is such that place him where you will, 
he is able to make himself almost as much felt 
as if actually in the midst of them. This is 
true. For fifty years Kreli has stood up against 
the advancing tide and has battled with it. 
The wars he has bravely fought, his many personal 
hairbreath escapes, his wisdom and eloquence in 
Council, and consummate skill in diplomacy cling 
like moss to a tree about the person of the old 
Chieftain, and make him even in adversity, the 
central figure on the Kaffir political stage. 
But he is ageing now, and what we must guard 
against is not so much the influence of his 
declining years, as the transmission to his son 
of the Chieftainship unimpaired, and the 
occupation by Sigcawu of their old country with 
its historic battlegrounds and traditions. 65 
Sarhili was consequently given Ncehana, Sholora and Mcelwana Locations 
as a permanent habitation, on condition that he accepted British rule 
and all its concomitant regulations. The old chief, after some hesitation 
and unable to manoeuvre any more, accepted, but continued to fear 
imprisonment on Robben Island until his death at Sholora Mouth ~n 1892. 66 
4. Disarmament 
Disarmament was the most potent factor in the unrest that was to 
lead to a major attempt to overthrow thealien yoke of white rule almost 
exactly two years after the end of the war. The few Ngqika who had been 
65. G.19-'86, p.9: 
Sigcawu's great 
in 1907 to join 
Stanford Memo., 19 May '85. 
son Gwebinkumbi, was "allowed to 
the major part of his people. 
66. Soga, Ama-Xosa, p.l23. 
D. S . A • B • i, 688. 
" 
return to Willowvale 
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allowed to retain their arms and the Rharhabe remnants in the Colony were 
disarmed first, and offered no resistance. This was not surprising, 
for the Xhosa nation's final bid for independence had resulted in their 
f . .. . 11 67 ef ectual demlse as a warrlor natlon or even as a natlon at a . 
But when the Government's intention to disarm all the blacks became 
known, not only was there considerable opposition in the colony, but the 
Transkei saw the return of the same tension as experienced during the 
war scare of 1876, and open resistance was narrowly averted. As with 
68 Griffith in Basutoland, many Government officials were either opposed 
to disarmament on principle or on grounds of expediency. One of the 
Merriman family friends wrote: 
Mr Brownlee says it is all very well for them 
[the Sprigg Government] to cro~v over Disarmament 
at present. They are taking weapons from a 
people who have just passed under the yoke and 
On whose necks the foot of Government is 
at present placed. But wait till they tackle 
the Transkeian Fingos, he adds - or Gangelizwe's 
Tembus ••• or the Basutos and then there may 
be a different tale to tell. 69 
Prophetic words! 
67. To speak of the Xhosa as a nation is incorrect, for historically, 
they were always disunited and British rule had prompted further 
division. However, the war came to represent an attempt at a 
unified Xhosa struggle, which having failed, could never be repeated. 
68. Benyon, p.291. Saunders, "Annexation", p.198 cites Blyth as an 
example of officials who opposed disarmament in private. 
69. Merriman Papers, 1878 file No. 55: J. Sievewright to Agnes 
Merrim~, 23 Oct. '78. 
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The Act could not in theory be applied east of the Kei before that 
territory was annexed, but the Gcaleka and Ngqika were disarmed before 
settlement in Gcalekaland, and other Transkeian groups were asked to 
surrender their arms 'voluntarily,.70 Thus on 23rd September it was 
announced that all Mfengu and inhabitants of the Idutywa Reserve were 
b d ' d 71 to e l.sarme. Later the Emigrant Thembu were also informed of 
their 'voluntary' disarmament. Neither the letter, nor the spirit of 
the Peace Preservation Act were followed, for the law was not proclaimed 
in any district in accordance with Articles I and II of the Act, the 
Act had not provided for Transkeian disarmament, and the non-racial and 
, , f h A 'd 72 perml.ssl.ve aspect 0 teet were l.gnore • However, the blacks were 
not caught unawares, for their worst fears were merely being confirmed as 
J.J. Jabavu wrote in December in an interesting letter to the Somerset 
Advertiser: 
From the very outset the natives knew that it 
has been the intention of the present Government 
to disarm every black man, merely because he is 
black, to gain popUlarity from a section of the 
colonists, whose aim it is to reduce the natives 
to nonentity for its own selfish ends. 73 
70. Saunders, "Annexation", pp.197-9. 
71. The Cape Argus, lead article, 23 Nov. '78. 
72. Ibid, see also J.T. Jabavu's letter quoted above. 
That Sprigg was rushing through a measure on his own authority, 
which was unpopular in the Department of Native Affairs seems to 
be confirmed by a minute Bright (the Under Secretary) wrote in 
November, in which he told Blyth he regretted he could not advise 
him as regards compensation for guns collected, as "nothing whatever 
is known in this department as to the wishes of Govt. in connection 
with disarming any of the natives." 
N.A. 2: Blyth to S.N.A., 11 Nov. '78, Bright minute. 
73. J.T. Jabavu to the Somerset Advertiser (2 letters) printed in 
The Cape Argus, 10 Dec. '78. 
" 
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Jabavu protested bitterly about the departure from the law and questioned 
what circumstances had made it necessary to disarm the Mfengu, 'loyal' 
Ngqika and Thembu. Compensation for the arms collected was only paid in 
late 1879 and was at face value,' rather than the cost price, increasing 
the bitterness felt over the move. 74 
Unrest caused by disarmament and the imposition of new Colonial 
control measures was greater among the Thembu and Emigrant Thembu. 
We have seen that the attitude of both groups towards British rule was 
already more than a little ambivalent - in fact the neutrality of Dalasile 
and Sitokhwe Ndlela, Gece10 and Mathanzima during the war had been an 
1 h k h ' 75 extreme y say t 1ng. Sprigg was therefore treading on dangerous 
ground when he decided to dispense with the formality of being requested 
by the Emigrant Thembu to become British subjects, before incorporating 
their land into the Chief Magistracy of Thembuland and placing them under 
the new system of colonial control. 76 Even the Bomvanas had been 
dignified with the token motions of obtaining their consent to accepting 
colonial control. 77 In August there were reports that Ngangelizwe had 
expressed a determination to resist the expected disarmament, and that he 
had warned the other Thembu Chiefs to be ready to support him. The 
killing of cattle 1n Gecelo's location was said to be a prelude ordered 
by Ngange1izwe to open resistance. William Curmning thought that the 
atmosphere was like that of the war scare of 187678 , and Levey confirmed 
that there was excitement at Xa1anga because it was believed that the 
74. C.2482, Encl. No. 138: Blyth to S.N.A., 10 Oct. '79. 
75. See above,pp.198-200. 
76. Theal, X, 143. 
77. See above, p.172, footnote 18. 
78. N.A. 158: W. Cumming to Levey, 24 Aug. '78. 
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that the Government intended to disarm the Thembu. It was his opinion 
that if the Governernnt attempted disarmament, there would be resistance. 79 
On 16 September Ayliff met Mathanzim,a, Gecelo, Ndarhala and 
Sitokhwe at Cofimvaba to explain the new system to them. The minutes 
of the meeting give the impression of a muted antagonism to the system 
on the part of the Thembu. The chiefs were particularly suspicious of 
a dimunition of their powers. 80 
By October Levey, volatile as ever, felt that he had talked away 
any reservations and 'misconceptions' the Emigrant Thembu might have had 
b d ' 81 b 'N b h h b h' 1 ' a out 1sarmament, ut 1n ovem er, w en e egan t e vo untary 
procedure aided by an armed party, he discovered that his earlier 
apprehensions had been justified. Sitokhwe who had been implicated 
in encouraging Mfanta to rebel, began to encourage resistance .to 
disarmament and even fired at Levey in what Ell~ot saw not as an attempt 
on his life, but as a mark of defiance. Sitokhwe's behaviour ha.d the 
effect of checking disarmament particularly amongst Gecelo's people, and 
Levey had to resort to force to complete it. Rumours again began to 
fly, this time to the effect that the Government intended to take the 
82 
wives and children of the Thembu away. 
It was not surprising then that Sitokhwe and Gecelo did not arrive 
to meet Elliot on the occasion of his first visit as Chief Magistrate of 
Thembuland in December. The Emigrant Thembu at the meeting were 
discontended and defiant. Mathanzim'a complained tha t the Government 
79. N.A. 158: Levey to S.N.A., 29 Aug. '78. 
80. CO.3299: Min~tes of a meeting of the Emigrant Thembu with the 
S.N.A. and C. Brownlee, 16 Sept. '78. 
81. N.A. 158: Levey to S.N .A., 22 Oct. '78. 
82. N .A. 158: Levey to S.N.A., 19 Nov. '78. 
N.A. 45: Elliot to S.N.A., 11 Dec. '78. 
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had acted arbitrarily in destroying the independence promised to them 
in 1865, by imposing magisterial control and by disarming them. He 
asked Elliot to give them an explanation, particularly of disarmament, 
reminding him that the Emigrant Thembu had not fought the Government during 
the war. They had kept faith with the Government, but the Government had 
not kept faith with them. 83 Gecelo and Sitokhwe expressed the same 
grievances when Elliot sought them out. 
In a report to Ayliff, Elliot concluded: 
There is beyond doubt a great deal of intriguing 
between Native Tribes going on at the present 
time, and it is impossible to say what course the 
Emigrant Thembu may not be induced to adopt. 
He implicitly criticised Levey's conduct of the disarmament, but it is 
unlikely that more tactful handling of the issue would have induced 
the Emigrant Thembu to swallow the bitter pill of disarmament. 84 
Nevertheless, Elliot approved Ayliff's decision to remove Sitokhwe from 
his chieftainship because of his behaviour, and this step was consequently 
85 taken in January. 
Sprigg hesitated to disarm the Thembu and the people of Griqualand 
East, not because of apprehensions of resistance, but because he feared 
that it would leave them defenceless before the Mpondo, when they were 
needed by the Colony as allies against that troublesome chiefdom. 86 
It seems that the non-disarmament of the Thembu contributed to the 
continuation of peace, for without Ngangelizwe's support the Emigrant 
Thembu were not then prepared to openly resist Colonial rule. 
83. N.A. 44: Minutes of a meeting of Major Elliot with the Emigrant 
Thembu, 2 Dec. '78. 
Macquarrie, i~ 104. 
84. N.A. 45: Elliot to S.N.A., 11 Dec. '78. 
85. N.A. 45: Elliot to S.N.A., 30 Dec. '78. 
" 
86. Saunders, "Annexation", p.199. 
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Elliot's undoubted influence over Ngangelizwe was also crucial. When 
Elliot and Ayliff met the Thembu in September to explain to them the 
new government regulations, Ngangelizwe made special mention of Elliot 
and his instrumentality in keeping the Thembu on the Colonial side during 
the war. He said the Thembu looked forward to having their children 
educated and he himself looked forward to a promised visit to Cape Town 
with Elliot. 87 For a while then, the non-disarmament of the Thembu, 
Ngangelizwe's clientship and the fresh memory of white successes in the 
recent war restrained those disenchanted with British rule. 
5. The Transkeian Rebellion of 1880 
However the vigour of Sprigg's policy and the increased momentum of 
the forward move into the Transkeian Territories brought a'new and common 
consciousness 88 of what white rule entailed allover the Transkeian 
Territqries. The Emigrant Thembu's cup was full'when after disarmament 
had been followed by the imposition of the hut tax in 1879, there was 
talk in 1880 of a further house duty of ten shillings. Mathanzima' 
told a Cape official 
Government does not say to me like a man I am 
going to take this and that privilege from you, 
but one by one my rights are stolen in the 
dark. Government is a wolf. 89 
He and other Emigrant Thembu chiefs presented a petition against the 
Thembuland Annexation Bill to the Cape in mid 1880. The petition 
87. C.2220, Enc!' No. 77: Ayliff to Frere, 28 Sept. '78. 
88. I am indebted for the following account to C. Saunders: "The 
Transkeian Rebellion of 1880-81: A Case-Study of Transkeian 
Resistance to White Control", South African Historical Journal, 
No.8, Nov. 1976, pp.32-39. 
89. Ibid., quoted p.34. 
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was ignored. It seemed to the Emigrant Thembu that annexation was 
imminent, for they could not anticipate the ramifications of Imperial 
and Colonial policy that were to delay the implementation of annexation 
until 1885. The drastic dimunition of the chief's powers contained 
in Sprigg's policy was made clear in St. John's where the confiscation 
of the Mpondomise Chief's tiger tails, the symbol of his judicial 
authority,caused great resentment. Finally Sprigg's announcement 
that he intended to confiscate Morosi's land in Quthing after his 
isolated rebellion in 1879 brought home the colonial threat to the 
black's land. Rebellion seemed the only desperate solution to an 
alien rule which threatened not only the whole fabric of traditional 
society, but its land as well. Sprigg's announcement of the application 
of disarmament to the Sotho people ~n Basutoland in April 1880 was thus 
both the signal to the Sotho there to rise up and tqrow off the yoke of a 
government that had betrayed their hopes, and the signal to the 
Transkeian peoples not yet beaten into submission, that the same fate 
awaited them. They therefore decided the moment had come to get rid of 
Colonial rule, particularly the magistrates who personnified the system. 
Saunders argues that the Transkeian Rebellion which began in October 
1880 presented a more serious challenge to the Cape Colony than the 
90 1877-8 war. This is true insofar as the potential danger was greater. 
Imperial help was not available, and most of the F.A.M.P.stationed in 
the Transkei had been removed to Basutoland. A larger part of the 
Transkeian Territories was involved than in the 1877-8 war and perhaps a 
fifth of the population from the Drakensberg to the sea was directly 
active in the Rebellion. 9l 
90. Ibid.,p.32. 
91. Ibi~,pp.36-7. 
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But the same factors which had prevented a combination of all 
T~~skeian peoples in the l877-Bwar operated again in 1880. Although 
conspiracy. was as popular a theory then as in 1877, there is no more 
evidence of the existence of such a conspiracy than previously. 
Chiefdoms and peoples still weighed self-interest before the interest of 
their race. The Mfengu, despite their bitterness over disarmament, 
again joined the whites, not least because their record on the frontier 
made them totally unacceptable allies to other blacks. Elliot was 
able again to command the support of Ngange1izwe and most of the Thembu 
again followed his lead. Mqikela had been teetering on the brink of 
conflict with the whites since his implication in the Griqualand East 
Rebellion of April 1878, but the way Frere had seized Port St. John's 
from him in 1879 when he refused to hand it over, persuaded him that he 
had more to lose than to gain by interference. \ Nqwiliso, like 
Ngangelizwe, owed much to white support and had not been subjected to 
white rule, so he gave active support to his allies. Small chiefdoms 
like the Bhaca who hoped for white support in their attempts to become 
more independent of the Mpondo also aided the whites. Finally, the 
Xhosa had been too effectively crushed in the three years before to 
contemplate assisting the rebe1s. 92 
Thus the Rebellion although it involved the Sotho of Griqua1and 
East, the Mpondomise, Sitokhwe and Gecelo of the Emigrant Thembu, the 
Qwathi and some minor Thembu chiefs, was within the power of the Colony 
which had strengthened its defensive powers after the 1877-8 war, and 
93 
was crushed by the end of February 1881. 
92. Ibid., p.37. 
93, Ibid., p.38. 
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Its significance as an example of black resistance may be gauged 
by the fact that although far shorter than the 1877-8 war, casualties were 
almost as high, and by the fact that it cost £1, 250,OQO to suppress as 
compared with the total Imperial and Colonial expenses in 1877-8 of 
9~ 
almost £1,800,000. Then too, coming so soon after the war of Ngcayecibi 
the Rebellion ensured that a major rethink of colonial policy took place. 
Sprigg's Ministry was rightly blamed for both the·Transkeian and Basutoland 
Rebellions and was replaced by Scanlen's Ministry in May 1881. The 
proposed annexation of Gcalekaland and Thembuland which might have been 
expected to be followed by the annexation of Pondoland, was abandoned 
for the moment as the colony lost confidence in its ability to rule the 
native territories. By 1883 the Cape Government had reached the 
conclusion that all native territories east of the Kei should be handed 
d ' B ' 'h 1 95' over to 1rect r1t1s ru e. 
The Upington Ministry came to office in 1884 on the platform that this 
should not happen and so no such transfer took place. Gcalekaland 
and Thembuland were annexed 1n 1885 as their position could not be allowed 
to remain so anomalous, and as Imperial opposition was withdrawn. But 
it was by then accepted that the Transkeian Territories should become 
a reserve separately ruled from the Colony in which no further land should 
be alienated from the blacks. 96 The widespread inroads by white farmers 
on the Western Transkei as a result of the 1880-1 rebellion were 
consequently the last expropriation of black land by whites and with the 
94. Ibid., p.38. Theal, X, 134 •. 
95. C. Saunders: "The Transkeian Rebellion of 1880-81". S .A.H.J. , 
No.8, Nov. 1976, p.39. 
96. Ibid. 
'0 
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changes made after the 1877-8 war, served to set the pattern of land 
97 
ownership that obtained well into the Twentieth Century. Likewise 
the pattern of administration of the Transkei was set after the 
Rebellion, some of the far-reaching changes being made as a result of 
the Report of the Native Laws Commission of 1883,98 a commission whose 
work the Rebellion had done much to stimulate. 
97. See Averill, Ch. VII, pp.1SO-200 for details. 
98. G.4-'83: Report and Proceedings with Appendices, of the Government 
Commission on Native Laws and Customs. 
" 
I 
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CONCLUSION 
The War of Ngcayecibi falls very definitely within the hundred-year 
tradition of Xhosa armed resistance to white encroachment and white rule. 
For the Eastern Xhosa, the Gcaleka, it was a reaction to the slow 
constriction of Gcaleka independence by the whites, while for part 
of the Western Xhosa, the Ngqika, who had experienced British rule and 
then had been allowed to resume a state of quasi-autonomy, it was both 
an act of desperation and a conscious attempt to throw off white rule 
altogether. The failure of the Xhosa to present a united front, and the 
resp'onse of other Ciskeian and Transkeian chiefdoms to the war" is 
evidence that the blacks had developed little sense of racial identity 
or common interest in the face of colonial rule. The responses of 
individual chiefs and their people to the war were determined by 
numerous factors, amongst which were how far a particular chiefdom' 
was along the road of colonial rule, the sharacter of the individual 
chief, perceptions of self-interest, the influence of colonial agents 
an~ missionaries and inter- and intra-tribal politics. 
Contrary to what De Kiewiet seems to imply, political factors 
are equally if not more important than economic factors in explaining 
why the Gcaleka fought. Gcalekaland waS overcrowded, there was a 
shortage of food and some measure of economic deprivation. But the 
Gcaleka had yet to be driven to 'labour on a large scale for the whites, 
and Sarhili , himself encouraged the overcrowding in an attempt to lend 
weight to his pleas for more land' and to reinforce his political and 
military muscle vis-a-vis neighbou~ing chiefdoms. 
On numerous occasions in the past when his father' was 
" 
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callously killed at colonial hands in 1835, when Gcalekaland was 
invaded on dubious grounds during the Seventh and Eighth Frontier 
Wars, and when he was driven across the Mbashe in 1858 on unfounded 
su'spicion of having masterminded th,e Cattle Killing Sarhili had 
had an equal, if not greater reason for fighting the whites. But 
as informants stressed and his actions confirm, Sarhili consciously 
strove to avoid war with the whites in the knowledge that war would 
prove disastrous to Gcaleka independence and perhaps even to the 
existence of the chiefdom. Unfortunately for Sarhili and the Gcaleka, 
the maintenance of a strong, independent Gcaleka chiefdom was at 
variance with colonial attitudes and official colonial policy: Sarhili 
was viewed with intense suspicion and his continued existence as an 
independent chief was seen as prejudicial to frontier security. 
Brownlee's "civilising mission" therefore sought subtly (and on occasion 
not so subtly) to undermine both Sarhili' s pOSition and Gcaleka 
independence. Gcaleka independence and advancing white rule were 
bound to clash. 
The Gcaleka·Thembu quarrel is a classic example of how inter· 
tribal conflict became entangled with the response of blacks to white 
pressures. The Colonial Authorities saw the security of the frontier 
as necessitating intervention in the conflict; but instead of acting 
as impartial arbitrators, the fear of a renascent Gcaleka power under 
Sarhili determined that the Thembu shoUld be drawn within the orbit 
of the Colony, first as allies, and then as subjects. In turn, 
the Thembu, misunderstanding the nature of colonial rule, willingly 
looked to it to protect them against the Gcaleka and generally to 
advance Thembu interests. 
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Sarhi1i was only too well aware of the discrimination he and 
his people suffered at the hands of the Colony. He had only to look 
at the Mfengu living and thriving on his former territory to see the 
personification of that discrimination. While refusing to be provoked 
into open defiance and, while maintaining his customary courtesy to 
all whites, Sarhi1i continued to employ his supreme diplomatic skill 
in resisting the pressures exerted on his people. In the cat-and-mouse 
game he played with the Colonial Authorities, he managed not only to 
keep the Gca1eka-Thembu boundary question open for a number of years, 
but actually to wring concessions from the unwilling hands of the 
Colony. 
However, as pressures on the Gca1eka increased, the tribe 
became divided. The politicking that took place at the end of 1876 
and the beginning of 1877 was partly the product of traditional 
rivalries and partly the product of differing responses to Colonial 
pressures. The mi~ority "progressive" element was favourably 
inclined to western institutions and British rule, although Maphasa 
was predominantly motivated by self-interest when he advocated the 
reception of the Gcaleka under British rule. The majority conservative 
party wished to preserve traditional cultural and political forms 
and were increasingly inclined to· fight those forces which seemed to 
be standing in the way of a return to pristine Gcaleka power, the 
Mfengu and the whites. Sarhili was caught between the two camps, for he 
shared the ideals of the conservatives but foresaw that their methods 
could only bring disaster to his people. Soga's contention that 
Sarhili entirely washed his hands of the war cannot be sustained, but 
it must be pointed out that Sarhili made his opposition to th~ war 
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quite clear and only finally bowed to the majority opinion of the 
chiefdom after he had postponed the war once at the news of Maphasa's 
intended defectio~and when the war was virtually inevitable. 
The Mfengu must accept some of the blame for the war. They 
shamelessly used the support of their white allies to provoke the 
Gcaleka and One cannot escape the conclusion that, many, at a time 
of overcrowding, looked forward to a war in the expectation of 
the same sort of rewards that they had received for participation in 
previous frontier wars. At the same time, it should be noted, 
as Moyer has pointed out for an earlier period, that they fought 
for substantially the same reasons as the whites. 
While frontier opinion, in a frenzy of panic, was all 
for firm meaSures with Sarhili, and while men like James Ayliff 
and Bowker saw the Gcaleka incursions into Fingoland as an opportunity 
to expand colonial rule over Gcalekaland, leading officials, according 
to their lights, did much to prevent a war. Frere's role in this 
respect is particularly striking. But a resolution of the Unmediate 
crisis would have left the more general one unsolved and Frere, who 
began after some months to see the contribution the war could make 
to his Federation plans, did foresee the necessity for eventually 
coming to grips with Sarhili and the Gcaleka. 
Many Gcaleka, remembering the 1872 war, did not really 
believe that the whites would interfere if they launched an attack 
on the Mfengu. When they were disabused of this illusion, they 
launched a close-formation, head-on attack on Ibeka. They did this 
because they were over-confident and trusted to the advice of their 
diviners and prophetesses that such atypical tactics would enable 
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them to sweep aside this impediment to their goal. Poorly armed 
and unable to employ those arms they had effectively, they fell 
victim to the combination of the superior fire-power of the carefully 
deployed whites and the skirmishing skills of their Mfengu allies. 
After the battle of Ibeka, the war waS characterised by 
Gcaleka resistance to the invasion and occupation of their land by 
the enemy allies. The Gcaleka made a strategic retreat taking, in 
the traditional fashion, their women and children to safety before 
returning to prevent the white settlement of Gcalekaland and the 
relocation of Maphasa. Very few, except some members of the peace 
party, like Bhotomane and Maki, responded to the whites' amnesty. 
Sarhili made a forlorn attempt to negotiate on the basis of a return 
to the status quo ante-bellum, but the young firebrand Khiva and his 
like were for a continuation of the struggle, and so Sarhili sent 
him on a mission to obtain the aid of the Rharhabe. 
Ngqika opinion was more completely split than ever before. 
A prominent group of Ngqika councillors and chiefs lead by Tyala 
counselled against war, but Sandile, who in the previous ten years 
had recovered much of his power, felt compelled to support the 
Paramountcy in its struggle, as well as desiring to throw off white 
rule altogether. The resilience of traditional Xhosa society and 
its institutions and Sandile's determined espousal of them is 
illustrated by this decision. The success of the colonial divide 
and rule strategy and the numerous other factors that determined the 
black responses are illustrated in the response of 
and Transkeian chiefdoms to the war. 
other Ciskeian 
The late response of Seyolo, Jaliand Delima and of portions 
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of Kama a~d Toyise's people to Sandile'a call for aid, waS clearly a 
measure of the desperation of the colonial blacks, for by then the 
military superiority of the whites and their allies was plainly 
to be seen. It is clear that economic adversity, provocation by the 
colonists and Mfengu, the suffering of blood relatives and, above all, 
a dislike of colonial rule, were more than the blacks could bear, 
unless there was some exceptional restraining influence. In Tini 
Maqomo and Gungubele's case, the response of the whites to the two 
chiefs' discontent and the unrest amongst their ,followers drove them 
both into open rebellion. In Tini's case, the whites explicitly 
aimed to deprive him of his land, while in Gungubele's case this 
was implicit. In the case of!Oba, the whites obviously sought to 
do the same thing but the foresight of Nightingale and the presence 
of Theal was perhaps the deciding factor in dela~ing and limit Lng 
the response of Oba's peopl,e, to Sandile's call. Thus the excuse for 
a colonial campaign was not forthcoming, though Oba lost most of 
his land nevertheless. Likewise, the Re~ Nauhaus had a strong 
influence on Siwani and encouraged him to collaborate with the 
whites. The death of Toyise, Kama's Christianity and Anta's old 
age were factors limiting the response of their followers. Whilst 
most of the educated elite had adopted certain aspects of Western 
culture, they too felt the plight of their people keenly, and those 
like Dukwana articulated wheir motive for joining the rebels not 
as a rejection of Christianity, but as an espousal of Xhosa 
nationalism in the face of white pressures. 
Of the Transkeian chiefdoms, the response of the Thernbu 
waS most crucial to the outcome of the war. Both the Thernbu 
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and Emigrant Thembu had manifested their discontent with colonial rule 
in 1876, but the restoration of Ngangelizwe to the Paramountcy removed 
their mo&t tangible grievance and so temporarily defused their discontent. 
Ngangelizwe was now not only indebted in the past to the whites for 
protection from the Gcaleka, the MPondo and the MPondomise, but also 
in the present for the enjoyment of his position and he sought to 
retain official favour by demonstrating undivided loyalty to the Colony. 
Hence he responded to Elliotts call to bring out the Thembu. 
Despite the fragmented nature of the Thembu Paramountcy, Ngangelizwets 
lead, plus the failure of the Gcaleka, and later the Ngqika, to meet 
with any success, ensured that the rest of the Thembu and Emigrant 
Thembu, save Sitokhwe Tyhali, either actively collaborated with the 
whites or remained neutral. British rule was not as yet long established, 
far-flung or intolerable enough to forge a common ,black identity overriding 
sectional differences and the obvious military superiority of the 
whites and their allies. 
responding to the war. 
Self-interest was the main guideline in 
If this was true of the Thembu, it was even more true of the 
rest of the Transkei. There was gre,at sympathy with Sarhili and the 
Gcaleka and they were given succour and refuge, especially by those 
who, like Moni and Gwadiso, had blood ties with them, but there was 
little incentive to join in a common struggle. Where individuals 
like Nqwiliso and Mhlontlo collaborated with the whites, it was in 
pursuance of self-interest, and even Nqwiliso did not bring himself 
to betray Sarhili. Geographical distance made any effective 
combination of the Basotho and Zulu with the Gcaleka and Rharhabe little 
less than an- impossibility, and the Basotho were not yet disenchanted 
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enough with colonial rule to resort to a strategy of simultaneous 
revolt. 
That there was little effective co-ordination between those 
who did fight may be explained partly by the division not only between 
chiefdoms but between progressives and conservatives within individual 
chiefdoms, and partly by the fact that many blacks who went into open 
rebellion only did so when provoked by colonial campaigns launched 
against them. 
The policy of the Sprigg Ministry was not a radical departure 
from the Molteno Ministry's policy, particularly from the policy that 
seemed to be developing during the war. Nevertheless, it was foolishly 
precipitate and arbitrary, and rapidly inflamed existing 
dissatisfaction with colonial drule untL the Transkeian Rebellion 
of 1880-1 and the Basutoland Gun War were precipitated. The Xhosa, 
, 
uprooted from most of their Ciskeian lands and relocated in only 
a portion of Gcalekaland, were left as a totally crushed people by the 
War of Ngcayecibi. The hundred years armed struggle against white 
expansion and white rule came to an end for them in 1878. 
A final word of conclusion • 
• 
Writing in Grahamstown on the War 
of Ngcayecibi in its centenary year was in many respects to experience 
the sensation of deja VUe There has been no fundamental change in 
racial attitudes "on the frontier" and there are striking parallels 
between the Cape Governmental policie~ and the arguments advanced for 
them, adopted in the settlement after the war (which, as we have seen, 
were really only an extension of those in operation before the war) 
and the policies of the present South African Government. 
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APPENDIX I. 
REPORT ON FIELDWORK. 
Any kind of thorough attempt to gather oral tradition from 
the des'cend~nts of the many chiefdoms involved in the war would have 
required far mo~time and greater resources than I had at my disposal. 
I therefore aimed only to take a quick sampling of oral tradition 
from amongst the Gcaleka and Ngqika peoples of the Willowvale and Kentani 
districts of Transkei. Even such a limited assignment ought properly 
to be stretched over several weeks, if not months, to allow time 
for. the fieldworker to observe the customary traditional forms of 
social intercourse and to thereby establish himself amongst the 
people with whom he is working. The assistance of Jeffrey Peires, 
who suggested the names of several informants he had found 
knowledgeable on earlier Xhosa history, and the invaluable aid 
and guidance rendered by my interpreter, Alcott Blaauw, who botp 
knew and was known by many of the poeple I wished to interview, 
smoothed my way considerably and enabled me to achieve a fair amount 
in two weeks of concentrated interviewing, despite my inability to 
speak or write Xhosa. 
All interviews were tape-recorded. Informants seemed to 
show no aversion to this practice, possibly because many of them 
had been interviewed in this way before. Mr Blaauw gave a running 
translation during the interview and this was checked and corrected 
when the tapes were transcribed. The names of the most useful 
informants are given below. From the brevity of the list, it may 
be inferred that most informants actually contacted had little to 
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offer, and that the setting up of interviews with potential informants 
is a process requiring much time and patience. 
WILLOVALE DISTRICT. 
The most useful interview of the whole trip was conducted 
with Mr Nonho Cyril Melane of Qwaninga Location, Willowvale District. 
Mr Melane, whose father was a young man in Sarhili's bodyguard at the 
time of the War of Ngcayecibi, was able to recite not ,only a detailed 
account of the origins of the war, the bare outlines of which most 
informed Xhosa know, but also, uniquely, a detailed and illuminating 
account of the progress of the war from the Xhosa side. Although 
literate, Mr Melane has channelled his interst in history into 
transmitting exactly the stories passed down to him by his father and 
others, and both Moyer and Peires have found him extremely useful. 
Mr Makasi, the Willowvale Inspector of Education, referred 
me to Mr Mda-Mda of Nyokana Store, Nyokana Location, Willowvale District. 
Mr Mda-Mda, like Mr Melane, displayed a special interest in the history 
of his people. Previously having practised as an attorney, Mr Mda-Mda 
has read all the available accounts of Xhosa history. But he has 
also assimilated tradition through sources such as the late Chief 
England Bhotomane, whom."he knew well', and Chief S.M. Burns-Ncamashe. 
The interview was therefore 'of special interest and produced' several 
important points. 
KENTANI DISTRICT. 
A Mr Jonas of Engcobcobo, who was known to Mr Blaauw, set up 
an interview with Sub-Headman Z. Fihla. of Thuthura Location No.4, 
Kentani District. Sub-Headman Fihla, a Tsonyana and direct descendant 
of the .Fihla involved in the beer-drink at Ngcayecibi's Kraal, had a 
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useful knowledge of local history. The Reverend Hugh Mason Nikani 
of Kentani, who was referred to me by Peires, was most willing to 
help but unfortunately those people he suggested I interview were 
either away or knew little of the period. 
BUTTERWORTH. 
Mr Cordwell Manona, headmaster of the Lamplough High 
School, directed us to Mr Thomas Bikitsha of·Zozulw.<;U'la LocatioJl~ 
Butterworth. Mr Bikitsha, born in 1~90, is the grandson in the 
right hand house of Veldtman Bikitsha, the renowned Mfengu leader,. 
and speaks good English. Ndawongqola Qege, ritual head of the 
-Qawuka, had temporarily left Shixini Location, .vl~llowvale District, 
where he resides, and was working in Butterworth when we interviewed 
him at the Butterworth Hostels. 
RHODES UNIVERSITY. 
Chief S.M. Burns-Ncamashe was attached to the Institute 
of Social and Economic Research in 1977 and I was therefore able to 
interview one of the greatest living authorities on Xhosa history 
whilst he was there. Chief Burns-Ncamashe, Chief of the Gwali, 
praise-singer to the late Paramount Archibald Velile Sandile and a 
former Minister of Education of the Ciskei, cleared up several 
important points for me. 
If I might generalise on such limited experience, the sad 
truth is that there is a disturbing and constant "wastage" of good 
informants through old age, while seemingly,oral tradition is no 
• 
longer actively passed on. For example, two of the informants 
Peires had suggested might be most useful to me 
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Chief England Bhotomane, the son of Sarhili's councillor Bhotomane, 
universally considered as the greatest traditional authority, had 
passed away, whilst the powers of James Kepe, a Tsonyana councillor 
of Thuthura Location, Kentani District, had failed in the short space 
of time between Peires' fieldwork in 1975 and mine in 1977. 
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